

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW



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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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THE MEDITERRANEAN CRISIS

By John C. Campbell

FROM history, climate, the cultivation of the olive and other aspects of a common civilization, the Mediterranean region has a certain unity. One can see it on the map. Yet it is too much a part of Europe, too much a part of the larger strategic concerns of non-Mediterranean powers, too diverse in the nations which encircle its waters, to constitute a subject of specifically regional politics, economics or security. A Tunisian foreign minister may call plaintively for a Mediterranean freed from the presence of superpower navies. A Soviet leader may float a suggestion for its denuclearization. A Yugoslav may propose a system of Mediterranean security to complete the work of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. A president of France may speak of a community stemming from his nation's historic and cultural ties with nations on both sides of the inland sea. Such proposals have had an occasional echo. But the Mediterranean area is not ready for a big international conference on security, for a negotiated set of principles of coexistence, or for the withdrawal of American and Soviet naval forces. Everyone sees a crisis there, but none agree on its description and no regional solution, no regional procedure for getting a solution, is at hand.

The Mediterranean today is the scene of serious local conflicts, of which those over Cyprus and over Palestine are the most intractable and the most dangerous. At the same time it has experienced the devastating results, both in international tension and internal instability, of the events which began with the 1973 October War and continued with the effects of the high price of energy. Add to this the continuing competition between the United States and Russia, the erosion of alliances and shifts in alignment, and the uncertainty on all sides as to how far détente will be applied, if at all, in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. One consequence of the oil crisis was to expose the weakness of the belt of southern European states from Portugal through Spain, Italy, and Yugoslavia to Greece and Turkey. Suffer-

ing the same financial drain for oil imports as the rest of Europe, they had less capacity for compensating through trade and investment.

The following simple description of the state of affairs in the spring of 1975, one sentence per country, gives a rough idea of the piling up of troubles. Portugal, in the hands of a radical group of military officers working closely with the Communist Party, is moving toward positions increasingly hostile to constitutional democracy and to co-operation with fellow members of NATO. Spain, coming to the end of the Franco era, is already witnessing the struggle for the succession. Italy is racked by civil violence as the Christian Democratic Party, after 30 years in power, seems less and less able to master the situation and to deny the demand of a powerful Communist Party for a share in the responsibility of government. Yugoslavia, its leadership trying to find an institutional base to preserve both party authority and national unity, cannot be sure of making the transition to the post-Tito era without internal strife and outside pressure. The Greeks, having replaced a dictatorship with a democratic regime, are unable to turn fully to reconstruction of their own society as long as the Turks insist on subjecting them and their compatriots in Cyprus to continuing humiliation. Finally Turkey, though riding the crest in Cyprus, can produce at home neither a stable government based on the last election nor an agreement to hold a new one.

In no one of these countries is there much sign of faith in NATO or in American leadership. Many seem to be blaming the United States for all that has gone wrong.

II

Over the past 20 years at least, American policy for the Mediterranean has been based on some fairly straightforward propositions. The first was to maintain naval superiority. The second was to strengthen NATO, so that any challenge from the Soviet Union, military or political, could be countered. A third was to support those allies which were in the most exposed position, such as Greece and Turkey, to resist Soviet pressures and aggression. A fourth was to encourage Yugoslavia's independent stand, and thus block the Soviet Union from the Adriatic. A fifth was to contain and reduce the gains made by the Soviet Union in its relations with Arab states on the Mediterranean's eastern and southern shores. And a sixth was to protect and strengthen Israel, primarily to help it maintain its existence but also, in the absence of an Arab-Israeli settlement, to enable it to play a part in the regional balance countering the Soviet position in certain Arab states.

In pursuing all these aims the United States developed the habit of

talking about Western solidarity but in fact taking the lead and acting alone. This seemed a natural result of its central place in NATO, of the primacy of American naval power in the Mediterranean, of the special relations with Greece and Turkey, of the interests and obligations which the United States acquired in the Arab world as British and French influence declined, and especially of the commitment to Israel. Hence the easy assumption of the task of "managing" the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973 and its aftermath, the preference for the step-by-step approach over the Geneva route as the way to Arab-Israeli settlement, and the annoyance with European efforts for a dialogue with the Arabs. Hence, too, the conviction that only the United States could usefully mediate between Greece and Turkey on the vexed question of Cyprus.

One has only to compare the list of today's problems with the axioms of the American approach to realize how far conditions have outrun policy. The Sixth Fleet is intended to help deter Soviet aggression and defend Greece and Turkey if deterrence fails, but Greeks and Turks are far less concerned with hypothetical Soviet aggression than with their quarrel with each other, and both see the Sixth Fleet as a symbol of a power which failed an ally at a critical moment. It does no good to invoke NATO as background for American diplomacy, since in Greek and Turkish eyes NATO evokes no higher loyalty and has been, for all practical purposes, the United States. For Arabs and Israelis, moreover, NATO was and is irrelevant.

The task of trying to mediate deeply rooted opposing positions has become impossible to carry out. These local conflicts are too stubborn even for virtuoso diplomacy. And when the miracles run short, failure is foreordained. American diplomacy has not been able to sustain the momentum of Arab-Israeli negotiation and agreement. It could hardly have done worse in Greece, where the triumphant return to democracy left America scorned and discredited, or in Turkey, where the embargo on further arms shipments was taken as an unpardonable insult. And there has been little American impact in Portugal, where extreme left-wing elements have apparently settled into power despite the clear results of the election of April 25.

From a wide variety of political circumstances, governments at both ends of the Mediterranean are now questioning the American bases in their countries: Greece, because American policy favored Turkey; Turkey, because the American Congress favored Greece; Portugal, because she has repudiated the record of the former regime and is edging away from its international connections; Spain, because the American bases there are resold by the Franco regime at each renewal

period and the time for negotiation is again at hand—and it can be assumed that a more democratic government after Franco would modify the agreements or drop them altogether. Even in Italy there has been strong popular protest against the possible transfer there of U.S. bases no longer acceptable to Greece.

These developments do not mean that America's allies are intent on driving the Sixth Fleet out of the Mediterranean. But they are symptomatic of a malaise that finds the U.S. military presence a natural target for the pent-up resentment of those angry over American support of former regimes or of rival states, over slights to their national pride, suspicion of CIA activity, or just things in general—to say nothing of extremists of the Right or the Left who have been waiting for years for just such an opportunity. There are not many other targets around. Britain is reducing its naval strength in the Mediterranean close to zero. France has moved ships there from the Atlantic but remains outside the NATO military structure and has been carefully cultivating Mediterranean nations, divorcing her own interests from those of the United States. All of the allies, moreover, suspect Washington of wanting to use their territories and their bases for the prime purpose of being able to supply Israel with weapons in the event of another round of war in the Middle East, a purpose which they feel has nothing to do with NATO and which they are not prepared to support.

It is possible that as base negotiations proceed the demands of “Yankee, go home!” will not be as loud and insistent as they now are in statements made for public consumption. Moreover, the United States might be able to compensate for the loss of some bases without irremediable damage to its military capabilities. But that is not the main point. In challenging these symbols, the most easily visible signs of America's influence, the Mediterranean countries were challenging policies which they found no longer compatible with their own interests. Somehow, nobody seemed to be interested in the common defense.

This sad state of affairs did not appear full-blown in the spring of 1975. The Portuguese revolution had begun to lose its democratic luster by the fall of 1974. And soon after the Cyprus crisis broke last July, it was clear that the United States could not control it, and that in the absence of a solution it would be blamed by both sides. Similarly, the leading role which Henry Kissinger took upon himself in mediating the Arab-Israeli conflict, while winning applause as long as it succeeded, was sure, if it failed, to shake America's newly won position in the Arab world and give the Soviets an unearned bonus.

What looked like failure—the suspension of shuttle diplomacy be-

tween Egypt and Israel—then happened at a time when the pro-American governments in South Vietnam and Cambodia were entering the final stages of collapse; when the disputes between the President and the U.S. Congress over the conduct of foreign policy were advertising American weakness to the world and, in relation to the Cyprus question, were depriving American diplomacy of necessary flexibility; when the oil producers organized in OPEC had demonstrated their strength in maintaining high oil prices and their unwillingness to discuss cooperation, except on their own terms, at a conference with consumers; and when the advanced industrial nations of the world were suffering from the worst economic depression since the Second World War. America was questioning and doubting herself. It is no wonder that small Mediterranean countries, many of them long accustomed to look to America for security and support and all of them respectful of her power, are also having doubts about her wisdom and will.

It is not the purpose here to prescribe a set of policies either for the general Mediterranean crisis or for the specific situations which have turned sour. But a few observations which may be relevant for future policy are in order. The first is that, despite all the turmoil and the obvious situations of weakness, the Soviet Union has not yet “moved in”—but may do so if the present drift continues. A second observation is that the problems are basically political and cannot be solved by military strategies or deployments, although military facts are not irrelevant. A third is that the United States has overextended itself in the Mediterranean, politically and diplomatically, and should look especially to (1) a greater role for Europe, and (2) some understandings with the Soviet Union both on specific questions and on the general ground rules of Soviet-American competition.

III

In this context let us look at three situations: the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Cyprus question and relations with Greece and Turkey, and political developments in the states of Europe's southern tier.

The situation at the end of the October War was favorable for an American effort to get negotiations started between Israel and its Arab adversaries, and Secretary Kissinger made the most of it in promoting the interim agreements reached in 1974. But these successes, in which the Soviet Union and the Europeans had no part, created an illusion that the United States alone could somehow bring the parties to an overall political settlement, although the two sides' conflicting conceptions of their inalienable rights and vital interests, which had

blocked peace for the past 25 years, remained all but impervious to argument. Moreover, the differences which existed on the Arab side, especially those surrounding the Palestinians, were almost certain to carry the process beyond the ability of American diplomacy to control; and other outside powers, principally the Soviet Union, could find innumerable opportunities to play a spoiling role.

There is another factor peculiar to the United States, and that is its special commitment to and relationship with Israel. This has been an advantage in that only the United States could offer the Arabs the hope of significant concessions from Israel. But whether it could or would effectively bring Israel to make such concessions is as real a question as whether it could get for Israel anything substantial from the Arabs with the Soviets supporting their maximum demands. As protector, patron, partner, and sole supplier of essential arms, the United States has had to be constantly alert to keeping Israel in a position to fight, whether events turned toward peace or toward war. Washington has had to pay attention to Israel's views regarding its own security requirements; it cannot be second-guessing at every step. Strong congressional sentiment for Israel has been an added factor.

To state these facts is not to discount any reassessment of policy undertaken in Washington after the (perhaps temporary) failure of step-by-step diplomacy in the spring of 1975, or to ignore the importance attached to America's renewed but still fragile relations with Arab countries. The fundamental question is whether an administration, President Ford's any more than those of his predecessors, can maintain over the long and complex process of negotiation an effective mediating capacity with both parties against the background of the historic relationship with Israel. It is not just a matter of whether pressure could be exerted on Israel and what guarantees could be substituted for the loss of strategic territory. Managing the Arab side of the process could be even more difficult, for in the absence of a steady progress toward settlement the reasonable would tend to give way to the unreasonable in Arab leadership and Arab politics. To play the game successfully would require moving the parties to an agreement along the lines of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 (including the return of all or virtually all of the territories occupied in 1967), plus creating a Palestinian state on the West Bank.¹ This would be difficult enough in itself, but the time element would be crucial. There

¹ On this point of the American approach to the terms of a settlement, see the following articles in *Foreign Affairs*: John C. Campbell, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict: An American Policy" (October 1970); Richard Ullman, "After Rabat: Middle East Risks and American Roles" (January 1975); Stanley Hoffmann, "A New Policy for Israel" (April 1975).

would be a danger of a new war at any point along the way, a contingency against which the United States would have to be planning simultaneously on two fronts—how to resupply and perhaps defend Israel and how to weather Arab anger and renewed resort to the “oil weapon.” With this prospect, it is no confession of inadequacy to conclude that the task of single-handedly and even-handedly promoting an Arab-Israeli settlement is beyond the capacity of the United States.

No other power could do as well, for the United States is uniquely placed, but Europe could play a key supporting role and has been playing virtually no role at all. The limiting factors are obvious enough: the European countries are not significant in the balance of power in the area; they are not the major arms suppliers; they could not do much to control a new war. In November 1973 the nine states of the European Community were so fearful of the loss of oil supplies that they issued a statement leaning further to the Arab side than ever before. Israel did not like it and was simply confirmed in its conviction that Europe had no role and should have none. The United States did not disagree.

The situation is now different. Europe and America have learned some lessons from the experience of 1973. Under the impact of the general oil crisis the consuming nations have come together in co-operation to meet any new emergency and to work out a long-term energy strategy. All are aware of the connection between the oil problem and the Arab-Israeli problem, not in the sense that the first dictates a pro-Arab attitude on the second, but in that failure to get a durable solution of the second will inevitably aggravate the adverse consequences of the first. The principal West European states, moreover, have made it absolutely clear since their statement of November 1973 that they support Israel's right to live in security. Alongside its economic relations with the Arabs, which are increasingly important to both sides, the European Community has economic ties also with Israel, made manifest in a recently signed comprehensive agreement. It is wrong to think that the only role Europe would play in the negotiating process would be one of complaisance to Arab demands inimical to the security of Israel.

The European nations, like the United States and the entire world community, have an interest in an Arab-Israeli settlement for reasons of world peace, an even more important consideration than Arab oil. They can represent that interest, parallel with and in support of American efforts, in helping to move the parties toward agreement. They could have a role in upholding a settlement after it was reached.

True, the European Community, despite the progress made through

the Davignon Committee, has not reached the point where it can speak with one voice on this issue or name a single envoy as negotiator or mediator on Europe's behalf. But its individual members can make their voices heard in ways that would reflect general community views. If Britain and France were invited to take part in the Geneva conference, they could speak for Europe, symbolically and in fact if not formally, as well as for themselves.

Should this prospect trouble the United States? Would it interfere with the delicate balances Mr. Kissinger has wrought in relations with Israel and with Egypt? Hardly, after the failure of the most recent phase of step-by-step tactics. The time has come for the United States to seek company in the quest for peace and to fend off the prospect of a new rift with Europe when the next Middle East crisis breaks. American and European ideas on the main lines of a fair settlement are not far apart. If they cannot work toward it, both may be driven into rigid positions helpful neither to common Western interests nor to peace in the Middle East.

IV

The Cyprus question reveals a similar pattern, although there the United States has not been directly involved in negotiations between the two Cypriot communities and has made little or no progress toward a procedure of third-party mediation or direct talks between Greece and Turkey. As the major ally and arms supplier of both Greece and Turkey, Washington might be expected to have powers of persuasion and indeed has been ready at all times to proffer good offices. Unfortunately, the military events of 1974 in Cyprus, unlike the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, did not improve the prospect for negotiations and settlement, for they left one party, Turkey, in possession of the field; another, Greece, humiliated and bitter; and the third party, the Republic of Cyprus, partitioned and impotent.

The inability of the United States to be effective in the situation had other reasons as well. American officials had known of the Greek junta's plan to overthrow Makarios but did not convey an effective warning to Athens to block it. And after the coup Washington remained passive to the point of seeming to accept the unspeakable Nikos Sampson, at a time when Turkey's intervention might still have been forestalled. By the time the Turkish army moved forward again in Cyprus, in the next month, the American pattern of inaction had been well established. In the end, the Americans were blamed by Greece for partiality to Turkey, and then, because of the suspension of military aid, blamed by Turkey for partiality to Greece.

Yet the inability of Washington to “manage” the Cyprus crisis of 1974, as it had the prior crisis of 1967 when the last-minute mission of Cyrus Vance kept both sides from military action, was not due mainly to a tragedy of errors or to historical accident. It was due, above all, to changes in the outlook and priorities of the parties themselves.

Until the mid-1960s the guideline of Greek and of Turkish foreign policy was NATO solidarity, and for all practical purposes that meant following the leadership of the United States. But with *détente* in Soviet-American relations came *détente* and the erosion of alliances and great-power authority in the eastern Mediterranean. The fact that Greece and Turkey have come to place their own conflict ahead of the Soviet threat in the forefront of their concern, and to judge NATO accordingly, reveals a drastic change. The United States, basing its policies toward both allies on the need to preserve NATO’s military posture and valuable bases, ends up by losing political capital and military positions as well. The effects on the Western defense posture are apparent. Greece leaves a gap by withdrawing from the military structure of NATO and begins a renegotiation of base agreements. Turkey says it will fill the gap, but for obvious geographical reasons cannot do so; meanwhile its military strength for defense against Russia is diminished by the congressional cut-off of American aid, which it regards as unwarranted pressure and therefore a good reason for *not* making concessions on Cyprus. Secretary Kissinger deplores the congressional self-assertion which has hamstrung his diplomacy. But the real responsibility lies with Greek and Turkish nationalism and with East-West *détente*.

If American diplomacy and the NATO mystique are ineffective, what about the nations of Western Europe? They too, of course, are partners in NATO, but their relations with Greece and Turkey are not seen on either side primarily in that context. The salient factors are economic and political. The economic relationships the Common Market has developed with Greece and Turkey—both now associate members moving slowly toward full membership—have a significance beyond fresh fruit or chrome ore or credits. The European connection has meaning for Greece for reasons of history and political culture, and especially because of the way the Council of Europe and the EEC, having taken a stand against the colonels’ regime and “frozen” relations with Greece, gave a warm welcome to the restoration of democracy and to the government of Constantine Caramanlis. For Turkey, facing west was an essential part of the Kemalist revolution, and so it remains despite the appearance of Islam-centered currents in latter-day Turkish politics. And like Greece, Turkey seeks to match a

lessened dependence on America with greater flexibility in foreign policy and stronger relationships with others—the Arab world, even the communist world, but above all, Europe.

As in the Arab-Israeli case, the outlines of a possible and practical settlement are not difficult to discern. Union of Cyprus with Greece and partition between Greece and Turkey are ruled out. All agree that Cyprus should remain an independent federated state with largely self-governing Greek and Turkish zones. All but the Turks agree that the Turkish zone or zones should take up substantially less of the island than the large area (roughly 40 percent) which has been occupied by Turkish troops and declared an autonomous state, and here there is room for compromise. The constitutional issues are complex, and years of negotiation between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities have not solved them. It could take many more years unless there is sufficient initiative from those who hold the reins in Athens and in Ankara, especially the latter. Perhaps nothing will be possible until Turkey has a general election and a strong leader with a solid parliamentary position and the necessary freedom to negotiate—Bulent Ecevit, the man who won popularity by the decision for military action in July 1974 and now finds himself out of power, may be the only one who could fill the bill.

In any event, the Western world is in for a difficult and dangerous time as long as Greece and Turkey remain close to the brink of war—not only over Cyprus but over other contentions such as territorial limits and oil-drilling rights in the Aegean. Their destinies, like their territories and populations, are so interlocked that the two peoples are condemned either to cooperation or to war. To tip the balance toward cooperation may call for the statesmanship of an Atatürk and a Venizelos, which served so well for a generation, but it may also require, especially in this uncertain time, outside help and counsel which Europe is better placed than the United States to provide.

One European state could perhaps make a more concrete contribution at an appropriate time. Great Britain, which has a legal position in the Cyprus question as a party to the agreements establishing the island's independence in 1960, also possesses two base areas on the southern coast. Those bases no longer serve any British strategic purpose. They could not be turned over to NATO without raising too many problems. But since Turkey's interest in Cyprus is in large measure a concern for its own military security, one of those bases might be ceded to Turkey in return for a less greedy attitude on the size of the area to be assigned to the Turkish Cypriots in the new federated state.

V

Our third area of inquiry, the belt of states in southern Europe afflicted by economic weakness and political instability, differs in that the vital issues appear in the guise of internal affairs rather than of international conflict. But the effects of what is happening could be of the greatest moment for the international balance. Where is Portugal's revolution in progress heading? And will Spain's revolution to come take a similar course? Will Italy, her political leadership stale after years in power and her social problems reaching the verge of class warfare, also turn to the left? Radical political change, as we have seen in the cases of Portugal and of Greece, may generate anti-American feeling, because of close American association with a former regime, and bring revision of arrangements for U.S. military bases. That is expected, and the chances are that we can adjust to it. A much more important question for Western security is the entry of communist parties into government: whether the Soviet Union, through them, will be sitting in the councils of NATO; or whether, in pushing for nonalignment, they will prepare the way for emasculation of Western defense in the Mediterranean and in all of Europe.

The keys to power in Portugal appear to be held by radical officers of the Armed Forces Movement (MFA), men who helped make the revolution of April 1974 and speak in its name. Together with the Communist Party, whose members hold a number of important ministries, they have pushed ahead in the field of social reform, where changes were inevitable and long overdue. But these two groups have also worked together to gather into their hands the levers of economic power and political action, such as control of the trade unions, at the expense of the non-communist political parties. Potential opposition forces, from conservatives to socialists, have been subjected to pressure, intimidation, and "salami tactics" strikingly like those by which the communist parties of East Europe cemented themselves in power in the late 1940s. The democratic parties may be in a potentially stronger position after their popular victory in the election of April 1975, but though still in the government as of this writing, they have no real power, and they had agreed under duress, prior to the election, to the continuing ascendancy of the military.

The Communist Party of Portugal is a Moscow-line party. Its leader, Alvaro Cunhal, takes his proletarian internationalism undiluted from the Kremlin. Much will depend, therefore, on how the Soviet Union chooses to use the Portuguese Communists, as well as on whether the latter gain or lose in the internal political struggle in

Portugal. The recent elections exposed the relative weakness of the Communists in public support and also had a deflationary effect on the prestige of the military leaders, whose call for the casting of blank ballots evoked only a feeble response. As of late May it remains an open question whether the leadership of the MFA will move back toward the center, conciliating the moderate officers in their own ranks and reaching out to cooperate with the democratic parties, or whether they will push on toward a totalitarian dictatorship with the help of the Communists or by dispensing with all parties. It should not be assumed that the military would allow the Communists to become a dominant or even an equal partner or would allow Portugal's foreign policy to be made in Moscow. But the possibilities are disturbing enough even if the worst does not happen.

Admittedly, what America and Europe can do about Portugal is limited. Force is ruled out. They have no "Brezhnev Doctrine." There are those in Washington who regret that the covert arm of foreign policy has been crippled by public exposure and tied by new rules and regulations; but that is misplaced nostalgia. The problem is not one for spectacular coups nor even primarily for conventional diplomacy. It is one of attitudes and influence. To have influence, outsiders must first of all have channels of communication to the government, the political parties, and the people of Portugal. They should not rebuff the government because it contains communists. They should not prejudge the domestic issues under debate or challenge measures of social reform. But they quite properly could and should strengthen economic ties, provide financial aid, and treat Portugal with the friendly respect due a country which has rid itself of a repressive regime and has rapidly liquidated a colonial empire. To reduce contact or cut off trade, as the United States did with Castro's Cuba, is to invite the same result, a rapid turn to Moscow.

In these respects Western Europe is better situated than the United States, which cannot shed its status of superpower, its concern with bases in the Azores (which are needed above all for Atlantic naval operations, rather than for the much-discussed supply line to Israel), and perhaps not even its ideological fixations about communism. Democratic European countries have a spectrum of political parties which are counterparts of those which have come onto the political scene in Portugal. Mário Soares and the Socialists, whose reward for winning a popular vote of confidence has been subjection to increased pressure, need the moral and financial support of the powerful socialist parties of Europe. The more Europe can develop constructive policies, finding the middle way between neglect and open pressure,

the better will be the chances for democratic forces and institutions to survive.

Of course, saying there is an important role for the Europeans to play does not mean they will play it. They reacted very slowly to the Portuguese revolution and to the new regime, watching the steady shifts to the left in Lisbon in fascinated inaction. Soares, visiting Brussels as Foreign Minister in 1974, could not make the EEC bureaucracy aware of what the real problems were, and the governments could not agree on economic action which might have increased their leverage. But opportunities have not yet disappeared. It is most important, as the EEC countries finally seem to be realizing, to show the MFA leaders that the European doors are open.

For the moment Portugal remains in NATO, and the other members must endeavor to keep her there, making whatever practical adjustments may be necessary regarding such matters as intelligence and nuclear planning. Should the Lisbon government emulate those of Greece and France in withdrawing from the military structure (but not the alliance itself), it would be no serious handicap to Western defense. A Portuguese choice of nonalignment, however, with its effects on Western strategic positions and possible influence as an example to others, would be a very damaging blow indeed. And a decision to join the Soviet bloc, challenging the balance in Europe, would be a disaster. Such possibilities raise the question of preventive diplomacy, directed not to Lisbon but to Moscow; let us return later to this theme.

Portugal's neighbor, Spain, may present the West with another "communist problem" which deserves some thinking about in advance. Spain also is at the end of an era: there does not seem to be much chance that the Franco regime can long survive Franco. Indeed, the outlines of a successor regime, in the form of a coalition of political forces, are taking shape while he is still there. The coalition notably includes a well-organized Communist Party hardened by years of repression and resourceful opposition to dictatorship, a test which communists seem to meet more successfully than liberal democratic parties.

Europe and the United States, if they are to deal with Spain at all, will presumably have to adjust to the presence of communists near the center of power—although events there will not necessarily follow the path of Portugal, where the critical factor was the Communists' alliance with a military faction radicalized by the experience of the African war. The main international significance of the end of the dictatorship, whether it comes by evolution or by revolution, will be the return of Spain to easier and more friendly relations with the

democratic countries of Western Europe. A European attitude of cordial welcome, such as was shown to Greece after the fall of the Athens junta, could simultaneously strengthen both the non-communist forces in Spain and the degree of European influence there. It should also give time to judge where the relatively untried Spanish Communists stand and what they will do.

To accept a communist role in Spain so calmly, even initially, may seem an exercise in naiveté; the point is that the differences among communist parties have become too striking to discount. The Communist Party of Spain is committed to broad coalition politics and to a West European model of socialism. It is unlike its counterpart in Portugal in that its leader, Santiago Carrillo, has opposed the Soviet Union on many issues, including that of Czechoslovakia. He successfully resisted Soviet efforts to create a new group with docile leadership to replace him and his party in the international communist movement. He has established close relations with the Italian, Yugoslav, and Romanian leaders in the common cause of asserting each individual party's independence of decision. Thus, a new degree of cleavage between orthodox and independent parties has become evident lately, notably at preparatory meetings for the conference of the European communist parties scheduled for the summer of 1975.

The Italian Communist Party (PCI) is the largest and most prestigious of the communist parties of Western Europe. It carefully nurtures its image of moderation and independence of Soviet direction, and proclaims its acceptance of Italy's democratic institutions, participation in the European Community (PCI deputies now sit in the European Assembly), and alignment with NATO. This has been a long-range strategy aimed at a "historic compromise" with the Christian Democrats by which the Communists will enter the government. Whether they succeed will depend on economic conditions and the ability of the Christian Democrats not merely to keep together their succession of unstable coalitions with other parties, including the Socialists, but by discipline and constructive reforms to reverse the loss of authority and public confidence they have suffered in recent years.

That communist parties can be transformed by their local environment is more than a theoretical proposition. Yet the historical record is one of adaptation and tactical change rather than of democratic evolution. For all its declared moderation, the Italian Party is a tough and disciplined organization with a sophisticated and resourceful leadership well able to shift its tactics; its ultimate aim can hardly be other than to exercise full power. At the very least, its taking a share of governing authority in Rome would bring new elements of uncer-

tainty into the international order.

What happens in Portugal may affect what happens in Spain, or more significantly, in Italy or France, either to encourage an opening to the Communists, or by way of warning, to convince all other parties to bar the door to them. NATO and the European Community must at least contemplate the possibility of communists becoming the "sinews" of non-communist governments, as Henry Kissinger has warned, and to be prepared to cope with it. Dangerous as the prospect may be to Western security, an automatic reaction of exclusion and hostility could be self-defeating. Europe's freedom rests on the strength of her own institutions, both national and European. It is especially in the growing development of a more united Europe that the weight of her underlying democratic beliefs can be brought to bear on the role of a communist party in any individual country, to maximize the possibility that it will play according to the democratic rules and to minimize and contain the effects if it will not.

The worst may happen. If communists enter a government, they may set out to disrupt the European Community and to sabotage Western defense. They may outmaneuver their coalition partners and move from shared responsibility to effective control. They may, as good communists, give their highest loyalty to the Soviet Union and not to their own countries or to Europe. In the Iberian peninsula it would be a most serious challenge. And Italy's choice of a neutralist or pro-Soviet policy would destroy the balance in the Mediterranean and in Europe.

VI

Such "worst-case" speculations carry certain assumptions about détente and the whole complex of Soviet attitudes and policies toward the West. As the coming political crisis of southern Europe unfolds, and as the Western allies attempt to cope with it on the local and on the European level, the other arm of policy must be the direct approach to Moscow, and here the United States may hold the key.

For the past five years or so, in accordance with the line laid down at the 24th Congress of the Communist Party in 1971, the Soviet leadership has been following the policy of peaceful coexistence, or détente, in its relations with the West. Its lines are familiar: a reduction of tension and of the danger of war; a willingness to negotiate some limitations on the arms race; a strong desire for trade and credits in order to get Western goods and technology; and stabilization in Europe through general acceptance of the status quo. It has not included a comparable stabilization in the Mediterranean, the Balkans,

and the Middle East, where Soviet competition with the United States goes on increasing the dangers residing in the Arab-Israeli conflict, inter-Arab disputes, the Cyprus affair, and the uncertain future of a number of Mediterranean countries. The Soviets have also made it very clear that they do not believe in ideological coexistence. Détente is a means of carrying on the unceasing struggle with capitalism.

The Western nations have not been unduly alarmed about Soviet declarations of ideological faith as long as the practical policies were those of stabilization and trade. But the magnitude of the West's economic and social troubles in 1974 and 1975, with widespread concern in the West itself about economic collapse and political breakdown, inevitably turned the thoughts of Soviet observers to a possibility not in view when the policy of détente was adopted. Is this a major crisis of capitalism, perhaps the ultimate crisis which Marxist teaching had predicted? If so, is a policy of cooperation based on the assumption of continued Western strength and growth still valid? Or should a more positive effort be made to exploit new situations of weakness? Recent Soviet speeches and articles show that such questions are indeed being asked. Some statements with ideological authority behind them, directed mainly to members of the apparatus of the Soviet and other communist parties, ring with a new confidence and militancy.

For the Soviet leadership the real question is not whether but how to take advantage of the situation, and especially how to make gains in the Mediterranean and in Europe without losing the benefits achieved through détente or increasing the risks of war. The present line seems not to contemplate a switch to aggressive or revolutionary tactics but to continue the softening process of détente both with Western Europe and with the United States. A new hard line would tend to isolate the communists in the big European countries, where they have worked so hard for a common front with socialists and others. Still, the Soviets have given financial support to the Portuguese Communists, and they appear to be angling for naval facilities in Portugal. We must contemplate the possibility that they will do the same elsewhere, that they will take small bites here and there, weakening European resistance and Western defense.

It should therefore be the conscious policy of the United States, with the backing of its European allies, to undertake certain approaches to Moscow—to propose, to test, and to warn. Specifically, the crises in the Mediterranean offer possibilities for expanding the scope of détente, with benefits for both sides and increased chances for peace. They also call for the United States to make clear that moves to upset the existing balance can bring détente to an abrupt end and

greatly increase the chances for war.

First, the positive side. Whether the Middle East question is tackled bilaterally again or at Geneva, it is useful and perhaps essential to seek a prior understanding with the Soviet Union on the general nature of an Arab-Israeli settlement, the procedures for reaching it, and the means of enforcing it. The two powers got further into these questions in their exchanges in 1969 than they have since the onset of summit meetings and the spate of talk about *détente*. Their agreement on the proposition that the Middle East is the most dangerous place in the world is hardly the point to stop talking. We urgently need U.S.-Soviet agreement on measures to limit arms deliveries and to discourage provocative or violent moves by respective friends and allies, in order to prevent another round of war or stop it if it starts anyway. Such an agreement would take the two powers well beyond where they were before the October War.

The Soviet Union does not have the same claim to a role in the Cyprus affair or in Greek-Turkish relations, which ought to be settled within the Western community. But the fact is that the parties to the dispute and their Western friends have failed, and unless they succeed soon the Soviet Union, which has been vocal on the subject in the United Nations, is almost certain to get a foot in the door. Actually, since the U.S.S.R. has naval power in the Mediterranean and is in a position to put pressure on both parties, it would make sense for the United States to smoke out the Soviets to see if there is a chance of their supporting and not sabotaging a settlement. Like the Americans, they seem to be caught in the dilemma of trying to make hay with all parties and succeeding with none, but they can be counted on not to forget that the strategic prize is not Cyprus or Greece but Turkey.

Second, the preventive side: the need for clarity as to the limits of Soviet action. In the Middle East, the Soviet Union should be left in no doubt that access to oil is a vital Western interest and that the American commitment to Israel is firm. Israel's existence must not be put in jeopardy. In the eastern Mediterranean, at a time when the United States and NATO are sorting out their policies and positions and where Greece and Turkey are still at odds and assessing their joint and separate security needs, it may be useful for the United States to talk to the Soviets to clarify interests and identify points of danger. If Greece or Turkey chooses to eliminate U.S. bases or to move away from NATO toward a nonaligned position, it may be necessary for Washington to let the Soviets know that the United States has security interests of its own in the region and that there is no open invitation to the Soviet Union to move in and establish a

dominant position in the eastern Mediterranean. The basic motive which produced the Truman Doctrine of 1947, to uphold the independence of those two countries against Soviet pressure, remains.

The question of how to forestall Soviet pressure or manipulation in other Mediterranean states is difficult but not to be avoided. Presumably one deterrent to Soviet adventurism is the likelihood of a Western reaction which would put an end to *détente*. The Western nations, and particularly the United States, should not hesitate to tell the Soviets frankly that tampering with the Western alliance or certain countries outside it like Spain or Yugoslavia, and thus with the balance of power in Europe, would indeed have that result, blowing up the conference on European security and the structure and hopes it may have created. We should not raise this question in a way which assumes or concedes Soviet control of communist parties in cases where we should be doing everything possible to let those parties show their independence. But the Soviets can be told that what they do to pull strings and intervene in other countries will be watched and weighed. The main thing, of course, is not to play a game of threat and counter-threat but to get understandings for mutual restraint, and also to let the Kremlin know that all of *détente*—trade, technology, scientific exchange, stabilization in Europe, arms limitation, the whole range of bilateral and multilateral cooperation—is at stake.

VII

The Mediterranean Sea could turn red. Its nations could drift into disorder and chaos. These are not unthinkable possibilities after what has actually happened in the past few years. If such calamities come to pass, it will be through the inability of these peoples to find common interests above the din of their domestic and regional strife, rather than through what is decided by way of global strategy, or left undecided, in Moscow or Washington. But the fate of the Mediterranean deeply affects the fate of liberty in Europe, and it is on the governments and peoples of Europe that the greatest risks and responsibilities lie.

France, in the era of de Gaulle and Pompidou, was the only European nation to articulate a Mediterranean policy, compensating for her reduced world role by fostering the concept of a Mediterranean community with France as its natural leader. In practice there was more articulation than effective policy, for France, in the absence of support from the rest of Europe and in the context of opposition to America, did not have the weight to carry it through. Italy and Spain did not rally to French leadership, Greece and Turkey were skeptical,

Israel was hostile, and the Arab states maintained their reserve.

What France could not do alone the European nations might do together. The Mediterranean policy of the European Community, mainly economic but with political overtones, is thus far a very modest affair. It consists of a set of differing types of preferential agreements with a wide circle of Mediterranean countries, covering trade and various forms of economic cooperation, plus development aid to the Community's own needier members and associated states. On the purely political side it has produced only the occasional pronouncements on the Arab-Israeli question, inspired more by fear than by thoughts of leadership, memoranda from the Commission in Brussels, and periodic discussions among the foreign ministers.

Ironically, it is the opening to the Arab world—now tempered by a firm position on the survival of Israel—that offers the greatest opportunities. As de Gaulle saw, the Mediterranean is the meeting place of European and Arab cultures and of complementary economic interests. For years not only France but Italy, Spain, Yugoslavia, Turkey, and now Greece and Portugal have sought openings to the Arabs, and not just for oil; but the results brought no great benefit to those countries or to Europe as a whole. The possibilities before the European Community are much broader. Hence the importance of the European-Arab dialogue. It is quite true that Europe's dependence on Arab oil puts most of the bargaining power on the Arab side of the dialogue for the next few years. But the goods, technology, and skills of Europe as a whole, including a thriving Germany, provide the basis for cooperation and, not least, for a massive infusion of capital and technology for development on both shores of the Mediterranean.

This is the dream of some at the Community's headquarters who yearn to see Europe find herself by tackling a big and imaginative task. Perhaps only thus can Europe overleap her current frustrations and disunity, cope with her "communist problem," and play her part in bringing greater order to the region. The Mediterranean cannot be Europe's *mare nostrum* without the presence of American power. But even political and economic success there could turn the Soviet Union's position from potential dominance to irrelevance. Judging by the present state of the Community and the flagging of the drive for unity, the portents are not promising, but it is not impossible that the need, if clearly recognized, could produce the will and that making a start could generate momentum.

For the United States, the failures of an overambitious Mediterranean diplomacy are no reason for retreat. It should maintain and

even strengthen its naval forces in the Mediterranean. They no longer have a vital role in strategic deterrence. Nor are they largely there to beat the NATO drums or to engage in complex military maneuvers with NATO allies. Ultimately, their purpose is partly to meet uncertain military contingencies, but still more to supply an intangible element of weight and concern. The precise relationship between naval power and political influence in a given area has yet to be proved. Yet, in the situation that prevails today in the Mediterranean, most of the unsettled problems, if they are not to grow worse, require the assurance of an American military presence and a continuing equilibrium of forces. Not only the Western allies but nonaligned states such as Yugoslavia and Egypt recognize the importance of that equilibrium for their own security. At some time the American and Soviet fleets may be limited by mutual agreement, with those of European and other Mediterranean countries largely taking their place. At some future time they may all be living in happy nonalignment. But that time is not now. And at this juncture when American commitments are being put in doubt, the Sixth Fleet's presence is an essential sign of a resolve to stay the course.

The real problems, however, are political and social. They call for an understanding of new forces, for shaping rather than meeting them head-on. The Western alliance will be better served by strengthening the common political base than by rigid adherence to timeworn military formulas. The United States must learn to balance continuing commitment with a division of labor with others and more modesty in leadership than has been its wont. All, including the Russians, have a vital stake in Mediterranean security. But in most other aspects of taming what we have come to know as the Mediterranean crisis—blunting the edges of nationalism, settling the terms of access to oil, the growth of societies and cultures in a modicum of harmony within themselves and with each other—the more direct interests and responsibilities belong to the Europeans and to the other peoples who live on the shores of the inland sea.

OPEC AND THE INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES: THE NEXT TEN YEARS

By Thomas O. Enders

FROM 1947 to 1973 the shift of power is exponential. In 1947 the United States ceased to be a net exporter of oil; the basing point for oil prices moved from the Gulf of Mexico to the Persian Gulf, and with it the underlying leverage. Although the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was formed in 1960, its membership was so disparate that at first it did little to exploit the shift. With prices low, U.S. dependence on imported energy grew to 14 percent of energy consumption in 1972. Europe's dependence on energy imports grew from 33 percent in 1960 to 65 percent in 1972; Japan's from 43 to 90 percent in the same period. By the late 1960s OPEC members were acting more masterfully to turn the increased dependence to advantage; prices began to move up. The 1973 October War revealed OPEC's full power.

It is important to be precise about the implications of this shift for the industrial countries. First, the cartel action continues to pose a short-term problem of economic management. The sharp jump in oil prices accounted for about a quarter of the average 14 percent inflation experienced in 1974 among the member-countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Industrial dislocation and unemployment caused by the 1973-74 embargo, and conservative demand-management policies in Europe and Japan designed to overcome oil-caused balance-of-payments deficits helped trigger the present recession. No doubt the effects of the continued high price of oil on internal demand will make it more difficult to design policies to return the industrial economies to a high rate of growth. All of these difficulties are important and costly, but they are—or can be made—transitional.¹

Second, there is a medium-term problem of financial management. Most recent studies suggest that the accumulation of financial assets by OPEC will peak in the late 1970s or early 1980s at levels perhaps in the range of \$200 to \$250 billion in 1974 dollars. This is an enormous total by present comparison—official holdings of financial assets by *all* the OECD countries totaled \$118 billion at the end of 1974—but it is less than was estimated a year ago. Although the political and financial implications of the expected accumulations cannot yet fully

¹ See Hollis B. Chenery, "Restructuring the World Economy," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1975.

be judged, recycling of oil dollars has proceeded more smoothly than feared, and this problem appears manageable.²

Third, however, there is a major long-term transfer of real income, which has only begun. The exact time-path of the transfer is difficult to determine, since it depends in part on how rapidly the financial assets OPEC is accumulating are converted into imports of goods and services and how long the high price is sustained. In 1974 OPEC increased its imports of goods and services from OECD countries by about \$8 billion in real terms (equivalent to somewhat more than 0.2 percent of OECD's 1974 gross national product). Into the future, OPEC imports from OECD countries, financed by its accumulated financial assets, will continue to grow for some time after its export revenues peak. It is possible that they will reach \$110 billion by 1980 (in 1974 dollars), as opposed to about \$30 billion in 1973 (in 1974 dollars). The \$80 billion gain, equivalent to more than 1.7 percent of the expected GNP of the OECD group in 1980, can be taken as an estimate of the peak value of the real annual cost of the cartel action to the industrial world.

These costs, imposed at a time when most of the industrial countries are having increasing difficulty in meeting the social, economic and security requirements of their people, are of major significance. It is important to realize that these are not one-time costs; they accrue each year.

Fourth, and perhaps most important of all, there are the political and strategic implications of vulnerability to a new interruption in supply. Existence of the cartel, and the high price for oil that it has imposed, are coordinate with that vulnerability; one presupposes the other. As long as the cartel is effective, the central element of energy in the industrial economies will be subject to manipulation, both as to prices and availability, by supplying countries which do not have, and may well not develop, an inherent interest in their prosperity. We must be ready for the exercise of this power in a new Middle East conflict; whether and how it would be used in other circumstances we do not know. But clearly the threat to the maintenance of stable economic conditions is significant.

As long as the cartel is effective, it will also impose a permanent tension among the consuming countries because of the wide disparity in their dependence on imported oil. Canada, the United States, and soon Britain have options that Japan, Spain, and Italy do not have. Competitive offers of special economic and political terms to secure

² Compare Khodadad Farmanfarmaian *et al.*, "How Can the World Afford OPEC Oil?" *Foreign Affairs*, January 1975.

petroleum supplies are widely recognized as likely to degrade the bargaining position of the consumers as a group. Such protective mechanisms as oil-sharing in an emergency and financial solidarity can provide a counterweight, and these have now been effectively agreed upon, largely through the International Energy Agency (IEA), formed a year ago.³ But over the long term the impulse will be strong to substitute producer/consumer lines of force for those now existing among the industrial countries of Europe, America and Japan. If that occurs, the internal contradictions between the security and the economic interests of the industrial countries will grow and their political coherence will dissipate.

So far, the short-term problems of economic and financial management have received the greatest public attention in the industrial countries. Exaggerated fear of their difficulty has given way to relief that they are not intractable. But the real costs of the cartel—the longer-term transfer annually of goods and services, and the potential deterioration of the security and political position of the industrial countries—have yet to be fully faced.

The real-income losses of the consumers are the gains of the producers, but in other respects the effects of the cartel action are not reciprocal. Producers share with consumers an interest in effective management of the short-term economic and financial problems. Return of the industrial economy to a high rate of growth strengthens demand for oil and thereby strengthens the cartel, and the protection of financial assets now is essential to future real transfers and growth. It is only by de facto integration into the industrial economy, through massive increases in trade, industrial investment and technological transfer, that the producers can realize their real-wealth gains. Four-fifths of OPEC's imports now come from the OECD group; as they rise, the interpenetration of consumer and producer economies will become a central datum of the international structure.

In politics, the lines of potential development lead in different directions. When the October War revealed its power, OPEC was the loosest of coalitions, harboring at least four contenders for leadership (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Venezuela) and a spectrum of traditional state rivalries. But to consolidate its gains and survive this year's slump in oil demand, OPEC has had to develop more coherence. Saudi Arabia, which some believed a year ago might play the maverick and use its vast producing capacity to bid the oil price down, has swung into a supportive role. The Saudis engineered the most recent overall price increase at Abu Dhabi in November, then created

³ See Henri Simonet, "Energy and the Future of Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1975.

conditions for, or acquiesced in, production cuts deep enough to balance OPEC supply with demand. (Saudi production in April was less than 6 million barrels a day [MMBD], down from 9 MMBD at the peak last summer; meanwhile Saudi capacity has reached more than 11 MMBD.) Leadership competition among the major states was muted. An informal system emerged in which states wishing to increase exports could do so by shaving quality differentials and lengthening credit terms, while the basic government take of \$10.12 per barrel remained intact.

This growing cohesiveness of OPEC has given it an opportunity to bid for the leadership of the whole developing world. The raw materials doctrine developed by Algeria—that the market power of consumers has long kept down raw material prices and thus the economic development of producers, and that cartel action is needed to “revalorize” earnings, along with “indexation” to protect the new wealth by increasing oil prices in proportion to increases in the prices of OPEC imports—served first as a defense against the resentment of other less-developed countries whose growth prospects have been damaged or halted by high oil prices. Increasingly, the doctrine is becoming a means by which the oil producers cement their own unity and that of the LDC bloc as a whole.

At the same moment that their economic integration into the industrial world is accelerating, OPEC members are asserting their political identity with a coalition of developing states intent upon challenging the industrial world. In doing so OPEC is making negotiation of stable new institutional ties with the industrial countries far more difficult, as the failure of the producer/consumer preparatory meeting this April showed. In time, the oil producers will expose themselves to escalating demands from the LDCs. And the tension between OPEC's economic and political interests will eventually increase.

II

It is in the interest of the industrial countries—indeed, of all consuming countries—that conditions be created in which OPEC loses and cannot subsequently regain the power to set oil prices at artificially high levels. What are these conditions? Essentially, that the market for OPEC oil be compressed to, and held at, a volume at which the mechanism for allocating production cuts within OPEC can no longer function.

It is possible to imagine a number of scenarios in which individual producers break ranks and slash prices. But none of these has much plausibility in view of the great economic and political interest all

OPEC members have in high prices, and because of the political pressure from their colleagues to which many are vulnerable. In order to predict with some confidence that several major members will cut prices in attempting to increase their market share, the following conditions must be present:

- Such a group of countries must have significant unused capacity, and practical possibilities for shifting production cuts onto the “low absorbers” such as Saudi Arabia must have been exhausted;
- They must be unwilling to accept a stretch-out of their development and military spending programs;
- They must be in payments deficit on current account;
- They must have reached the limits of drawing down accumulated financial reserves and of borrowing within or outside OPEC;
- Relief through increases in the real price of OPEC oil must have been exhausted.

We know that there is little chance that these conditions will occur or can be created between now and the end of 1977. As a result of the second mild winter in a row, the recession, drawing down of inventories, and price resistance, the OPEC export market will be down to an average of 27 MMBD this year from 30 MMBD in 1973. With the end of the recession, the steady decline of oil and gas production in the United States, and a return to normal winters—all of which seem overwhelmingly likely—oil export demand will return to or exceed pre-embargo levels by 1977. If real prices are maintained, OPEC exports might reach the \$125 billion range (in 1974 dollars) in 1977, reflecting an export demand that might by then have risen to 31 MMBD.

As to the amount of the real income transfer, OPEC import expenditures have risen faster than expected: 27 percent by volume in 1974. They may do so again in 1975, although limitations on port facilities and resultant demurrage and delay in the Persian Gulf are already significant and growing. Thereafter constraints on internal transport and distribution are likely to take over. The current account surpluses of OPEC as a whole are likely to remain large—on average about \$50 billion a year (in 1974 dollars) in the period 1975–77—but some individual producing countries will probably go into deficit: Algeria and Indonesia this year, Ecuador in 1976, Venezuela in 1977. These countries now have some excess capacity, but the volume is small enough (perhaps 0.5 MMBD that they would like to use) so that others in OPEC could accommodate it by reducing their production. Intra-OPEC loans (a possibility Algeria has already broached) would be another means of adjustment. Some slowdown in Algerian and Ven-

ezuelan development spending is also likely.

In the period 1978–1980 a major change is likely to occur in the OPEC export market as North Sea, Alaskan, Mexican and Chinese oil come on in quantities. As a rough guess, net OPEC exports might then fall to 25 MMBD or even less. With a constant real price of oil and continued import increases, Iran and most OPEC members other than Saudi Arabia and Kuwait would move into balance-of-payments deficit on current account. Drawdown of accumulated assets would provide some cushion; but there would be strong contradictory pressures—on OPEC countries collectively to *raise* the real price of oil and on some individual members to improve their market share by *shaving* prices. Hence this could be a period of substantial stress on OPEC, from which it might emerge either with a higher real price and renewed discipline or in disorder and with substantially lower prices.

In the period 1981–85 the swing element, insofar as can now be estimated, will be the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) and Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 4 (NPR-4) in Alaska. On the basis of geological surveys these regions are now roughly estimated to provide 5–7 MMBD in this time frame. If they do, the overall OPEC market may stabilize at about the 25 MMBD level, and the pressure on OPEC cohesion, already substantial, would increase. (This is similar to the forecast in the long-term energy assessment of the OECD, published this year.) If on the contrary these regions prove unproductive (so far only two dry wells have been sunk in NPR-4), or if for economic or other reasons they are not fully exploited, pressure on OPEC would ease substantially.

What are the chances of substantial deviations from these forecasts? Economic stagnation in the OECD and large-scale new finds like the Mexican fields would compress the OPEC market below these predicted levels.⁴ On the other hand, boom conditions or failure to solve the rate, financing, and siting problems of nuclear-fueled electrical utilities and thus to achieve the high rates of nuclear-power growth expected (from 20 gigawatts in 1973 to 200–240 in 1985 in the United States) could lead to a significantly larger OPEC market.

There are three conclusions to draw from this analysis:

First, there is a likelihood of strong stress on the cartel toward the end of the decade.

Second, maintenance of that pressure thereafter depends critically on the exploitation of the OCS and NPR-4.

⁴ Such new producers as Mexico may, of course, join OPEC, and in any event conform their price policies to those of OPEC. The point is that their need for export outlets will still affect the market available to OPEC as a whole.

Third, the potential swings become very high in the 1980s. If the cartel loses its power to set prices in the 1978 to 1980 period, and successful exploitation of the OCS and NPR-4 maintain conditions in which it cannot be reconstituted, OPEC's annual export earnings might fall from the assumed 1977 peak of \$125 billion (in 1974 dollars) to half that or even less. If OPEC were able to maintain its price-setting power and thus offset the declining market by higher real prices, the income could stay at the \$125 billion level, and the higher real price would have a dampening effect on economic growth in its major markets. In both cases the real transfer through actual imports would adjust with a lag. The swing between the two cases (\$60 billion or more in 1974 dollars), plus the negative impact on growth, could exceed 1.5 percent of the real OECD gross national product annually. And, of course, the political leverage of OPEC hinges almost wholly on which case applies.

III

How can the consuming countries increase the possibility of an outcome in their favor? And at what cost?

First, by conservation. If President Ford's conservation proposals of January 1975 were fully adopted, and if they were matched by similar European and Japanese programs, they could be decisive. These measures were originally designed to reduce U. S. imports by 1 MMBD by the end of 1975, 2 MMBD by the end of 1977, and over 4 MMBD in 1985 (below what they would otherwise be).

Through the actions announced by the President on May 27—increased import fees and the proposed decontrol of “old” domestic oil prices—the United States can still make progress toward his goals.⁵ However, what Congress will finally do, as well as the actual impact on consumption, may not be clear for some time. Meanwhile Europe and Japan have moved faster than the United States to take effective conservation measures, but the combined bulk of their savings is not yet large.

Although the controversy has not been settled, the balance of evidence is that savings of the magnitude proposed by the President will not have growth-depressing effects. In the United States the amount of energy used per dollar of GNP fell from 107,000 BTUS to 90,000

⁵ With much of 1975 already gone, the White House currently estimates that the effect of the May 27 actions would be a reduction of 0.1 MMBD by the end of 1975, 0.7 MMBD by 1977, and 2.5 MMBD by 1985. The impact of the President's total legislative program, however, including measures to stimulate production as well as conservation, would be a reduction of 0.7 MMBD in 1975, 2.2 MMBD in 1977, and 7.2 MMBD in 1985. White House Fact Sheet, *The New York Times*, May 28, 1975, p. 20.

in the years 1947–1973, a period of rapidly rising income growth. High prices will accelerate the decline in this ratio.

Second, by stimulus to the development of alternative sources. Here three sorts of action are required:

1. *Relaxation or removal of existing policy constraints.* Almost every form of energy enterprise in the industrial world is encumbered: U.S. and Canadian gas and oil by price controls; nuclear power everywhere by inadequate or outmoded utility rate structures and by siting restrictions; coal by environmental limits; new hydrocarbon exploration by legal restrictions. The relaxation of these constraints is above all a domestic political question, although it can be spurred by international review and analysis.

2. *Provision of financing.* Estimates of financing required over the next decade for energy development in the industrial countries center in the trillion dollar range (in 1974 dollars), equivalent to a fifth or a fourth of expected total capital formation. The question posed is whether energy investment should receive some form of priority access to capital markets, through the use of government guarantees or government-sponsored intermediaries. For such costly developments as oil from shale, tar sands, or coal liquefaction (which may come in in the range of \$15 a barrel), substantial government financing, including such devices as the sharing of initial “front-end” costs, must be employed. Such projects lend themselves to international cooperation, with possible deals combining funding with access to technology and, in an emergency, access to product. On the other hand, many governments have so far hesitated to provide assistance to conventional energy enterprises, believing it disadvantageous to substitute political priorities for economic calculation. But some support is inevitable even in this area.

3. *Protection against “downside risk” for private capital investment.* To the extent that the financing of new energy sources is provided through government channels, such capital investment need not be seriously affected by changes in the overall price of oil, or of energy in general. As suggested above, government financing is likely to be the preponderant mechanism for most of the “non-conventional” energy sources such as solar and geothermal power, oil shale, or the Canadian tar sands.

The real problem concerns the major expansion of “conventional” sources, for which private investment must be the principal mechanism, but for which the anticipated costs are significantly higher than the price level to which OPEC oil might conceivably fall over the next ten years. New North Sea oil (less the share taken directly by

governments) comes in in many cases at \$5 or even \$6 a barrel. Conventional nuclear facilities, coal, and the vital OCS and NPR-4 may all be in the \$6 to \$8 range for their energy-equivalent output. All of these investments are price sensitive both at the outset and as they go along: they may not be undertaken, or may be delayed, if there is an actual or perceived risk that international prices will fall to or below that range in the course of development.

Such downside risk is closely linked to the future viability of the cartel. If, for example, the cartel were to lose its ability to maintain a high price in the stress period of 1978–80, the development of OCS, NPR-4 and North Sea oil could all be retarded or stopped. That in turn would result in a substantially higher OPEC export market than would otherwise occur, and conditions for renewed cartel action could be created. Put the other way around, by protecting against downside risk it is possible to be fairly certain that expected major energy investments will occur, and thus increase the odds that in the early 1980s the cartel will lose its power to set the oil price and not regain it thereafter.

IV

The problem of downside risk for investment in conventional energy sources is widely recognized. But there is much controversy over its solution. Broadly speaking, two main concepts have been put forward.

The first of these may be labeled that of "deficiency payments." Under this approach, private firms engaged in the development of energy sources would receive a subsidy from their national governments if the overall oil price falls, possibly set to cover the difference between some base price and the market price.

The advantage of this approach is that any drop in price is passed on to the consumer. The major disadvantage, however, is that under this approach it would almost surely be impossible to meet national self-sufficiency targets. In the event that overall oil prices fall, consumption is bound to be restimulated, and by substantial amounts. Thus, in contrast with the forecast that demand for OPEC oil by 1980 might be in the range of 25 MMBD at present oil prices, the demand for OPEC oil can be estimated to rise to 35 MMBD if the overall oil price were to drop to, say, \$4 per barrel (in 1974 dollars). Even a remotely comparable rise in consumption would leave the industrial world still highly vulnerable to embargo and would in turn lead to new cartel action, as surely as the low prices and high dependency of the 1960s and early 1970s stimulated it in the first place.

Other drawbacks of the deficiency payment approach are the high costs to the taxpayer and the uncertain credibility of a system dependent on annual subsidy appropriations for energy companies by the American Congress or by the parliaments of OECD countries.

The second approach to the problem can be described as "border protection." The object of this approach is to prevent imported oil from being sold to the consumer within the industrial economies at disruptive price levels, i.e., at levels below the amounts required to offer the prospect of a fair return to the investors in expanded energy sources. The means required to implement this approach could be varied according to the national choice of the individual consuming countries; tariffs, import quotas, or variable levies might be used separately or in combination to produce the intended result. But the price levels maintained to assure adequate domestic investment, it may be emphasized, would be fixed only in terms of price levels to the consumer. The price actually paid to the OPEC producer would continue to be determined by the international market situation—in effect, by the relative bargaining power of consumers and producers. This is *not*, in short, a system for guaranteeing the return to the OPEC countries; indeed, its basic objective is to permit market forces to operate, eventually in favor of the consuming countries.

The major advantage of this approach is that national self-sufficiency goals can be protected. Through the stimulation of the necessary investment in expanded conventional sources, this approach provides high odds that OPEC's market will in fact be compressed to a volume inconsistent with continued cartel action.

The principal disadvantage of the approach is that the citizen as consumer does not receive the full benefit of whatever price drops may result over a period of time; on the other hand, the citizen as taxpayer in the consuming countries should have a very much lower burden under most of the possible techniques for achieving the basic goal. As for the question of continuing credibility, the "border protection" approach cannot be described as 100-percent credible, since Congress or parliaments would be under substantial pressure to remove protection and to favor the consumer when and if prices fall. However, the credibility of this approach should be greater than that of the deficiency payments approach because border protection can be legislated or decreed in advance. Once in place, and once investments have been made with reference to it, the system would develop a political constituency that would tend strongly to validate it.

Any policy of downside protection, however, will be of limited help and may disadvantage the countries that adopt it if only a few do

so. Here, as in every other aspect of the energy problem, it is important to develop a new calculus of interest:

—Energy-poor countries are interested in low prices to their citizens, but also in seeing energy-rich industrial countries develop their resources. For only if they do will demand on the international market fall and oil prices come down.

—Energy-rich countries like Britain, Canada, and the United States are interested in seeing energy-poor countries like Italy and Japan adopt the same level of protection. For the main burden of investment must fall on the energy-rich, while the primary advantages of lower prices caused by the resulting compression of OPEC's market will accrue to energy-poor countries that import much of the energy they need. Without a common level of protection, this would leave the former locked into a high-cost energy economy, and at a competitive disadvantage.

—All industrial countries have an interest in putting OPEC in the position of residual supplier of oil, with a market kept small enough to prevent renewed cartel action.

Recognizing the basic common interest that underlies this calculus, the industrialized consuming countries, meeting in the International Energy Agency, have already reached a preliminary agreement in principle. On March 20 of this year, they agreed on a minimum safeguard price system, under which each country would use means of its own choosing to prevent oil from being sold in its domestic economy below an agreed common price. The system is to be elaborated by July 1, 1975.

The question that remains is, of course, the level to be adopted for the agreed common price. Here the divergent interests of the energy-rich and energy-poor members of IEA must be reconciled. Broadly speaking, a high level for the agreed common price would benefit energy enterprise and thus countries with important energy resources. A low level would favor consumers, and thus countries that must import most of their oil.

The costs and benefits of a given system and price level can be analyzed as follows. If the level of protection is set unnecessarily high, the result will be that more investment would be undertaken than turned out to be required. With an annual investment bill estimated at roughly \$100 billion per year, the real cost of any excess investment would be some relatively **small part** of this amount.

The opposite risk is less easy to measure precisely. If the level of protection is set too low, the result would be not enough investment to

deprive OPEC of its ability to set prices. Broadly speaking, what would then be lost to the consumer countries would be the difference between the level of their real-income transfers to the producer countries at cartel-set prices and the level of the same transfers if the cartel fails; in addition, the growth-retarding effect of higher prices must be weighed. As analyzed above, it does not seem excessive to estimate this potential difference at as much as \$60 billion or more a year (in 1974 dollars). More important, the cartel would retain its power to disrupt the industrial economies by embargo, and the risk that its economic power over the consumers will be transmuted into political power would grow.

In short, the level of protection chosen must be evaluated, in effect, like the premium on an insurance policy. The penalty for guessing wrong and doing too little is incommensurately heavier than the costs of doing too much.

V

An exponential increase in the power of any group of countries, occurring rapidly and initially at the expense of others, is never easy for an international system to absorb. Obviously, the nations fortunate enough to have major oil resources will be able, in any event, to maintain a greatly improved power status and to advance the lot of their people immensely in the years to come. Only the degree of change is now at issue, and with it the broader question of a lasting accommodation that will make the adjustment bearable to oil consumers—poor countries even more than rich—and that will evolve toward a world economy in which all may advance together.

Because of the interdependence of their trade and investment, the industrialized countries hold vast reciprocal power over each other's well-being. But a structure of economic, political, and security institutions governs the exercise of that power and makes its possession tolerable. No such structure exists between the oil-producing and oil-consuming states. Its creation will ultimately be in the interest of both producers and consumers: for the producers, because their dependence on the industrial economies is growing inexorably as they convert oil earnings into real imports and new industries; and for the consumers, because oil imports and oil-related financial transactions will play a major role in their economies, whether or not OPEC retains its capacity to set prices.

But for three reasons it is too early seriously to address the design of that structure.

First, we still do not know how rapidly and how forcefully the con-

sumers will act to change the underlying market balance. In 1974 the industrial countries moved fast to draw the consequences of the embargo, establish a common strategy in the International Energy Agency, and draw up domestic energy programs. But by the time their response was ready at the start of this last winter, the recession had replaced energy as the dominant economic issue. The consequence has been to delay and to dilute energy action. As the industrial economies pull out of the recession and rising demand for oil creates conditions for new oil price increases, the politics of energy within the industrial countries will again change. It will not be possible to judge the full scope of their response until next year.

Second, it is not yet clear how far the producers will press their bid for leadership of the developing world. Should this become a permanent, dominant aim of their foreign policy, chances of successful negotiation of a new economic and ultimately a political framework between producers and consumers will be low.

Third, the future internal structure of OPEC is not yet knowable, for it depends on the way in which bargaining over production cuts develops. At one extreme would be a structure in which each OPEC member insisted that cuts be proportional to base-year output or capacity. In this case, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait would accumulate much of the OPEC financial surpluses, the industrial development of other OPEC members would be slower, and the cartel would be more fragile. At the other extreme, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait might take up most of the necessary production cuts, with the result that the industrial development of the group would accelerate, while the accumulation of financial assets by all OPEC members would be less. If developments approximate the first case, the real institutional problem between consumers and producers will be the management of the huge financial assets of a small number of countries. If events fit the second case, the problem will extend to all producers and cover a far wider range of economic and industrial problems.

The inability of the preparatory meeting called by President Giscard d'Estaing in April to agree on a concept for future discussions between producers and consumers reflected these uncertainties. But bilateral contacts to organize a new meeting are already under way, and the search for that concept will go on, for there can be no equilibrium in the world economy or in world politics until a more balanced relation of power between oil producers and industrial countries is reached, defined, institutionalized.

THE INDOCHINA WAR AND WORLD POLITICS

By Alastair Buchan

SIR LEWIS NAMIER, the great British historian of a generation ago, used to warn his students of the danger of trying "to argue with history": of abstracting, that is, one event or sequence of events in a historical epoch in an effort to determine how world politics would have been different if it had not occurred; the past is a seamless web, he used to argue, of interrelated developments whose individual strands cannot be unraveled and examined separately. One does not have to be a historical determinist to accept the soundness of this view, and a great deal of the "oh, if only" historiography that now surrounds the American involvement in Indochina seems to me to be based on fallacious abstractions of parts of the national decision-making process at isolated points in time over the past quarter-century. The blow to American idealism which the protracted brutalities of the involvement occasioned, the damage which military and political failure in Vietnam may have done to American influence, are only aspects of a larger process of change; and the new structure of power relations in the world would not, in my view, be radically different if the United States had never become seriously involved in Indochina, or even if it had been able to impose a peace settlement upon the area between 1964 and 1973. Much of the American literature of *mea culpa* is an aspect of what Dennis Brogan first called "the illusion of American omnipotence," the belief that prevailed for nearly a generation, not only that American policy was all-determinant in molding the map of the world, but that the United States had a greater degree of choice at any point in time than was in reality the case.

This emerges particularly, I think, if one examines the history of American policy toward Indochina in the 15 years before President Kennedy took office. Indochina had been on the American horizon ever since the Japanese conquest of it in 1941, and Roosevelt's attempts, during the Second World War, to evolve a future for it that would avoid a return of French colonialism are well known. But be-

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tween 1942 and 1954 France could exert a degree of leverage on American policy which was a result of the fact that the United States had become a global power. Washington needed the goodwill of first Vichy and later de Gaulle in defeating the Axis powers in the Mediterranean and then in Europe. And in the postwar years the key position of France—geographically, in creating a system of military and diplomatic containment against the Soviet Union in Europe, and politically, in relation to the German question—put the United States in leading strings to French policy elsewhere in the world. Acheson has been blamed for succumbing to French pressure for armaments to resist the Vietminh in 1950 and thereafter, and his memoirs show the reluctance with which he succumbed to it. But given what seemed to be the frailty of the European balance of power, he had little choice. France did not lose her power to influence American policy until the failure of the European Defense Community in 1954 forced or enabled Dulles to develop an independent American relationship with Germany.

By that time the French position in Indochina had collapsed, and one may legitimately ask why the United States became and remained so preoccupied with resistance to communist penetration in an area where it had few economic and no direct strategic interests. Clearly the answer is in part ideological: the determination that communism should not undermine “free Asia” or overstep what Walt Rostow, who reflected a potent strand of liberal ideology, always referred to as “the World War II truce lines.” But it was also closely related to an earlier decision, namely that Japan could not be held in thrall for a generation and must be permitted to resume her independence, at least as an economic power. Economic stability for Japan meant access to the markets and raw materials of Southeast Asia; denial of them raised specters of resumed Manchurian or other adventures. The connection between the future of Japan and that of Southeast Asia was a matter of common agreement in Washington in the mid-1950s and was explicitly recognized in the National Security Council paper on the consequences of the Geneva Conference, which stated that “the loss of Southeast Asia would imperil retention of Japan as a key element in the off-shore island chain.”¹

Moreover, to the extent that Western policy in Southeast Asia during the 1950s represented the attempt to apply a containment strategy to an area for which it was unsuited, it was not of American inspiration alone. Although the “domino theory” emerged under that name

¹ *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967* (The Pentagon Papers), Washington: GPO, 1971, Vol. 10, p. 732. This document is not included in the unofficial Gravel Edition of the Pentagon Papers.

in Washington in 1954, the concept was formulated by Britain's High Commissioner for South East Asia, Malcolm Macdonald, a strong friend of Asian nationalism, at a meeting of the foreign ministers of the Commonwealth, in Colombo in January 1950, when he warned of the effect that infiltration from China into Indochina would have on the security of Thailand and Burma. Even earlier one can find Dutch, French and even Indian adumbrations of the same theme. The Australian and New Zealand governments were extremely concerned after the Korean War about the possibility of communist infiltration in Southeast Asia, and exerted pressure on the United States to do something about it; the concurrence of both Australia and New Zealand in American policy in the area did not change until the early 1970s. Eden and Dulles might dislike each other, and might disagree on the feasibility of military intervention in Vietnam in 1954 or about trade with or recognition of China. But the British (who were particularly concerned about the future of Malaya) and the Australians (who were particularly concerned that Indonesia might come within a communist sphere of influence) had the same basic concern with the containment of communism in Southeast Asia, which lasted in the British case until about 1966 and in the Australian case until considerably later.

I do not mean that the United States could not have resisted the pressures or entreaties of its allies if it had chosen and if there had been a settled official and political consensus in the 15 years after VJ-Day that under no circumstances should it dabble in the politics of Southeast Asia. In hindsight, the European balance does not now seem to have been so precarious in the late Stalin or post-Stalin era as it seemed then. But given the fact that the Western alliance in the Truman and Eisenhower years was a coalition in which the United States was as dependent on its major allies for bases and other facilities as they were on it for economic and strategic support, it would have taken a bold act of policy to ignore their views about Southeast Asia, especially as they coincided with its own. By deliberate acts of policy, alternative trading partners could have been developed for Japan, in Latin America for instance. All I would suggest is that America's original preoccupation with Indochina was a normal outcome not merely of ideological perspectives or a sense of global responsibility but of earlier decisions about her relations with other countries.

II

But this does not provide an answer to the central question: To what

extent was the American involvement in Indochina, during the period when decisions were made about it unilaterally in Washington, a prime factor of change in the nature of the international system? First, a point of definition. One can argue that American policy toward Indochina has been made more or less unilaterally ever since 1954, despite nominal consultation with SEATO or other allies during the earlier years; Britain, for instance, was hardly consulted about the decision to abandon the attempt at Vietnam-wide elections in 1955 and 1956 which the Geneva Conference called for, though she was the co-chairman of the conference. American relations with Diem were entirely bilateral throughout. But since the situation in Vietnam was relatively quiescent in the later 1950s, and the situation in Laos, the focus of crisis in 1960-61, was stabilized by a multilateral agreement in 1962, I think we are justified in limiting ourselves principally to the period between Kennedy's encouragement of the overthrow of Diem in November 1963 and the uneasy armistice of 1973, the period of deepest U.S. involvement.

Certainly, if one compares the structure of power and influence in the world then and now, the contrast is a very striking one. In 1963 the United States was not only the most powerful state at every level on which state power is exerted but also the most magnetic society. It had a superiority over the Soviet Union in strategic weapons of the order of ten to one, and Kennedy had recently used that margin of strength with skill and prudence to settle the Cuban missile crisis. It produced nearly half the world's wealth; it was the major source of development aid; it was the forcing house of innovation in almost every aspect of science and technology. Its policy decisions were central not only to those of its 40-odd allies but of many formally non-aligned countries as well. Though it was clear that its racial problems had become more serious with the urbanization of the black minority, the United States was still the world's greatest experimental society: it had led the world in the expansion of higher education; and there seemed to be a flexibility in its approach to new social problems which older societies could not match.

The Soviet Union had just suffered a major reverse over Cuba and was heading into an internal political crisis. The Sino-Soviet dispute was reaching the height of its first phase, which arose from conflicting ideological views and national interests (as contrasted with the tensions arising from the border crisis and from security considerations in 1969). China exerted only a limited influence in parts of Southeast Asia and little elsewhere. De Gaulle had vetoed Britain's first application for entry into the European Economic Community,

which had itself progressed little further than the removal of various internal trade barriers. To virtually all the West European countries the NATO relationship was more important than the Community. Japan was only just beginning to become an economic power in her own right.

Twelve years later only parts of this landscape are still recognizable. True, the United States is still the world's most powerful state at every level of material power. But the Soviet Union has achieved "parity" in the number of strategic weapons it deploys (which includes numerical superiority in land-based missiles), even though the total of nuclear warheads the United States controls is still larger than that of its "adversary partner." The Soviet Union is also a global power in the sense that it was not ten years ago, with an ocean-going navy and alliances with India, Egypt, Iraq, and Somalia. Equally important, China is now a full member of the international community, has taken her seat in the U.N. Security Council, has a strategic force in the process of building, and has identified the Soviet Union as her prime adversary. As a consequence of American initiatives between 1969 and 1972, there is now a triangular political relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union and China, in which developments in the relations of any two of the partners affect the relations of each with the third.

The United States remains the core power of the system of alliances which it constructed in the early period of the cold war, in Europe, in Asia, and with the Latin American states. Among other things it has a virtual monopoly of strategic power, for the size of the British and French nuclear forces remains small, their future in doubt. Moreover, the possibility that allies like Japan or Germany might assert their independence by becoming nuclear powers is still a fairly remote one. The United States still stands, therefore, in the same central relationship to its major allies as it did a decade ago.

Yet, even in NATO, the relationship between the United States and its allies has become one of *primus inter pares* rather than one of dominance. American military power continues to be decisive because of the integrated military system upon which European security rests, and the close link between conventional and strategic deterrent power. But the level of the American military commitment is now a matter both of debate in Washington and negotiation with the Soviet Union. And in East Asia the change—now that Vietnam has completely fallen—seems likely to be marked. Almost certainly the American military presence will be removed from mainland Southeast Asia, and probably reduced in the Philippines, perhaps in Korea as

well. Basic American alliance commitments in East Asia may remain (though that with Taiwan may soon be wound up), but the effect of the measured American withdrawal—foreshadowed by the Nixon Doctrine of 1970—will be to leave America simply a strong Pacific power, as she was in the earlier twentieth century, and not the dominant one that she has been since the Korean War.

And on other planes of power than the military, the structure of inter-allied relationships has changed profoundly. The principal allies now exercise considerably more initiative than they did a decade ago, whether it be the West German government's Ostpolitik, Japan's development of her own relationships with both China and the Soviet Union, or the European Community's relations with the African and other developing states. And the contrast is even more marked in economic and monetary relationships. The United States began to have an overall adverse balance of payments as early as 1958, but it was not until 1964 that other countries began significantly to accumulate surpluses of dollars. By 1970 the American balance of trade was in deficit, primarily with Canada and Japan, and three devaluations of the dollar between the end of 1971 and the middle of 1973 have made it certain that the Western monetary system will have to be reconstructed, if it is to be reconstructed at all, on a different footing from that which has obtained since 1946, in which the U.S. dollar has been its basic currency. Japan has been for several years the world's third strongest economic power; the enlarged European Community has a combined GNP of \$750 billion. To cap these difficulties, a major increase in American overseas investment to take advantage of lower wage levels in Europe and elsewhere has not only increased balance-of-payments difficulties but disrupted domestic employment in some areas. Finally, the United States is becoming less and less self-sufficient in raw materials, most particularly in oil, for whose supply it has become increasingly dependent on the Persian Gulf states, even though Europe and Japan are even more dependent still.

So marked has been the change in the structure of world politics over this period, so changed is the position of the United States, that it is not surprising that the fact that this process coincided with frustrating and ultimately unsuccessful intervention in Southeast Asia should make many Americans feel that Vietnam—its cost, its slaughter, the domestic tensions it created, its ultimate failure—was the prime cause of their change of fortune.

III

What a great nation perceives to be a fact is itself an important

determinant in international politics; I shall return at the end to this point and to its profound implications for the present and future. But if one sticks to the process of change on the world scene that has occurred over the past decade or so and assesses underlying causes as a historian might do, a strong case can be made that the effect of Vietnam upon the most basic elements of transformation has been either marginal or at most indirect. It is generally agreed that the greater pluralism of the international system in the mid-1970s by contrast with the mid-1960s has resulted from a convergence of two motive forces in particular: first, the Sino-Soviet conflict, which has made each of the mainland powers identify the other as its principal adversary, and thus move to make limited accommodations with the United States and other centers of power; second, the ending of American dominance within the non-communist world, most particularly in her alliance systems—at every plane of power except the strategic—and a consequent redefinition of American interests.

I am not an expert on the Sino-Soviet dispute, but it seems to have a quality of inevitability which is more than simply the product of hindsight. Once the fears generated in the Chinese leadership by MacArthur's handling of the Korean War had subsided, once it became clear that the presence of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the China Sea was not a prelude to an American invasion, the conflict of interest between two states that are hostile for reasons of geopolitics and race began to assume an ideological form. And the first signs of this occurred as early as 1958 or even 1956, while the American involvement in Indochina was still quite small. One can, of course, argue that the growing American presence there after 1962 or so, plus the tendency of both Kennedy and Johnson to treat China and the Soviet Union as equally hostile powers, at least in Indochina, created for about six years a synthetic unity of action between Moscow and Peking. Though the Chinese have no great respect for the North Vietnamese, whose leadership was more interested in relations with Moscow on military and other aid, they could not ignore the possibility that a large American military force near their southern border might be the prelude to an American onslaught on China herself, in which case they would need Soviet assistance. In other words, the Vietnamese involvement of the United States had the effect of delaying the time when Moscow and Peking would begin fully to develop containment strategies around the world vis-à-vis each other.

One can also argue that the Vietnam conflict, by reinforcing a hostile and threatening image of China in the eyes of large parts of the Administration, the Congress, and the public (though clearly some

people in the Administration, notably the CIA, always doubted the real influence of Peking on Hanoi), delayed the moment when, in the interests of her security, China could put out feelers to the United States for an improvement of relations, and prevented the United States from exploiting the Sino-Soviet rift to improve its bargaining position with Moscow. But this argument can only be applied to the early and mid-1960s, because after 1966 the onset of the Cultural Revolution, whose inner springs were primarily domestic, really closed Peking to intercourse with the outside world until 1969.

Finally, one can argue that Vietnam delayed the opening of serious discussions between Washington and Moscow on détente, strategic arms control, European security or the Middle East; and by delaying them made it harder to achieve serious progress or to align superpower interests. This is a more substantial point. It was clear throughout the second half of the 1960s that the Soviet interest in trade and technological collaboration was rising, and that a political price could have been explored if the United States had been able to devote sufficient time and diplomatic effort to it. Many Europeans were also convinced that the muted American reaction to Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was a consequence of Johnson's preoccupation with Vietnam. He often seemed like a hunter caught in his own trap, anxious to stabilize and improve superpower relations or to take other broad initiatives, yet obsessed with the next day's bombing targets in a remote corner of Asia.

Yet there are strict limitations even on this argument. The summit at Glassboro in 1967 made clear that the Soviet leaders were not prepared for serious arms-control negotiations until their strategic armory was larger, nor for discussions on the Middle East while it seemed that they had the whole radical Arab world in thrall. Their approach to European security questions changed markedly after the Prague summer. It was the re-entry of China into the international system, not American frustration in Vietnam, that changed the name of the game.

And by the time the great-power relationship had become a triangular one that included China, there was an agenda of Soviet-American business to be disposed of which had only an indirect relation to Vietnam. For one thing, the Soviet attainment of parity in strategic weapons was a consequence of decisions taken in Moscow after the Cuban missile crisis, though continuing tension in Southeast Asia may have created an incentive to keep the program going, even when its cost rose. From what has been published about the SALT negotiations between 1969 and 1970, it is clear that rising congressional

resistance to defense expenditure as a whole, which was a direct consequence of Vietnam, did have a bearing on American negotiating positions about the mutual abrogation of ABM systems. But what really gave the SALT negotiations their impetus was technological developments, the ABM itself and the multiple warhead, which had been under development for over a decade. Certainly Vietnam and the rapid increase of American defense costs from 1965 onward made the United States anxious to stabilize the strategic confrontation with the Soviet Union. But this was a political as much as a fiscal calculation, which went back to Robert McNamara's early days in the Defense Department before serious expenditure on Vietnam had started.

This brings one to the other principal motive force of change, the redefinition of the American role in the world. The first point to make is that the present situation—in which Japan and the European Community are important economic, and increasingly important political, actors in an international system that is in general more plural in nature—is one that the United States was nominally anxious to bring about ten and even twenty years ago. There may be an unresolved ambiguity in American policy in that the United States wishes its allies to assume more initiative and a greater share of the general burdens of the West in such things as development aid or conventional military power but is most reluctant to devolve any strategic responsibilities on them, or recently even to treat them as serious coalition partners on issues such as the Middle East. Yet no American administration has committed itself either to the goal of a bipolar world or to permanent dominance within its alliance systems in the way that the Soviet Union has and still does. But the way in which a more plural or polycentric system has come into being was not of American choice, and Vietnam did have an important, if indirect, bearing on the course of events.

It is true that Charles de Gaulle was a phenomenon quite independent of his time. It is also true that Gaullism, as an attitude of mind that gathered weight not only in France but in other countries in the 1960s—Romania, for instance, or India or Iran—was a reassertion of nationalism in an era of greater strategic stability than the cold-war years, so that middle powers felt greater freedom to assert their autonomy. But carnage in Vietnam, an area which the French felt they understood better than the Americans—though with little reason, for it had been the most neglected of all French colonies for two generations—helped give a national basis to de Gaulle's personal defiance of American leadership, and made it harder for governments like those of Britain, Germany or Italy to defend their continued accep-

tance of that leadership. Vietnam certainly widened de Gaulle's personal influence in the world beyond the borders of France.

Elsewhere in Europe as well as in Japan, Vietnam aroused popular opposition, though originally this was intense only with the student generation. It also made governments uneasy that they might become embroiled in an Asian conflict in which they had no interest. Ironically, it is clear from the Pentagon Papers and other sources that one of the prime reasons why Kennedy and then Johnson, together with Dean Rusk and in particular Robert McNamara, argued that first the Vietcong, and later North Vietnam as well, must be defeated at almost any cost, short of the use of nuclear weapons, was the maintenance of the credibility of American guarantees to the allies of the United States. Yet neither the European NATO countries nor, as far as I can see, Japan felt that their security was in a real sense enhanced by American persistence in honoring a self-engendered promise to a small Asian ally. Germans in particular tended to feel that Vietnam was distracting the attention of Washington from both the risks and the opportunities developing in Europe as the Sino-Soviet conflict made the Soviet Union more edgy about its position in Eastern Europe and readier to contemplate accommodation with the West. If the British were concerned about the risks of American failure in Vietnam, this was largely because of their own interests, in Malaysia and Singapore, and not from acceptance of arguments about the credibility of American strategic guarantees. The British role at the apogee of the Vietnamese conflict is not a shining one: growing reservations about American policy and fear of its consequences, coupled with a reluctance to stand up to the United States on the issue, because the position of sterling was at that time so dependent on the support of the dollar. But though Vietnam may have diminished European confidence in the American decision-making process, it did not affect the conviction of European governments that the Atlantic Alliance was essential to their security.

Very naturally, the impact of Vietnam has been much greater in Southeast Asia and Australasia than in Europe or Northeast Asia. Since 1973, and now more clearly after the dramatic denouement in Cambodia and Vietnam, the Thai can hardly rely on their American alliance through SEATO. They, with Malaysia and the Philippines, are already moving to establish ties with Peking, and in general the nations of Southeast Asia are bound to search for a policy or norm that accepts the area as one accessible to the influence of all the major powers—provided that none tries to claim a hegemonial position—in place of an American-led system of containment directed against the

mainland powers. Australia and New Zealand will join in this concept, even though the ANZUS alliance will probably retain some contingent importance for them.

Economic historians may well argue for some time how significant a role the Vietnam War played in weakening the external economic and financial position of the United States. Clearly, from 1965 onward the fact that defense expenditure rose rapidly but that there was no significant increase in taxation contributed to inflation in the United States, and this tended to drive American investment overseas toward cheaper labor markets and weakened the competitive position of American exports and ultimately of the dollar. Japan also profited directly from American procurement there for Vietnam. But it seems to me that the weakening of the American economic position was primarily due to more rapid advances in Japanese and European, than in American, productivity during the 1960s and early 1970s, as well as to the refusal or inability of first the Johnson and then the Nixon Administration to place controls on overseas investment, and only secondarily to any economic distortions that may have been caused by the war in Vietnam.

Finally, there is a factor that is nonetheless real for being impossible to measure accurately, namely, diminishing respect for the United States as a society on the part of Europeans, Japanese, Latin Americans, Asians, even Russians. Certainly, the student unrest to which the war gave rise played a part in this, though such unrest had its counterpart in many other developed countries for quite different reasons—the overcrowding of the Japanese and French universities, and the antiquated structure of authority in the German universities, for instance. The eruption in the 1960s of many domestic issues in the United States—increased racial tension, concern with the decay of the cities, greater awareness of poverty and welfare problems—was a consequence, it seems to me, not of Vietnam but of some twenty years' preoccupation, on the part of elites and those controlling the purse strings in Congress, with foreign rather than domestic issues. Vietnam simply exacerbated problems that would have risen to the top of the agenda at that time in any case; and it was not Vietnam alone but a host of other external commitments which made it impossible for the Administration to switch its focus when the issues changed. Undoubtedly the costs of Vietnam cut sharply into funds available for Great Society programs. But even if these programs had been fully funded, there would have been a heavy proportion of failures—even the wealthiest society cannot wipe out deep-seated problems in the space of a few years.

IV

The most lasting international consequences of Vietnam—and not only for Americans—may well be on Americans' perceptions of themselves, of the world, and of the proper role of the United States in it. The fact that a conflict which lasted for nearly a decade, killed 55,000 Americans and over a million Vietnamese, and represented the first palpable failure of American arms in the history of the Republic, happened to coincide with the emergence of a number of endemic domestic problems and a loss of American strategic and economic predominance, has had the consequence of reinforcing the view of many Americans that the world is an ungrateful place. The fact that the American involvement was liquidated by a President whose interests were in international affairs, and that he was returned to office by a landslide in 1972, partly because the Vietnam War had itself created severe disarray within the Democratic Party, may have simply delayed political expression of a fundamental change in public priorities, rather than averted it; the present Congress shows marked tendencies in the direction of downgrading all effort abroad, and the trend seems to go beyond the impact of the new "Class of 1974" or even of the recession.

One must be careful, however, to recall Namier's dictum. How much of the current decline of public confidence in Washington is really a consequence not of Vietnam but of Watergate, or of the sudden elevation to the Presidency of a mild man who has neither the gift nor the taste for exercising its authority and powers on a broad front? How much is it a consequence of the accidental conjunction of domestic recession and debacle in Indochina?

One can also argue that the completeness of the recent debacle wipes the slate clean, that the self-deception of the years of striving for "peace with honor" between 1969 and 1973—involving the invasion of Cambodia and the bombing of Haiphong—or of the phony armistice of the past two and a half years, were as damaging in terms of American political and moral self-confidence, if not of lives, as the earlier war years. Logically, the American polity should now be ready to address its enormous ingenuity, energy and humanity to the transformed agenda of world politics, to the negotiation of the new multi-lateral armistices or nonaggression pacts that will be needed to govern access to food, energy and raw materials, to order trade and monetary relations, to control North-South as well as East-West conflict.

But the concealed consequences of wars often linger in the public consciousness long after the dead are buried. And I am haunted by

that famous quotation from Max Weber: "Interests (material and ideal), not ideas, dominate directly the actions of man. Yet the 'images of the world' created by these ideas have very often served as switches determining the tracks on which the dynamism of interests kept the action moving." The Vietnam War may have been such a switch point in the whole public conception of the nature of American society, and of its relationship to other societies. Unlike the Civil War, which left simply a void of grief and anger in a country whose external relations were still quite limited, the Vietnam War may lead—especially in a period when the United States is in a more competitive position, strategically with the Soviet Union, economically with Europe and Japan—to a harsher definition of American interests. It could also lead to a gradually pervading sense of national pessimism based on the belief that the United States is simply a big power, with as much capacity for harm as good, like other big powers in history, and not the distinct and buoyant civilization that it has been during most of the first two hundred years of the Republic's history. I do not say this must be so, and as someone who regards America as his second home I hope I may be wrong. But it will take a span of remarkable domestic leadership in politics, in the universities, the states, and the cities, to restore the self-confidence, the social generosity, and the breadth of view that since Roosevelt's day have been associated with the word "American."

CONSEQUENCES OF THE END GAME IN VIETNAM

By Earl C. Ravenal

AS THE last outposts crumbled in March and April, the Administration castigated Congress for abandoning Vietnam, labeled certain Americans "isolationists," and predicted the worst consequences from the American failure to stave off the collapse. Other Americans—hopeful politicians, wishful editorialists—angrily, urgently, denied the charges, rejected the epithets, and argued that Vietnam had little to do with the American position in the rest of the world; indeed, release from Vietnam might well benefit the American position elsewhere.

Perhaps now the analysis and the debate can be conducted with more detachment and objectivity. For several reasons, the original fears of "dominoes" might have some truth. The reasons have to do with the process of American policy-making, the reactions of allies and adversaries, and the resulting shape of the international system. All of these factors were sharply illustrated and profoundly affected by the end game in Vietnam. Unfortunately, they are not entirely subject to the control of American commentators or administrations. Like it or not, we cannot limit the damage of Vietnam to suit our hopes and our consciences.

Americans are tired of lessons of Vietnam. This is one war in which the retrospections started virtually before the events had occurred. So it is necessary to ask: What conclusions might be different now from, say, the fall of 1974? or from before the events of March and April 1975—the sudden ultimate collapse? What do we know *now* that we didn't know then? Or rather, what do we *know* now that we could only conjecture then?

After all, we already knew that the powers of the executive had been closely hedged about, since the congressional amendment of August 1973 that prohibited reintervention in Southeast Asia. And perhaps we should have been able to predict the ultimate American default after the congressional cuts in Vietnam appropriations in 1974, from the Administration's request of \$1.4 billion to \$700 million, and the reluctance to restore the cuts in the winter of 1975. And Watergate had run its course. But, in a sense, the evidence was not all in until the final test; we could still speculate on the effects that congressional obstruction and presidential penance would have on the

executive license to make war. What happened, of course, confirmed the tendencies of the preceding year. We had the spectacle of a very "constitutional" president (the first since Eisenhower, who had acted, or refused to act, similarly in the analogous Indochina crisis of April 1954), who was content to put the decision on Vietnam and Cambodia up to Congress.

And what we now see about the end game in the spring of 1975 is that the consequences of our demonstrated failure to act—however justified and right it may have been as a decision—are more important than the consequences of the "loss" of Vietnam itself.

II

Most of the lessons drawn by liberal and moderate observers have been to the effect that the loss of Vietnam is tolerable, even welcome; that intervention there had been a mistake; that its loss might leave us better off in our international relations; that at least we could choose, by an act of will and an expression of confidence, to limit the damage to American prestige, influence, and strategic position—even to enhance the value of these assets. For example:

Past errors must not now be compounded by a misreading of their meaning for the future. This country's failure in Indochina is, as President Ford has so succinctly stated, neither the end of the world nor the end of America's role in the world. . . . This country's tragic misadventure in Indochina in no way diminishes the need to keep and make international commitments.¹

Henry Kissinger acted like a child with a wounded ego exaggerating his loss. "Look how unreliable we are," he told the world in effect. "Look at the disaster our perfidy has caused."²

. . . the basic fact is that the Vietnam experience is not powerfully relevant to the present problems of the United States.³

The sources of U.S. power are intact, despite Indochina.⁴

At least there was no need to make the end even worse by proclaiming what could be called a self-domino theory.⁵

Even the Administration, after a few false starts during March and early April, and after a few more penultimate defeats in Vietnam, finally joined in this interpretation. In his speech to Congress on April 10, even while urgently requesting \$722 million in aid for Vietnam, President Ford used the occasion to recite positions of American strength and to pledge renewed support of our commitments. For

¹ "After Vietnam," *The New York Times*, May 4, 1975.

² Anthony Lewis, "Hubris, National and Personal," *The New Republic*, May 3, 1975.

³ Joseph Kraft, "Letting Go of the Vietnam Issue," *The Washington Post*, May 6, 1975.

⁴ Henry Brandon, *The New York Times*, April 13, 1975.

⁵ Stanley Hoffmann, "The Sulking Giant," *The New Republic*, May 3, 1975.

this, he was applauded by *The Washington Post*: "President Ford quietly banished the domino theory from presidential policy." Later, on April 23 at Tulane University, the President definitively gave up the game of recriminations against Congress and joined his liberal critics in the exercise of damage-limitation: "[The events in Indochina] portend neither the end of the world nor of America's leadership in the world." Again, the President was widely applauded. As *The New York Times* put it: "The end of the misguided military adventure in Indochina should make it easier to return to Lincoln's vision of the American destiny." A few days later, on the night of the final American evacuation from the roof of the embassy in Saigon, the President, in a somewhat Lincolnesque statement of his own, said: "The time has come to look forward to an agenda for the future, to unify, to bind up the nation's wounds and to restore its health and optimistic self-confidence."

The entire American political center, anxious to avoid external humiliation and internal division, had embarked on the creation of a new myth: that Vietnam never really mattered; that its loss does not really matter now; that it was a special case, an unnecessary one at that; that it is separable, at least containable; that its loss might even be a blessing and a source of renewed strength—that perhaps America will be even steadier, more reliable, her assurances and guarantees more credible, now that we have shed this "irrational" and "aberrant" situation; that the United States can smoothly transform its military role into some other form of functional leadership—diplomatic, economic, or just spiritual; that all we have to do is to cure our "hubris," recognize our limited, even nonexistent, interest in Southeast Asia, and then, presumably, our adversaries might stop challenging us, our friends would stop doubting our firm will, benevolent intention, and good sense, and our own people would renew their grant of trust in their government. In short, "no dominoes."

No recollections were invoked, no apologies given, for earlier judgments, such as this typical one from *The New York Times* 12 years ago (November 3, 1963):

... the loss of South Vietnam to the Communists could raise doubts around the globe about the value of U.S. commitments to defend nations against Communist pressure. ... The impact on revolutionary movements throughout the world would be profound. At best, neutralism in the East-West struggle might spread. In much of Asia there might be a feeling that the Communists—under the leadership and inspiration of Peking—represented "the wave of the future."

And there were no retractions by President Ford or Secretary of State Kissinger of their earlier statements predicting implicit, in-

escapable reactions of allies, adversaries, and the American people. Kissinger, then Assistant to the President, in a background briefing at San Clemente, June 26, 1970, had said: “. . . we certainly have to keep in mind that the Russians will judge us by the general purposefulness of our performance everywhere.” And, in a news conference, March 26, 1975, Secretary of State Kissinger had said: “We must understand that peace is indivisible. The United States cannot pursue a policy of selective reliability. We cannot abandon friends in one part of the world without jeopardizing the security of friends everywhere [Though] we are not saying that every part of the world is strategically as important to the United States as any other part of the world, the problem we face in Indochina today is an elementary question of what kind of people we are. . . . This is a fundamental question of how we are viewed by all other people, and it has nothing to do with the question of whether we should ever have gotten involved there in the first place. . . . There is no question that events in Portugal, Greece, Turkey, and Indochina had an effect on the conduct of the [Middle East] negotiations. On the part of our friends, it raised the question of the durability of our assurances. And since one of our problems was to substitute American assurances for some physical terrain features, this was a factor.” And President Ford, in a news conference at San Diego, April 3, 1975, had said: “I believe that in any case where the United States does not live up to its moral or treaty obligations, it can’t help but have an adverse impact on other allies we have around the world.”

Who is to say that the logic of these earlier statements was false? Perhaps only the conclusions were untenable: that the position in Indochina, deemed necessary for America’s global influence and control, could be sustained; or that it was worth what it eventually would cost to maintain—in lives, resources, and destruction.

It may be true that harping on the dominoes, on the probable effects of American unreliability, is a self-fulfilling prophecy. The trouble is that it has a basis in fact, in the independent actions of other parties that are not subject to our control. The corresponding trouble is that the opposite model—that of the liberal critics and now the Administration pragmatists—is not even self-fulfilling. At best it is a self-delusion; indeed, it is designed for domestic consumption, as a salve to our pride, an antidote to “recriminations.” At worst, it could be a multiple disaster, both for those allies who believe it and continue to depend on American assurances, and possibly for us, if we are called upon in the future to redeem our newly reaffirmed expressions of support.

The stubborn latter-day hawks (and their mirror images, our domestic radicals) were always closer to the truth of the matter. Certainly they have been more faithful to their original analysis, which was once the shared wisdom of a wider spectrum of American opinion: Vietnam *did* matter; expressions of American will and intent in one part of the world, or, on the contrary, a default or aborted effort by the United States, do have an effect on other areas, other relationships; they do affect the American position in the world, and consequently the shape of the international system itself. The question was always whether we should accept the challenge or accommodate to the loss, with all its consequences. In any case, the liberal and moderate prognosis of the effects of the end game in Vietnam might be just as shallow as their diagnosis of the significance of Vietnam. The "damage-limiting scenario" is just too good to be true.

III

Before we trace the reactions of allies and the prescriptive lessons for the United States, let us mention some of the things that the outcome in Vietnam does *not* prove—some of the nonessential issues that have been pursued so persistently, with such consequent distraction from the underlying structural lessons that are to be learned.

One such issue—and perhaps the most salient in the waning hours of the war—was the concern that we should honor our debts to those Vietnamese who had believed in and aided our cause; more recently this has centered on the humanity with which we should treat the refugees in our own country. However compelling these claims might be, this issue has mostly served to obscure the significance of the debacle for our strategic position.

Another non-issue that has been aired (again) is the question of whether we were right—or had a right—to intervene in Vietnam in the first place; whether our intervention was an international outrage or a benevolent national gesture; whether, regardless of the effects and the outcome, our motives were correct. This issue could be settled one way or the other without any decisive effect on the real lessons and enduring consequences of the encounter.

Still another distracting question is "who was responsible for the loss?" Many have taken this to be the essential question—the one to be either settled or avoided if we are to escape the recriminations that followed the "loss" of China in 1949. Various propositions have been advanced, none of them conclusive or comprehensive. One is that defeat was the narrow result of Thieu's tactical incompetence—by some accounts, the result of a single error by a single incompetent com-

mander in the highlands of the Second Corps area, who, by a disorderly withdrawal, began the unraveling of Saigon's entire military position. Other interpretations fill the rest of the spectrum of possibilities: the general ineffectiveness of the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam), its continuing reliance on American assistance and methods; the unwillingness of the South Vietnamese to fight, or the fact that they had nothing convincing to fight for; and—closer to home—the failure of Congress to provide enough assistance, the inhibiting effects of the military cutoff of August 15, 1973, in denying the plausible threat of American reintervention or retaliation to police the Paris accords.

A closely related issue is whether Thieu's regime ever "deserved" our support, or whether we should have, or could have, used our leverage to exact his compliance with the Paris accords, and whether this would have averted, postponed—or, on the contrary, hastened—the demise of the Thieu government. The implication of this kind of argument—not always intended—is that we might have salvaged something short of abject defeat, and that in future cases we might make greater use of American influence.

Another non-point is that we "did enough" for South Vietnam, or the Saigon government, or Thieu. But, of course, "enough" to satisfy our private criteria might not be "enough" to satisfy the more objective demands of the situation. The argument implies that we were not enough concerned with the results to make the marginal investment to salvage what we had already invested.

The most weighty of the nonessential issues is whether Vietnam was ever a real interest of the United States. The contention that it was not is one of the props of the damage-limiting argument. If Vietnam was never really an interest, then all we need to do is acknowledge our mistake and the future will hold no terrors for us—indeed, it will present enhanced opportunities for an intellectually regenerated foreign policy. But this would achieve only absolution, not immunity, from the effects of the collapse of South Vietnam. The main point in the argument that Vietnam was of little intrinsic interest for the United States is that our intervention was based on the misperception of the "monolithic" nature of communism. What this contention overlooks, however, is that challenges to the situation of a "great" nation have never come in a single size and shape, but they may nevertheless be challenges. One can doubt—as I do—that the essential integrity of the United States would have been much affected by an unopposed triumph of native Vietnamese communism; but such doubts do not conclusively dispose of the *real* issue: what the United

States would *do* to protect its various interests, and those of its allies, against variegated threats from many quarters—some quite marginal in a strict calculus.

For in the future the probable sources of disorder will be multiple, and not necessarily ideologically aligned or strategically concerted. There will be local revolutionaries; willful nationalists, including, of course, many non-communist states; and opportunistic large powers. The very heterogeneity of communism might make it *more* troublesome for the United States; local communists will be less likely to be restrained by dictation from Moscow, which might well want to preserve détente and some semblance of world order.

What all these non-issues prove is that, if we ask the wrong questions, we are likely to get the wrong answers. The questions are wrong because they are not operational questions about the future of American performance and, in turn, about the reactions of other nations that, together, constitute the shape of the international system.

IV

There are two points to emphasize about the effects of the end game in Vietnam. They add up to the conclusion that the effects are not containable by our own will or desire, since they have to do with objective aspects of the operation of (1) our own system and (2) the international system.

The first point is that the American performance in Vietnam has revealed how our own polity, society, and economy work as a policy-making system—particularly the constraints that Congress and public opinion put on the actions of the executive. Thus, we should ask ourselves how our behavior is likely to manifest itself in future situations, even those that are different in certain respects from Vietnam. After all, it is the future, contingent reactions of a nation that constitute its “policy.” In turn, it is the internal policy process of the nation that defines the limits of American assurances and commitments—including the new assurances our leaders are putting about in the wake of Vietnam. In this respect, the trouble with the new myth of damage-limitation is precisely that it ignores the implications of this policy process. There is not a sufficient realization that policy is the product of systems, not individual wills, and that these systems are complex and have many restraining, as well as motivating, elements. The best intentions, the most earnest attempts at credibility, the highest honor, and the most profound humanity of leaders may be severely impaired, and sometimes completely obstructed, by the operation of the entire political, social, and economic system.

Only those who do not understand the complexity of the total American foreign-policy process will be reassured by the promises of our executive branch. What is at stake is not, after all, the willingness, or good faith, of the President and his advisers. What hobbled U.S. policy in Southeast Asia was not the reluctance of the executive branch to implement its commitments. It was more than willing. What frustrated the American effort at home was the eventual resistance of Congress, and behind Congress, the public, to prolonging sacrifices and risks of lives and resources in situations that were not immediately compelling or clear. Thus, it is not Vietnam directly that will inhibit American responses in the future. It is the *structural* similarity of future challenges, as perceived by the American people and their representatives, that will be likely to evoke the same responses or obstructions, hence the same ultimately effective constraints on American power. There is no reason to think that, after Vietnam, these factors will cease to operate. The reliability of the American response is the first casualty of Vietnam, and particularly of the end game there.

The second point is that the performance of the American system in Vietnam will have a tangible and profound effect on the actions of other countries, allies and adversaries, and will consequently change the shape of the international system. Other nations cannot simply speculate about the future performance of the United States; they must do something about it. Both those nations that have depended on us and those that have feared our response will, respectively, hedge against our default or probe our further reactions. Each nation will do this in its own way, according to its peculiar strategic situation. This is why the "dominoes" are neither perfect as an analogy nor obvious as a fact; but it is also why they are nonetheless real.

The most neutral and general statement one can make is that not only the integrity of alliances, but the whole shape of the international system is built on every country's expectation of the behavior of each important member. For the international system, in the last analysis, is not a simple thing, but a construct of two elements: (1) what countries *can do* to one another; and (2) what they *intend to do* to one another. And both of these elements are inevitably affected by the operation of America's internal system. We cannot undo these principles, since we did not establish them in the first place; they are definitive properties of the system in which we exist as a nation.

Specifically, U.S. leadership in the world—during the long regime of the bipolar system, and the brief reign of the balance of power—has rested on our capacity and resolve, perceived by others, to do some-

thing for our friends if they, or their systems or values, are threatened (or, in a balance of power, to do something even for adversaries for the sake of the stability of the system). There is no reason to believe that our adversaries are going to help us by limiting their efforts now to a more benign competition. The experience of Vietnam has chastened the United States—and perhaps properly so—about the efficacy of force; but the shape and character of the international system still depend on the ability and propensity to use or threaten force, in the last resort, to defend friends, strategic assets, and political values.

Both the bipolar system and more recent balance-of-power politics have depended on the high probability of intervention by a superpower, in this case the United States. In the bipolar system, such intervention would be used to support allies against threats by a major adversary; in the balance of power, to preserve the equilibrium that is the condition for the continuing independence of states. Thus, the collapse of South Vietnam not only has undone the premises of the Nixon Doctrine; it has also provided an early clue to the instability of the balance of power. The dilution of American guarantees makes it both more necessary and more feasible for allies, as the case may be, to seek the protection of the adversary, to accommodate the adversary, to strike a posture of neutrality, to attempt more equidistance between the great powers, or even to pursue self-reliance, perhaps to the point of acquiring a national nuclear force. The type of international system that might emerge from these tendencies will not be the neat structure of manageable pluralism envisaged five or six years ago by Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon. It will be an extreme pluralism of general nonalignment, approximating the quasi-anarchy of a nuclear “unit veto” system.

The point, then, about the American performance in the end game of Vietnam is not simply that the United States failed to re-enter the contest, but that in similar—or even dissimilar—instances in the future it would be subject to the same kinds of constraints. It does not matter that the United States may still remain selectively “interested” in different parts of the globe or that it will undoubtedly retain the raw capacity for a potent response. It certainly does not matter that allies may become the objects of renewed pledges by American leaders. They would be foolish to depend, to the same extent as before, on American guarantees if these were not redundant with alternative defensive or diplomatic arrangements they had already made. Specifically, even less than before, can they now (as in the case of Israel) exchange tangible strategic assets for American guarantees of future contingent support, even in the form of an explicit bilateral mutual-

security pact, let alone the secret, and perhaps illegal, personal promises of a transient Secretary of State. In short, they must hedge—now more widely than ever—against the possible failure of an American response.

Thus, the real lesson—which can be ignored but not escaped—is that both the American role and the shape of the international system as we have known it for the past 25 or 30 years have been irrevocably altered by Vietnam, its outcome, and most of all by the revelation of the American response in the final critical days of the war. For this judgment, it does not matter that we could not do anything effective, or that our support might not have done any lasting good. These facts only aggravate the judgment. Thus, the dependence of allies on our commitments, and the efficacy of these commitments in stabilizing the international order, constitute the second casualty of the end game of Vietnam.

When the matter is put in this way—in terms of structure, cause, and effect—the real issue is clearly not “isolationism.” This facile abstraction not only misrepresents and oversimplifies the American attitude, but it locates the discussion on the wrong ground. We are talking not about a vague, undifferentiated, subjective psychological phenomenon, or a matter of comparative philosophies of an ideal international order. The matter is more tangible and more objective: it lies in the specific operations of the American policy-making system, including its constraining elements; and it lies in the specific responses—the actual reactions, the necessary hedges—of allies, and also the probable strategies of adversaries.

V

In fact, the effects of the end game are rippling out from Vietnam and Cambodia. We have seen the resuscitation of factional warfare in Laos, subverting the accords of 1973. There are the feverish accommodations of Thailand to the concerns not only of China—an old story that dates from the Nixon Doctrine and the American approach to Peking—but also now of Hanoi. The Thai Foreign Minister has referred to the United States as a country that “does not have any morals at this point”—deriding the assurances of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. The Prime Minister of Thailand has ordered the 27,000 U.S. airmen withdrawn by March 17, 1976, and the five U.S.-used bases returned to Thai control.

The government of the Philippines is having second thoughts about the two major U.S. bases on its territory—Clark Air Base and the naval installation at Subic Bay; and President Marcos has challenged

the Mutual Security Treaty with the United States. This shift, like Thailand's, began at the time of the Paris accords. By now, both the bases and the treaty have become net liabilities in the eyes of the Philippine government.

President Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore was wishfully misinterpreted by American editorialists, when he said, "I am not going to talk about dominoes." What he meant might have been precisely the opposite: for he also said that "what is happening [in South Vietnam and Cambodia] is having a profound effect on the minds of others in Southeast Asia, particularly Cambodia's immediate neighbors, the Thais." Lee sees the United States as "no longer [able to] intervene in Southeast Asia," and foresees a regional power contest "mainly between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union."⁶

Taiwan professes to trust the American security guarantee—perhaps because in any case it does not need it for its defense. But it wonders which of Taiwan's interests President Ford might sacrifice in his trip to Peking later this year—since it is abundantly clear that the United States cannot get something for nothing from Peking.

South Korea worries about a North Korean move in 1975 for forcible reunification of the peninsula, and ruminates about acquiring a national nuclear capability. The recent extended visit (April 18–26) of North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung to Peking may be obscure in its specific intent, but it cannot be an accident. At least, judging from reports of the visit in the Chinese press, Peking seems to be sending the United States a harsher message, and a sterner interpretation of the events in Southeast Asia, than most American analysts will admit: that South Korea is a domino—though perhaps not the next; and that we might have been exaggerating China's "need" for American collusion in a stable balance of power in Northeast Asia. Japan, generally unnerved, sent its Foreign Minister to Washington in mid-April 1975 to seek a conspicuous pledge of support for the Security Treaty.

Farther afield, in the Middle East, it may be true that a handful of Gulf sheikhdoms still respect American power. Still, the decisive case is the nation that is faced with the actual choice of trading territorial and strategic assets for American guarantees. This exemplary case, of course, is Israel. Arguments will rage about the effect of the crumbling of Vietnam and Cambodia during March 1975 on the concurrent decision of the Israeli cabinet to reject Kissinger's terms and assurances. But it cannot have failed to have an effect.

⁶ Address to the New Zealand National Press Club, April 7, 1975, *The Washington Post*, April 13, 1975.

Again, it is not the fall of U.S. positions in Southeast Asia that directly affects the decisions and dispositions of nations halfway around the globe; it is the evidence of American attitudes and the demonstration of the operation of the American policy-making system. What is at stake is not the intention of the executive branch to meet its commitments, let alone one man's fervent promises. Rather, it is the calculable ability of the executive branch to back up the personal commitments of leaders, either by mobilizing reluctant American sentiment or circumventing it through deception or the presentation of a *fait accompli*. And in this precise respect, the analogy of the assurances of Nixon and Kissinger to Thieu could scarcely be *more* apposite to Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East.

Even in Europe, the American default in Vietnam has had its indirect effect. No doubt European leaders would prefer to dissociate Vietnam from their own circumstances. They do not relish having to make a precipitate and drastic reassessment of the American connection—whatever its strains and cracks—since any alternative is measurably worse. Nor is it expedient for European leaders to air their private doubts too loudly, or for American leaders to reaffirm any but the most sanguine sentiments of European statesmen. And it is true that the United States is actually in the process of providing three additional divisions oriented to the defense of NATO, as well as improving its readiness to deploy troops to Europe. Moreover, for the first time in eight years, Senator Mansfield, wary of the implications of a steep force reduction at this moment, does not plan to introduce his perennial amendment or resolution to cut forces in Europe. But even Senator Mansfield's temporary reticence may not long hold back the growing American constituency, influenced by the experience of Vietnam, for large-scale troop withdrawals from Europe regardless of strategic consequences. And this possible future deletion of American conventional strength from Europe raises to the surface various proposals to substitute nuclear strategies (the selective use of America's strategic nuclear arsenal, or the development of new tactical nuclear doctrines and weapons, such as "mini-nukes"). All of these create new fears of the decoupling of America's ultimate responses from the fate of Europe; it is no wonder that there are new stirrings of interest in European nuclear alternatives.

VI

There is yet another lesson that our allies will have to draw from Vietnam, and from our manner of leaving it: that the United States will not defend allies as they might prefer to be defended. It is still

possible that we might intervene in some conflicts—particularly where we perceive that the Soviet Union is the real adversary or even the major possible beneficiary. But the United States will fight in its own traditional way.

There is such a thing as “the American way of war.” It arises out of the conditions of our society and our economy. It is capital-intensive, attaching a high value to the trade-off of American dollars against American lives; it does not directly engage many of the “threats” that might be experienced; and it is annihilatingly destructive in the cases where it is applied. One conclusion is that it is simply beyond—or, more properly, beneath—the capabilities and the nature of our system to fight an “un-American” kind of war, such as Vietnam. We, and others, ought to realize that our system cannot be retooled to do this, except at costs that it is not styled to bear.

There is a further corollary to this. The entire American mode of defense is *not* that of a steadily committed global imperial power, continuously maintaining its magnetic field of force over the whole strategic universe. Geography, and the circumstances of the founding and building of this nation, have—for better or worse—endowed us with a “fortress” mentality. We give battle if necessary and when provoked. We are likely to use “leverage” on our ally, to secure certain reforms that will make our temporary alliance with him more palatable to our sensibilities. We will pursue the battle to an unconditional—sometimes unnecessary—outcome; or we will abandon the field when it suits our purposes—when we think we have done “enough.” (President Thieu’s parting complaint, though querulous and ungrateful, was, in this particular sense, quite accurate. After all, the United States extricated itself by bargaining for its prisoners, fabricating an overhead deal with its ally’s mortal adversary, signing a cosmetic and imperfect agreement on behalf of the local contestants, and forcing the deal down its ally’s throat.) The advent of nuclear weapons has, if anything, given us all the more license to behave this way. In sum, our defensive efforts in the world are likely to be last-ditch, self-serving, overwhelming, destructive—and above all intermittent. Potential allies ought to be more wary about inviting the United States to participate in their troubles.

The experience and the outcome of Vietnam have even further skewed the choices that the United States is likely to pursue in waging war. One of the effects of Vietnam was to cast a shadow on the feasibility of limited conventional war. During the decade of the 1960s, limited war (in a spectrum from conventional to subconventional or counterinsurgency) was thought to be the solution to the dilemma of

holocaust-or-paralysis that was ushered in by what Henry Kissinger has called "nuclear plenty." Logically, limited war should be even more appropriate to the succeeding age of "essential equivalence" that we now have. But this logical recourse has been clouded by the experience of Vietnam, considered as a token of an era of advancing diffusion of power. (Diffusion of power takes the form of countervailing reactions by adversaries, uneconomical effects of the application of force, the disintegration of alliances and regional groupings, and the inhibitions placed on governments by the ungovernability of their constituents.)

Whatever the specific or general causes, the American government, by the end of the first Nixon term, had been driven to the conclusion that intervention, if attempted, must be decisive, and escalation purposeful. Indeed, if the culminating North Vietnamese offensive of 1975 had been indefinitely postponed, and if we had been compelled to draw our lessons of Vietnam from the earlier phase—the one that included the blocking of the spring 1972 communist offensive, the mining of Haiphong, and the Christmas bombing of Hanoi that ended in the Paris accords of January 1973—we would have concluded that the decisive application of force, and the further threat of retaliation or escalation, were the lessons of Vietnam. Now, we can conclude only that the choice, for the United States, has been narrowed to decisiveness or default. But neither mode is nicely calculated to mesh with the defensive preferences of our allies.

VII

The more seriously we construe the lessons of the end game of Vietnam, the more we implicitly vindicate the policy-makers of the early and mid-1960s, who responded to the challenge in Vietnam, and the Administration of Nixon and Kissinger, which sought to avoid obvious defeat. Those groups of policy-makers believed that Vietnam was a challenge of more than local or regional import, and one that we could not safely decline, for more than domestic political reasons—for reasons that had to do with the nature of the international system and the continuity of American influence. To expect, now, that they might have viewed the challenge differently, that they might have taken the large risks of default, is, to say the least, anachronistic. However these fateful decisions turned out, they were not trivial or cynical—not some psychological aberration or bureaucratic mindlessness. The very expressions, now, of affirmation of the continuing validity of our other security commitments, by Congressmen and others who had criticized and aborted the Vietnam War, are back-

handed tributes to the seriousness of the effects which, in prospect, impelled those decision-makers to intervene.

Ironically, if our international position is now compromised and if the collapse in Vietnam hastens the evolution of the international system out from under our control, the policy-makers of the Kennedy-Johnson era and the Nixon-Kissinger administration are vindicated—in a way despite themselves. One does not have to accept the validity of the decisions to intervene and escalate in Vietnam. But, to the extent that one rejects these decisions (as I do), one must be willing to accept the train of consequences that will follow from America's default.

Two divergent prescriptions can thus be drawn from the American experience. One would be actively to shore up the American position in the world; deliberately to neutralize the adverse consequences—even, perhaps, to invite some demonstrative confrontation; to rebuild U.S. alliances; to restore our credibility; to make stronger declaratory statements of our resolve. This prescription would imply a conspicuously larger defense budget; it would move American policy away from the incipient balance-of-power policy of Kissinger; and it would move the international system back toward bipolarity.

Another, and opposite, prescription would be to “roll with the punch,” to accommodate oneself to a situation of increasing confusion; to recognize that the damage cannot be limited to Saigon and Phnom Penh, that we can no longer influence events or control the reactions of our allies to the same degree that we did prior to the final collapse of South Vietnam. Nor are we likely even to concert our own political system, to forge a sufficient consensus to respond to marginal challenges that structurally approximate Vietnam. This would be a prescription of disengagement; and the process would not end until we had found a new, obviously defensible security frontier. We would have to reconcile ourselves to a diminished weight in the international system—to let allies make their accommodations, to do some hedging of our own against their defection, and perhaps even to let our adversaries have their season of mischief in the world.

My preference is for this second policy—the substantial political-military disengagement. In fact, it is not so much a preference as a suspicion that the United States, though it might resist, will eventually be forced to embrace this policy. Such a policy would be responsive to the unfolding of the international system in the wake of Vietnam: the diffusion of power to the point where power becomes unmanageable in itself, and unusable in influencing the constructive behavior of other states. Such a policy would also be responsive to a

domestic situation in which an American government will scarcely have the legitimacy to induce its diverse constituencies to support actions, which are not in their obvious and immediate interest, for the sake of remote international order.

This latter prescription is not tantamount to leaving the United States defenseless. It is simply a recognition that an alternative way to avoid the domino effect is to put some space between them, to get the first ones to stand up by themselves, and to make the final domino—ourselves—invulnerable to a host of pressures, and correspondingly resistant to the temptation to intervene.

There is a third kind of prescription proposed by many—one that lies in the center. It would have the United States remain engaged, but more “selectively.” It would seek an active foreign policy for the United States, but with fewer risks and lower costs. It would reaffirm commitments to worthy allies, but attempt to avoid or minimize the consequences of possible contingencies. The proponents of this sort of policy orientation, mostly the “liberal realists,” criticize the engagement in Vietnam primarily on the grounds of its disproportionality to interests that were, at best, marginal. Their diagnosis of the failure in Vietnam rests on the observation of its uniqueness—the special, and especially intractable, circumstances.

Yet this prescription is, upon analysis, less a policy than a hope that nothing will happen to disturb the new composure, the new moderate elite consensus that seems to be forming. The trouble is that it will not be up to the United States to “select” the next threat, the next challenge, the next contingency. The United States will not be able to cut and trim its commitments artfully to fit the cloth of its capabilities—Walter Lippmann’s classic admonition. Our adversaries will not respect our basis of convenient selectivity. And our allies will be wary of accepting the meticulous guarantees of a nation that cannot find the will or the purpose to extend them, or honor them, more generally.

In castigating what they consider the myopia of those who stubbornly chose to stand in Vietnam, the proponents of selectivity forget the fact that wars must be taken as they come, with their intractable features, their uncertainties, and sometimes their long odds against convenient victory. Or wars have to be avoided, in rather wide moves of policy direction, long before they happen. And that surely means a shedding—a devolution, if you will, but not some neat tailoring—of commitments. In the end, the prescription of selectivity of commitments is part of the larger syndrome of myths of the liberal and pragmatic center—a syndrome that includes the myth that the damage of Vietnam can be limited, and the prior myth that Vietnam was a “mis-

take" and unessential to our experience as a nation.

The myths of a nation are functional. They are the half-truths, and half-lies—the explanations we know are false and yet choose to believe—that gloss over divisions and bind a society together. It is almost compelling, therefore, to refrain from challenging them.

But perhaps we should not rest so easily with the new myths of Vietnam. For they are also intended, specifically, to salvage from the debacle of our ambitions and intentions in Vietnam the capacity and the will for further intervention. Of course, there is the hope that the prospective new American global leadership will be benign—humanitarian, economic, diplomatic—anything but "military." Indeed, the apologists for amnesia about Vietnam and renewal of the American global engagement would have it that the principal fault of our prior policy was its "militarization."

Along with this call for a rebirth of American leadership in the world comes, not unnaturally, a call for a renaissance of presidential leadership at home. Saving only the ritual purification of the removal of Richard Nixon, many are already claiming that the pendulum has swung too far toward congressional government, that we face obstruction or incoherence if the tendency goes too long unchecked.

So perhaps this time we must choose between two kinds of "lethality." There are the healing qualities of these myths about Vietnam, particularly their intention to avoid recriminations and divisiveness and enable this country to unite and get on with its business. This is the Lethe of forgetfulness and renewal. But there is also the danger that, by obscuring the causes and consequences of the encounter in Vietnam—by evading sufficiently deep and wide conclusions and the fundamental changes in foreign policy objectives that might follow from them—this country might invite the lethality of another encounter, perhaps in a place, and in circumstances, that do not look like the last one. In short, we might have to choose between some recriminations and the risk of "another Vietnam."

THE DEVOLUTION OF POWER: A DREAM?

By Michel Tatu

IT is almost a mockery to preach European unity in 1975. During recent months, the uncertainty about whether Great Britain will remain in the Common Market and about its future policy regarding Europe has added yet another spot to an already stained canvas. The reality is, in fact, still grimmer. For the last decade, the building of a united Europe has hung fire and the great hopes of the 1960s have evaporated. It is quite miraculous that the Community has not broken up under mounting difficulties and general disillusionment. Why this setback?

The reasons for the present stagnation are not necessarily those that appear in headlines these days. Indeed, public opinion generally construes European activities in terms of periodic "agricultural marathons" in Brussels or the often squalid discussions about the price of beef—or of kangaroo, for that matter. These polemics reflect apparently irreconcilable economic interests but, after all, similar problems arise between different regions of one country without jeopardizing its integrity. Indeed, if the Common Agricultural Policy is defended by some with exaggerated dogmatism and comes to monopolize everyone's attention, it is precisely and unfortunately because Europe is still, above all, just that. Once an industrial or an energy policy, for example, enters the picture, it is quite probable that the possibilities for bargaining will increase and that the agricultural differences will become somewhat less acute.

Another false reason for the faltering of a united Europe is the quarrel about institutions. One of de Gaulle's mistakes, in the mid-1960s, was to concentrate every bit of attention on this question by issuing verdicts from which there was no appeal. By proclaiming himself European while categorically excluding any form of supranationality, the French leader gave the impression of chasing two hares at the same time and also supplied his European partners with an excuse, actually an alibi, for doing nothing. An alibi because in 1974, when Giscard d'Estaing relaxed the French positions and even took the initiative in institutional reform (adoption of the principle of election of the European Parliament by direct suffrage, restriction of the use of the veto, an end to the Gaullist ostracism of the Brussels Commission, etc.), not one of France's partners threw itself into the breach he opened. Perhaps the time will come when the question of institutions is headline news once more; but for the moment it is

obvious that the obstacle lies elsewhere.

The real problem is the absence of political will. Everyone agrees with this, but an attempt should be made to analyze the causes of this lack of will. Why do the European countries lack a shared point of view and the determination that would permit them to unite despite obstacles? Why are their conceptions of Europe so divergent that the Community is prevented from seizing each opportunity for progress that is offered? Let us proceed at once to the conclusions. In my view the principal point of discord among the European countries is the attitude that should be observed regarding the United States, and this is the direct result of the overwhelming role the latter has assumed in assuring Europe's security. In the last analysis, the main obstacle to European unity is Europe's military dependence on the United States and, among other things, the presence of American troops on the Continent.

II

It is inconceivable that a community of states can long survive, much less develop, if the essential ingredient in the makeup of any state or confederation of states—its defense—does not lie in its own hands, or, at least to begin with, in the hands of its members. Doubtless the defense of small and medium-sized nations, today as always, can only be accomplished through an alliance. But if the Atlantic Alliance takes care of all defense needs and if, moreover, this alliance is very much unbalanced—as is the case today between the various European countries and the United States—then the idea of a Community of the Nine is vitiated from the start. Either this community will pursue only modest goals and be at best a customs union; or it will have a political and thus a military component. But in the latter case it will have to be enlarged to encompass all the members of the Alliance, including, of course, the protecting power. Then why not build a community comprising Europe and the United States? In fact, this already exists in NATO and the Atlantic Alliance, but it does not function satisfactorily, precisely because the timid undertakings of the Nine obstruct its actions: there is one community too many. Furthermore, why should anyone be surprised that the Europeans, no longer responsible militarily, should show themselves irresponsible politically, as Kissinger recognizes in his moments of bitter frankness?

Thus, it is the irresponsibility of the Europeans rather than the presumed narrowness of their interests which makes them ineffectual. They should not protest when the American Secretary of State remarks (or deplores, according to one interpretation of his April 1973

speech) that their interests are "regional" compared to the "global" interests of the United States. Every embryonic power center begins by having regional interests and by focusing on them, as the United States itself did at its birth. The principal difference from earlier periods is that nowadays the regional economic interests of Europe to a great extent overlap those of the rest of the world, particularly those of the other industrialized nations. There is solidarity among these nations on a certain number of problems, and therefore dialogue is necessary. But solidarity does not mean identity of interests, nor dialogue alignment. The dialogue cannot be carried out under conditions of equality if one party depends on the other for its security and if the regional interests of the protected nations cannot be asserted politically in the face of the global interests of the protector. Moreover, one cannot reproach the United States for considering its military forces in Europe as part of the global apparatus of its power: this overseas detachment cannot be put into a separate category, for it is part of the whole U.S. strategic concept. The Europeans regularly become aware of this in times of conflict, for instance in the Middle East. It is therefore fruitless for them to hope to translate their regional interests into specific political action and to take up very different positions from those of their protector on controversial subjects.

And still more to the point, their dependence on American military protection is interpreted quite differently by each European country, further complicating the task of political coordination among them. The Federal Republic of Germany, prohibited by treaty from access to nuclear weapons and facing the strongest concentration of Soviet troops in the world, cannot permit any faltering by the United States in its military protection, expressed by the presence on its soil of 200,000 American troops and several thousand tactical nuclear weapons. This insurance policy is *the* defense policy of the country and must take priority over all other considerations. Doubtless Germany, anxious to remain associated with its neighbor, France, and to participate in the building of European unity, does not like to have to choose between "Europe" and the United States. But should it be forced to make a choice, it cannot but choose the United States. Chancellor Schmidt confirmed this without beating around the bush during the energy conference in Washington in February 1974. To a lesser degree, because they are less exposed, Italy, the Netherlands, and the smaller countries of the European Community are in the same situation as West Germany. Except perhaps for Belgium, they are all inclined to make the same choice.

Owing to its geography and its nuclear capability, Great Britain has a certain freedom of choice. But its traditions induce it to choose the Atlantic, and its wider horizons, over Europe. The advances initiated toward Europe by former Prime Minister Heath have not been endorsed by his successor and, even if Great Britain remains in the Community, its present and future leaders are hardly likely to be its enthusiastic partisans. In any case they will not work to reinforce the notion of a "European" Europe, that is to say, a Europe at a certain remove from the United States.

Should the Atlantic Alliance fail, London considers its nuclear force a last recourse and, in the meantime, as no more than a weak contribution. Not only does the maintenance of this force depend on American programs, but at least according to the present government it is also not destined to be expanded beyond its present capacity.

This leaves France, which has, on the whole, the same ability to choose as Great Britain, but in fact uses it quite differently. In substance, the basic orientation has remained the same for the last ten years despite the fact that the Gaullist doctrine was made more accommodating, first under Georges Pompidou and then under Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. This orientation can be summed up in two points:

1. *Priority of "Europe" over transatlantic relations.* In some cases, "Europe" in fact veils specifically French interests; in others—notably under de Gaulle—secondary quarrels about "institutions" have obscured France's "European" commitment. The fact remains that France's attachment to the political construction of Europe should not be doubted, particularly insofar as this construction is considered by Paris as the only possible counterweight to American preponderance and the best framework within which the "French identity" can be safeguarded.

2. *Priority of an independent defense effort*—as demonstrated by withdrawal from the military organization of the Atlantic Alliance and the continued development of a nuclear force making use of entirely national technology and strategy. This priority entails another, less clearly explicit, one: in choosing between reliance on the United States and the French nuclear effort, the latter is considered more important for the country's security, at least in the long run. This does not mean that the Alliance is considered superfluous, rather that it is complementary to France's own nuclear force. In this sense, France's nuclear "strike force" is different from the British nuclear force, because London considers its force an integral part of the Atlantic Alliance, and belonging to the Alliance the most important factor in Britain's military posture.

This writer is not an advocate for the French government and realizes perfectly well that its stand is often considered "selfish," "nationalistic," as setting a "bad example," etc. It is also true that such a posture is only possible because of France's particular historical and geographical situation (Germany, especially, could not permit itself such a policy), and because of NATO's liberal attitude in allowing this "wayward child" to choose from the menu à la carte, taking what she wants from the military and technical programs of the Alliance and rejecting the rest (though this is also, of course, in NATO's interest, as compared to not having France at all). To be sure, the French government realizes the advantage of having American troops in Germany and being able to expand its own forces behind this shield. In this respect France is not utterly "European," since the presence of these troops and the resulting dependence on them form the most important obstacles to the construction of European unity. But France is not alone in closing her eyes to this.

There is at least one area, however, in which the French point of view is valid. To try to explain the situation, in the way so often done on both sides of the Atlantic, as if everything were compatible with everything else—as if the building of a united Europe presented not the smallest contradiction to the expansion of the Atlantic Community and entailed not the slightest change in the relations between Europe and the United States; as if the best "Europeans" were at the same time the most ardent "pro-Americans"—is a bit like wanting to have one's cake and eat it too, or pretending to start a family while continuing to live with one's parents.

Indeed, this might have been possible at the beginning of the construction of "Europe," when the principal political aim of the Community was the reconciliation of France and Germany and when the United States was so disproportionately strong in relation to its allies that it could allow itself to be extraordinarily generous toward them (as was evident in the Marshall Plan). But such an attitude could not be permanent, especially when the United States became more demanding toward its allies, reminding them of their military dependence and requiring that the United States be consulted before the Nine make any political decisions; or when it substituted programs that embraced the "community of industrial democracies" for more modest Common Market undertakings (in the matter of energy, for example). The choice between "Europe" and an "Atlantic" orientation which was thus imposed on the Europeans cannot be escaped. Taking into account the enormous obstacles in the way of building a united Europe, that enterprise can only hope to progress insofar as

it is given the highest priority. In other words, although this displeases Henry Kissinger, the unification of Europe must be an *end in itself*, in the same way that the unification of Italy, the unification of Germany (past and future), and the creation of the United States have been or are ends in themselves.

Does this mean that if a united Europe comes into being it must be formed in opposition to the United States? Certainly not. It is in fact practically certain that, given common democratic ties and the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe, Western Europe will never take the initiative of renouncing the Atlantic Alliance. Barring an unforeseen upheaval, the Alliance will always be a useful complement to Europe's security system, regardless of the state of the European Community and its military organization. But one cannot obscure the fact that an eventual political unification of Europe would put a certain distance between the Continent and the United States: such a unification must happen without the United States and even slightly against its wishes, at least to the extent that Washington would want to control the process and maintain all its positions. Alternatively, if one wants to change nothing in the existing Atlantic Community, and even strengthen it, as Henry Kissinger has apparently desired for the last few years, this objective will prevail and European unification will once again be put off indefinitely.

Stated another way, the basic problem of the Europeans' attitude toward the United States can be summed up by two quite contradictory statements. Any anti-American attitude *divides* the Europeans because of their varying degrees of dependence on the United States, and consequently forms an obstacle to European unity. But at the same time the pro-American attitude maintained in principle by the majority of the European governments *paralyzes* the construction of European unity. The status quo is judged preferable to any initiative that might risk estranging Europe from the United States, or might weaken a protection which the protector is already tending to transform into an instrument for applying pressure.

One need not stress the fact that this situation may very well continue in existence for a very long time and that therefore the building of a united Europe will not take place in the foreseeable future. In theory, doubtless, nothing prevents one from believing that the 250 million West Europeans could defend themselves alone—at least primarily alone, with the Alliance complementary rather than essential as it is today—against a like number of Russians whose economic and even technological potential is largely inferior to that of the Europeans. In fact, for the moment, this is only theoretical. Defense is not

popular, and nobody—not even the French government—is ready to give up the comfort provided by the massive American military presence in Germany, despite the unhealthy aspects of a “gift” which is both periodically questioned by the U.S. Congress and used to put pressure on America’s allies.

More specifically, the Bonn government has every reason to prefer the stronger and at the same time more distant protection of the United States to the weaker but closer protection its neighbors can offer. Among those neighbors, the primary role would be France’s, which would see her theories triumph and impose her conception of a “European” Europe. While Bonn’s position is perfectly legitimate, France’s is less logical. Successive governments in Paris continue to lament the “pro-Americanism” of their neighbors and their refusal to become involved in a “European” Europe, while themselves adapting very well to the conditions which produce both the pro-Americanism and the refusal. One must admit that it would be particularly presumptuous of France to suggest to her neighbors that she provide a hardly credible military protection, and even more so that they substitute this protection for that of the United States. Who would want it? Thus, whichever way you turn, there seems to be no evidence that any initiative is likely to come from the Europeans.

III

Will it come from the United States? That would be more normal since the Americans, after all, supply the military force which benefits the Europeans. It is also the Americans who complain the most about this burden and reproach the Europeans, more or less publicly and with good reason, for their laziness and “irresponsibility.” Finally, it is in the United States that the one serious movement toward changing the status quo is being outlined in the form of the Mansfield Amendment, which aims to reduce the strength of the U.S. Army in Europe by half. Given Congress’ general attitude toward U.S. commitments abroad, and given the restraints Congress has imposed on the Administration concerning Vietnam and Cambodia, the adoption of this amendment must be considered a serious possibility.

The Mansfield Amendment has the advantage of trying to introduce some health into a very unhealthy situation but it is not, by a long shot, the best way of achieving the goal. It has not been accompanied by constructive solutions for replacing the repatriated military forces and, in general, it does not even seek to reduce the degree of Europe’s dependence on the United States as far as security is concerned. It would reduce the *quantity* of troops stationed in Europe but would

modify scarcely at all the *quality* of the relations between the United States and Europe; the same frustrations and even greater fears would remain.

Moreover, this is precisely the way Washington and the Europeans would interpret the sense of the amendment. Assuming that Congress adopted the Mansfield Amendment—or an equivalent troop-reduction plan—Washington would swear to the bereaved Europeans that the United States was more than ever disposed to defend them, that the U.S. commitment had in no way changed, and that the troop reductions would be compensated for by a modernization of their armaments and an increase in their firepower. Airborne exercises would be undertaken to demonstrate to friends and enemies alike that the withdrawn troops would be able to return in minutes in an emergency. Solemn declarations would be signed on both sides of the Atlantic; the European governments would end up by allowing themselves to be convinced and would explain to their public that they had received “every assurance” that the American commitment would be maintained. Thus, the “crisis” would be deflated—until the next alert, that is to say until the arrival of another Mansfield, who would feel that the number of American troops in Europe could and should be reduced again.

It would obviously be preferable to find a fundamental solution to the problem, but which solution? Let us fantasize for a moment. Let us imagine a particularly farsighted American government which, instead of carrying out a rearguard action against the isolationist spirit of the public and the Congress, decided to direct and control this movement and to initiate an orderly withdrawal. Washington would announce that not only the Second World War but the postwar period was over and that a new era had begun. For this reason the United States could neither constitute the essential element in Europe's defense indefinitely nor keep its troops there for centuries. While the Atlantic Alliance would continue to exist, it would have to be restructured, the ideal for the United States being to deal as an equal with a Europe politically and militarily united, and equipped with her own deterrent force. Thus, Washington would be prepared to discuss various stages, to arrange for desirable transitions, and to provide guarantees until the process was completed, but at the end of a certain time, say 10 years at least, perhaps even 15, the American military presence in Europe would come to an end.

It would not be absolutely necessary to adopt this dramatic variation of the scenario right away or to specify the amount of time it would take to carry it out. During the first stage, the government

could confine itself to setting forth the general considerations mentioned above, and accompanying them with two "messages."

One, directed to the British, would free London from the restrictions with regard to nuclear matters that were imposed by the McMahon Act. Great Britain would then be free to transmit the atomic information it had received and to freely cooperate with its European neighbors. Congress would have to authorize this, but that would be the least it could do in exchange for the Administration's support for an improved Mansfield formula.

The other message, directed to the West Germans, would advise them to rely more on their neighbors for their defense. Obviously it could not be a question of "dropping" Germany but of encouraging a progressive substitution for the military apparatus already in place, with American assistance during the necessary transition period. For example, Washington could announce that it would keep its tactical nuclear arsenal in Germany (having previously reduced it to more reasonable dimensions than those currently in place—a task Defense Secretary Schlesinger is already undertaking) as long as the European Community was not in a position to field the equivalent; in 15 years time, it is by no means unthinkable that Europe could achieve this.

All this is, of course, only a dream, but similar ideas sometimes emerge in the United States under the rubric of "devolution of power" at the center of the Alliance. Thus it is worthwhile following the dream to its end by examining the principal objections that are made to it. Two main arguments are put forward. In the first place, it is said that the Soviet Union would consider this a serious "destabilization" and would react aggressively, particularly to the green light that would be given to a European nuclear force with which the Germans would be associated.

The fact is that up to now Moscow has only accommodated itself to "European unity"—and not without reticence and criticism—to the extent that the Community was simply a "common market." Tendencies toward political unification have given rise to even less enthusiasm (but, after all, the little that has been done in this respect in recent years has not caused the U.S.S.R. to object categorically); any move toward military independence would be received with even more reservations.

At the same time, Soviet policy is contradictory. The U.S.S.R. does not want to see any new progress toward European unity and it is doubtless for this reason that it has resigned itself to the principal obstacle to this union, i.e., the American military presence in Europe.

But this does not mean that the Kremlin has accepted this presence once and for all. The disagreements which the American presence creates between the United States and Europe and between the various European states are widely publicized in the Soviet press; anything which might tend to weaken the ties between Washington and the European capitals is welcomed as a good thing. It is hardly in order to displease the Kremlin that the French Communist Party keeps a vigilant guard against any attempt at a rapprochement between France and NATO and even pleads in favor of France's withdrawal from the Alliance.

In other words, the Soviet Union, which sometimes even seems to enjoy its own ambiguous policy, would also like to have its cake and eat it too. Its ideal would be a Western Europe increasingly cut off from America and less and less protected by her, but at the same time not unified on her own terms. Consequently Moscow's most telling reaction to a scenario leading to a devolution of power would not necessarily be 100-percent negative. One of the Russian objectives—putting up obstacles to Europe's unity—would not be achieved, but the second one—a reduction in the American presence—would be.

The balance will nevertheless be negative for the Kremlin, simply because what most appeals to the Soviet leaders in the present situation is that, at some time in the future, the Americans will leave Europe without any offsetting factor. But all the same, one must reckon with the more complex calculations and second thoughts that might influence the Soviet reaction, including tactical considerations at the time.

Might these tactical considerations dictate aggressive behavior only intended to frighten both the Americans and the Europeans? This seems doubtful since a renewed tension in Europe would first result in a reinforcement of NATO—the opposite of Moscow's goal—and would encourage both America and Europe to strengthen their defenses. Clearly, if the United States is to maintain the firmness of its commitment to Europe during the entire transition period (and this is an essential condition to the success of the undertaking), any devolution of power should not and could not be presented in the context of a cold war. It should be undertaken precisely because there would not be any immediate danger; rather, the situation in Europe could be considered stabilized—that is the reason that the United States, more than 30 years after the war, could separate itself from the Continent.

At the same time the military balance would not be affected to the detriment of Soviet interests. Quite the contrary, since it is hardly

likely that the 200,000 American soldiers in West Germany would be replaced, even 10 or 15 years later, by a greater number of European troops.

Why not, then, take advantage of the talks on mutual and balanced force reductions to fix a ceiling on military forces in both parts of Europe, regardless of whether they are "nationals" or simply "stationed" there? Besides, would this not provide Western Europe with significant leverage by demanding that the Russians evacuate their troops from Eastern Europe in the same manner as the Americans from the West? Even if this were only a starting point, it would give the West valuable freedom of action in persuading the Russians to moderate their response.

The status quo would therefore be respected with regard to the quantity of conventional military forces; the only novelty would be a change in the quality of the relations between the United States and Europe. The situation would be different with regard to nuclear power. Here there would be a quantitative impact to the extent that the nuclear programs underway in France and Great Britain would have to be considerably developed.

On the other hand, the change should not be qualitative, at least not on the essential point of the possession and control of these weapons. Even if the Federal Republic of Germany contributes financially to their development, it ought to remain on the whole in a situation identical to its present one with regard to American nuclear weapons, that is to say, in the double-key system. Not only is this a question of respecting the treaties concluded among the allies in the 1950s but also of keeping in mind the dangers inherent in the possession of nuclear weapons by a divided country, and of responding to Russia's legitimate preoccupation on this point.

True, the situation is bound to evolve, since the political and military unification of Europe, strongly stimulated by the devolution of power, would doubtless quite quickly result in the establishment of a European government along the lines of a confederation. But even in this case, provisions would have to be made so that no German alone would be able to decide on the use of nuclear weapons. This would not easily satisfy German pride. But is Bonn's present situation any better, for at the moment the German government is dependent from day to day on a strategy developed in Washington from a necessarily different perspective from its own? On the contrary, the pre-occupations of the Federal Republic might be better heard in the context of a European council, especially since that council would have to delegate to the West Germans increased responsibility with

respect to conventional weapons.

Of course, people will object that there is too great a discrepancy between the American nuclear arsenal and the one the Europeans might dream of building: that the task is too great and therefore unrealistic. In fact, the present discrepancy does not at all mean that Europe could never deter an aggressor. One must consider the question in terms of a 10- or 15-year period.

Obviously Europe cannot aspire, for quite a long time, to the luxury of a Schlesinger Doctrine, which is based on the size of the American arsenal and, by a refined sophistication in the way the arsenal is used, is designed to compensate for the diminished stakes that the arsenal must defend (not only American territory but peripheral objectives as well). As a medium power, Europe can only think of using her deterrent for essential objectives. Europe can thus be satisfied with an anti-city strategy, the only condition being—and here lies the principal lesson that all nuclear powers, even the small ones, must learn from the Schlesinger Doctrine—that her nuclear force must be capable of being divisible, which is to say that each firing must be accompanied by the further threat of inflicting even greater damage. At the end of the present programs, that is to say before the end of the decade, France and Great Britain together will have at their disposal 11 missile-launching submarines. Even without multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles, it would only take 13 to destroy the 50 principal Russian cities; if one considers the “worst case hypothesis” as far as Russian defense is concerned, perhaps 20 such submarines would be needed.¹ Is this objective beyond the reach of the economic resources of France, West Germany, Great Britain and their partners in the European Community?

Technical aid from the United States is not inconceivable, although it is certainly debatable given the Nonproliferation Treaty and the spirit of past agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. Instead of this aid, which does not appear to be imperative, a political go-ahead from Washington and a U.S. determination to ensure the transition and those guarantees affecting it seem to be more important.

The second argument currently put forward against the idea of the devolution of power is that the withdrawal of the United States would throw the Europeans into a panic: they would run to Moscow to negotiate an accommodation. Europe would thus provide for her own “Finlandization”—in other words, a progressive loss of her ability to

¹ Cf. “Nuclear Forces for Medium Powers,” by Geoffrey Kemp, London: Adelphi Papers, Nos. 106 and 107, Autumn 1974.

resist and of her determination to remain independent in the face of Soviet pressure.

First of all it must be noted that this argument contradicts the preceding one and that it is difficult to sustain both at the same time. If indeed the European reaction were to be one of "Finlandization," why would the Russians object to a devolution of power? To assume in advance a hostile Soviet reaction is to admit that the European "collapse" would not be as automatic as is claimed.

Actually, the "Finlandization" argument resembles more a stratagem to dissuade the Americans ("remain in Europe, otherwise you will lose it") than a reality. Every government and every society seeks security not in order to become part of one or another system and thus as an end in itself, but because security will permit the government or the society to maintain its identity and its values. Just as a shipwrecked person who has lost one plank will not let himself drown but will look for another plank, so there is no reason to suppose that the European governments, not abandoned by America but simply invited to take charge progressively of their own defense, will immediately give up the values in whose name they so long attached themselves to America. This is especially so if a solution for replacement is suggested, in the form of a European unity for which they have clamored for almost 20 years and which would have the blessing of the United States.

Must one believe that the European attachment to liberalism and democracy is valid only so long as the United States is willing to guarantee these values? Or is it rather the contrary, that the alliance with America springs from the Europeans' own attachment to these values? The argument that Europe would turn herself into another Finland lacks dignity as well as cogency. It aims above all at justifying to the Americans the indefinite maintenance of a status quo which itself could lead to "Finlandization"; for the state of irresponsibility in which this status quo confines Europe is more likely to lead to European abdication than anything else. Moreover, who can be sure that one day the entente between the two superpowers will not result in forcing a progressive neutralization of the "clients" of whichever superpower loses momentum?

Finally, the thought of a rush to Moscow to negotiate the conditions of a "new security system" seems hardly reasonable: with what trumps and with what object in mind would this curious "negotiation" be carried out? What value could one give to "agreements" negotiated under these conditions between disunited Europeans who felt themselves abandoned by their protector and a Soviet Union more powerful than ever?

IV

Actually, even setting aside these objections, the devolution of power remains a dream, because it seems extremely unlikely that an American government would ever launch such an undertaking. Doubtless this devolution of power would be in America's long-range interest. The "European," that is to say independent, Europe that would result would certainly be a more solid ally than the present conglomeration of client-states with their frustrations, their lassitude, and their fears. What Mr. Kissinger calls a community of industrial democracies would then rest on two more-equal pillars, at least on both sides of the Atlantic. Its survival would be far better ensured over the long run than by an indefinite reliance solely on the United States, a power itself no longer immune from crises, and which periodically balks at the extent of its commitments. A united Europe would not even mean abandonment by the United States of its strategic interests in Europe, nor the end of its military protection, at least if Washington so desired. It is simply that the protection would only come into force at the third stage, because American strategic power would be kept in reserve until after the Europeans had used their tactical nuclear weapons and their own capacity for dissuasion. As has already been pointed out, all forms of security would be combined, and the Europeans would never refuse this supplementary guarantee, this added uncertainty to be taken into account by any possible aggressor.

At the same time, such a devolution of power in Europe would reduce the net power of the United States and its role in the world. A true community of states in Western Europe would trim the U.S. sphere of influence, and this new center of power would inevitably establish itself as a competitor. If, historically, many nations have had to *consent* to such a development, none has actually *encouraged* it. The scenario for the devolution of power given here implies not only that the United States take the initiative for a withdrawal, but also that it impose it on its European partners, all of whom, as has been said, prefer the status quo and their dependent situation. An inordinate amount of generosity, farsightedness, and courage would be required. Although America has given evidence of possessing all of these qualities many times in her history, it is asking a bit much to hope that she manifest them all at once and embark on this difficult task.

Since it is virtually out of the question that the Europeans will take the initiative, nothing will happen. Does that mean that the situation

will thus remain the same until the end of the century or longer? Certainly not, because the evolution evident during recent years will continue its work of erosion: the desire of the American public and of Congress to reduce the American military presence abroad, the American feeling of being overcommitted, the European frustration with having to pay politically and economically for this wavering security, the fear of suffering the fate of Vietnam, the inability to bring about European unity. A destabilization is inevitable, but what kind?

There is one small element to be considered, however. France's nuclear force, no longer negligible, could, in 10 or 20 years at its present rate of development, achieve a level of credibility which could interest France's European neighbors as well. After all, the progressive construction of this force is the only new qualitative development in 15 years in the field of European defense.

Two curves, however, run through this landscape. One is the credibility of American protection: set high, it extends along the top of the horizon but with a tendency to slant downward. The other is the credibility of the French nuclear deterrent (not the arsenals themselves but their capacity to dissuade an aggressor within the context of the defense of Europe): set low, it is climbing, even though its level is ridiculously low in the opinion of Americans and a number (though less considerable) of Europeans. Only perhaps in the distant future will the two curves finally intersect.

THE STRATEGY OF TERRORISM

By David Fromkin

THE grim events at the Athens airport on August 5, 1973, were in a sense symbolic. Dreadfully real to those who were involved, the occurrences of that day also transcended their own reality, somewhat as myths do, epitomizing an entire aspect of contemporary existence in one specific drama.

When the hand grenades were hurled into the departure lounge and the machine gunners simultaneously mowed down the passengers waiting to embark for New York City, it seemed incomprehensible that so harmless a group should be attacked. The merest glance at their hand-luggage, filled with snorkels and cameras, would have shown that they had spent their time in such peaceful pursuits as swimming, sunbathing, and snapping photos of the Parthenon.

The raid had been undertaken on behalf of an Arab Palestine. Yet the airport passengers had done the Arabs no harm. Their journey had only been to Greece. Palestine had nothing to do with them; it was another country, across the sea, and its problems were not of their making. Moreover, Athens was a capital friendly to the Arab cause—as was Paris, the scene of more recent airline attacks.

Similar incidents have occurred with terrible frequency throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The generations that have come to maturity in Europe and America since the end of the Second World War have asked only to bask in the sunshine of a summertime world; but increasingly they have been forced instead to live in the fearful shadow of other people's deadly quarrels. Gangs of politically motivated gunmen have disrupted everyday life, intruding and forcing their parochial feuds upon the unwilling attention of everybody else.

True, other ages have suffered from crime and outrage, but what we are experiencing today goes beyond such things. Too small to impose their will by military force, terrorist bands nonetheless are capable nowadays of causing enough damage to intimidate and blackmail the governments of the world. Only modern technology makes this possible—the bazooka, the plastic bomb, the submachine gun, and perhaps, over the horizon, the nuclear mini-bomb. The transformation has enabled terrorism to enter the political arena on a new scale, and to express ideological goals of an organized sort rather than mere crime, madness, or emotional derangement as in the past.

Political terrorism is a distinctive disorder of the modern world. It originated as a term and, arguably, as a practice, less than two cen-

turies ago and has come into the spotlight of global conflict in our lifetime. Whereas both organized and irregular (or guerrilla) warfare began with the human race, political terrorism emerged as a concept only in 1793. As a political strategy, it is both new and original; and if I am correct, its nature has not yet fully been appreciated.

Of course nobody can remain unaware of the upsurge of global terrorism that has occurred in recent years. But the novelty of it has not been perceived. Force usually generates fear, and fear is usually an additional weapon. But terrorism employs the weapon of fear in a special and complicated sort of way.

II

The disassociation of fear from force in the context of organized politics emerged first in the Reign of Terror, the episode (1793–1794) during the history of revolutionary France from which the English and French words for terrorism derive. The terrorists in question were, of course, Robespierre and his satellites, St. Just and Couthon. Sitting as a faction in the Committee of Public Safety, their accusations of treason sent victims to the guillotine in droves. By the mere threat of accusation against their fellow Committee members, they used the entire Committee, thus united, in order to dominate the National Convention and the other public bodies of the French Republic.

Robespierre was overthrown when his system was used against him. His mistake was in letting Joseph Fouché know that he was the next intended victim; and Fouché, the wily intriguer who later became Napoleon's minister of police, made the best possible use of his few remaining days. He persuaded the feuding, rival politicians of his day that they had to unite against the triumvirs or else face execution one by one; fear of the regime should cause them not to serve it, but to overthrow it. On 8 Thermidor (July 26, 1794) Robespierre made another mistake when he told the Convention that he had prepared a new list of traitors in their midst—and then refused to tell them whose names were on the list. Fouché's warnings were confirmed, and his counsel was heeded. When Robespierre entered the National Convention late in the stormy summer morning of 9 Thermidor, he found a mob of delegates united by the determination to murder him before he could murder them; and that was the end of him.

Robespierre had coerced a nation of 27 million people into accepting his dictatorship. His followers sent many thousands either to jail or to their deaths; one scholar's estimate is 40,000 deaths and 300,000 arrests. Yet when retribution came and Robespierre and his group of

supporters were executed, it turned out that in all there were only 22 of them.

Of course it is not meant to suggest that this is the whole story of the French Terror. Yet what emerges most strongly from any account of these events is the dramatic disparity between the objective weakness of the Robespierre faction, whose numbers were few and whose military resources were limited, and their immense subjective power, which allowed them to kill, imprison, or control so many. There was no need to fear the triumvirs other than the fact that other people feared them and therefore would execute their orders. Their power was unreal; it was an illusionist's trick. No citadels had to be stormed, no armies had to be crushed, in order to overthrow them. If the public ignored what they said, then the terrorists went back to being political nobodies. Their dictatorship vanished in an instant when Robespierre and his colleagues were prevented from reaching the speakers' platform on 9 Thermidor.

In the end, the terrorists overreached themselves, and men saw through them and stood up to them. Then—and only then—it became clear that France had never had anything to fear from them other than fear itself.

III

Perhaps the closest parallel to Robespierre's method was that followed by the late Senator Joseph McCarthy in 1950–54. Like Robespierre, McCarthy claimed to have lists of traitors whose names he would not immediately reveal, and many did his will in order to avoid being accused by him of treason or of lack of patriotism. And, like Robespierre's, his power stopped when he went too far and Joseph Welch, his Fouché, stood up to him on television. But McCarthy never seized supreme power in the country, nor did his accusations send people to the guillotine. In that sense it can be said that Robespierre has had no successors.

Since his time, in fact, political terrorism has become especially notorious in a different cause from that in which Robespierre used it. It has been used to destroy governments rather than to sustain them. This changed the way in which many people thought of it as a political strategy and how they viewed its adherents. As revolutionaries, terrorists have come to seem romantic figures to many. Their life of dangers and disguises, risks and betrayals, conspiracies and secret societies, exerted a powerful fascination. As torn and tormented characters, they provided authors with the stuff of which complex and interesting novels can be made.

Though the terrorists seemed romantic, until recently they also seemed ineffective. Until the Irish Treaty of 1921, they scored no significant political successes. The most famous of the terrorist groups up to that time was the Terrorist Brigade of the Russian Socialists-Revolutionists; and not merely did they fail to change the Tsarist government in the ways in which they desired, they also failed to pick up the pieces when it was overthrown by others. Plekhanov, Lenin, Trotsky and the other Russian disciples of Marx had seen more clearly in placing their emphasis on mass organization rather than on individual terrorism. The Bolsheviks came to power by winning the metropolitan workmen, the sailors of the Baltic fleet, and the soldiers to their side. Organization proved to be the key to victory. It was not individual gunmen but armed masses who seized power in Russia. Revolution, like war, is the strategy of the strong; terrorism is the strategy of the weak.

It is an uncertain and indirect strategy that employs the weapon of fear in a special sort of way in which to make governments react. Is fear an effective method? Is fright any kind of weapon at all? What can terrorists hope to accomplish by sowing fear? How can it help their side to vanquish its opponents? Clearly it can do so in many ways. Fright can paralyze the will, befuddle the mind, and exhaust the strength of an adversary. Moreover, it can persuade an opponent that a particular political point of view is taken with such deadly seriousness by its few adherents that it should be accommodated, rather than suffering casualties year after year in a campaign to suppress it.

All of these elements came together, for example, in the struggle that led to the independence of southern Ireland. It is difficult to disentangle the role of terrorism in this achievement from the other elements that were involved, for the Irish also had put in motion what was, in effect, a guerrilla warfare campaign. Moreover, the Liberal members of the coalition that then governed the United Kingdom had a political commitment that went back more than a quarter of a century to the cause of Irish Home Rule. Yet there can be little doubt that terrorism played a major role in causing Britain to tire of the struggle.

Terrorism can also make heroes out of gunmen, and thereby rally popular support to their cause. The problem this creates for them is that when the time comes to make the compromises necessary in order to negotiate the terms of their victory, the glamour wanes, and with it, the political support. Michael Collins was a romantic figure who captured the imagination of all Ireland as long as he was an outlaw; but when he sat down to make peace, he was seen by many in a much

different light. As he signed the Irish Treaty of 1921 on Britain's behalf, Lord Birkenhead remarked to Collins, "I may have signed my political death-warrant tonight"; to which Collins replied, "I may have signed my actual death-warrant." Eight months later Michael Collins lay dead on an Irish roadway with a bullet through his head.

Just as it can make gangsters into heroes, terrorist provocations can also make policemen into villains. The Black-and-Tans who fought the Irish revolutionists were, in an objective sense, so successful at repression that Michael Collins told an English official afterwards, in regard to the July 1921 peace negotiations: "You had us dead beat. We could not have lasted another three weeks." Yet Black-and-Tan methods made the cause of repression so odious that Britain was induced to choose another course of action.

Brutality is an induced governmental response that can boomerang. It is this ability to use the strength of repression against itself, in many different ways, that has enabled terrorist strategies to succeed in many situations that have, rightly or wrongly, been described as colonialist in the modern world.

IV

Sophisticated approaches have been developed along these lines. One of these was explained to me and to others at a meeting in New York City sometime in 1945 by one of the founders of the Irgun Zvai Leumi, a tiny group of Jewish militants in what was then the British-mandated territory of Palestine. His organization had no more than 1,000 or 1,500 members, and it was at odds with the Palestinian Jewish community almost as much as it was with the mandatory regime. Yet he proposed to combat Great Britain, then a global power whose armed forces in the Second World War numbered in the millions, and to expel Great Britain from Palestine.

How could such a thousand-to-one struggle be won? To do so, as he explained it, his organization would attack property interests. After giving advance warning to evacuate them, his small band of followers would blow up buildings. This, he said, would lead the British to overreact by garrisoning the country with an immense army drawn from stations in other parts of the world. But postwar Britain could not afford financially to maintain so great an army either there or anywhere else for any extended period of time. Britain urgently needed to demobilize its armed forces. The strain would tell; and eventually economic pressure would drive the Attlee-Bevin government either to withdraw from Palestine or else to try some reckless

and possibly losing gamble in an effort to retrieve the situation.

It can be argued that such is in fact what happened. Of course Britain might have withdrawn anyway, at some other time or for some other reason. But that is really beside the point, for the Irgun wanted independence then and there, in order to open up the country to refugees from Hitler's Europe. They got what they wanted when they wanted it by doing it in their own way.

There were two flaws in the Irgun strategy. It would have failed had the British not reacted to the destruction of buildings as they were expected to do. If instead they had done nothing at all, maintained only a modest military garrison, and sent for no reinforcements, all that would have happened would have been that a few more buildings would have been blown up and the owners would have collected the insurance money and would have rebuilt them; and the Irgun would have proved a failure.

In the second place, the plan of attacking property without hurting people proved to be unrealistic. Accidents inevitably occur when violence is unleashed. Almost a hundred persons were killed when the Irgun blew up the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. According to the plan, they should have been evacuated before the blast, but in actual life people misunderstand, or their telephone line is busy, or somebody forgets to give them the message in time. Moreover, terrorism generates its own momentum, and before long the killing becomes deliberate. The bloodshed caused by the Irgun isolated it politically and alienated the rest of the Palestinian Jewish community. The British failed to perceive or exploit this situation. But Ben-Gurion did; in 1948 he made use of it to crush the Irgun, for the Israeli army might have been unwilling to carry out orders to attack those unloading the Irgun ship the *Altalena*, if the Irgun had not used up its political credit before then by the taking of too many lives.

Yet despite its flaws, the strategy was sufficiently ingenious so that the Irgun played a big part in getting the British to withdraw. Its ingenuity lay in using an opponent's own strength against him. It was a sort of jujitsu. First the adversary was made to be afraid, and then, predictably, he would react to his fear by increasing the bulk of his strength, and then the sheer weight of that bulk would drag him down. Another way of saying this is that the Irgun, seeing that it was too small to defeat Great Britain, decided, as an alternative approach, that Britain was big enough to defeat itself.

V

In the 1950s, the nationalist rebel group in Algeria developed yet

another method of using the strength of an occupying power against itself. Their method was to induce that strength to be used as a form of persuasion.

For, in Algeria, the whole question was one of persuasion. The problem initially faced by the miniscule band of Algerian nationalists that called itself the National Liberation Front (or, in its French initials, FLN) was that Algeria at that time had little sense of national identity. Its population was not homogeneous; and the Berbers, the Arabs, and the settlers of European descent were peoples quite different from one another. The name and separate existence of Algeria were only of recent origin. For most of recorded history, Algeria had been no more than the middle part of North Africa, with no distinct history of its own. Legally it was merely the southern part of France. The French had treated Morocco and Tunisia as protectorates, with separate identities, but not Algeria, which was absorbed into France herself. With sarcasm, Frenchmen used to reply to Americans who urged independence for Algeria by saying that, on the same basis, the United States should set Wisconsin free or give back independence to South Carolina.

It was a jibe that went to the heart of the matter. Colonial empires were coming to an end in the 1950s and 1960s. If Algeria was a nation, then inevitably it would be set free to govern itself. Only if it were genuinely a part of France could it continue to be ruled from Paris. All depended, therefore, on whether the indigenous population could be convinced by the French government that Algeria was not a separate country, or upon whether they could be persuaded by the FLN to change their minds so as to think of themselves as a nation.

The FLN strategy of terrorism addressed itself to this central and decisive issue. By itself, as has been said, terror can accomplish nothing in terms of political goals; it can only aim at obtaining a response that will achieve those goals for it. What the FLN did was to goad the French into reacting in such a way as to demonstrate the unreality of the claim that there was no distinct Algerian nation. Unlike the Irgun, the FLN did not set out to campaign merely against property; it attacked people. It used random violence, planting bombs in market places and in other crowded locations. The instinctive French reaction was to treat all persons of non-European origin as suspects; but, as Raymond Aron was to write, "As suspects, all the Muslims felt excluded from the existing community." Their feeling was confirmed when, in the middle 1950s, the authorities further reacted by transferring the French army units composed of Muslim Algerian troops out of Algeria and into mainland France,

and replacing them in Algeria by European troops. By such actions they showed in the most unmistakable way that they regarded no Algerians as Frenchmen except for the European settlers. They spoke of we and us, and of they and them, and did not realize that their doing so meant the end of *Algérie Française*.

Thus the French conceded the issue of the war at its very outset. They threw away the potential support of Muslim Algeria because they were skeptical of the possibility that it could be obtained. From that moment the conclusion of the conflict was foregone. Once the sympathies of the population had shifted to its side, the FLN was able to outgrow mere terrorism and to organize a campaign of guerrilla warfare. It also was enabled to appeal to world sympathies on behalf of a people fighting for its freedom. From the French point of view all had become hopeless; for no amount of force can keep an unwilling population indefinitely in subjection. Even though the FLN had written the script, the French, with suicidal logic, went ahead to play the role for which they had been cast.

The FLN success was therefore a special case. It required a particular kind of opponent. It could not be duplicated in other circumstances and conditions.

VI

Revolutionist-terrorists of the last decade have failed to perceive the special characteristics of the colonialist situation that facilitated success for Irish, Irgun, and Algerian terrorists. They have tried to apply the strategy of terrorism in situations that are essentially different. This has been true, for example, of extremist groups seeking to overthrow liberal-pluralistic regimes during the 1960s. Their theory has been that their terrorist attacks would force hitherto liberal regimes to become repressive, a change which in turn would alienate the masses, thus setting the stage for revolution. But it has not worked out that way in practice. In the United States, for example, terrorist bomb attacks have not led to any change at all in the form of government, much less to a transformation of America into a police state. On the other hand, in Uruguay, once the model democracy of Latin America, the terror of the Tupamaro bands has led to a military dictatorship that brutally destroyed the Tupamaros, but that does not seem, at least as yet, to have led to the predicted reaction by the masses in favor of revolutionary action.

Other revolutionary groups have taken a somewhat different approach. They have argued that liberal democracies are already police states. Thus, the object of revolutionary terrorist action should

be to reveal this hidden reality to the population at large. Unthinking reaction by the authorities to terrorist provocation would accomplish the desired result. Thus the aim of terrorism would be to trick the government into taking off its mask.

In open societies such as Great Britain and the United States, the liberal democratic features have proved to be a face and not a mask: there is nothing to take off, and the strategy failed because its factual premise proved to be untrue.

In closed societies, the strategy has been to show that authoritarian regimes are actually impotent despite their outward show of virility. In such circumstances, supposedly, by demonstrating that the public authorities are powerless to enforce law and order, a campaign of terror can cause a government to collapse; but the flaw in the theory is that the terrorists usually are not strong enough to take its place. Either some more broadly based group will seize power, or else, as in Argentina, private groups will take the law into their own hands and retaliate in kind against murder and extortion, so that society relapses into a semi-anarchic state of reprisals and blood feuds, where terrorists are buried with their victims.

VII

It is against this background that Arab Palestinian terrorism has seized the attention of the contemporary world. It is aimed at Israel; it is aimed at the Arabs who live within Israel; and it is aimed at the world outside. It is, in other words, a mixed strategy. Each of its mixed aspects has to be considered separately. All that Arab terrorism can accomplish in the land that has been promised to so many is to frighten and to threaten the Arab inhabitants of Israel in order to keep them from cooperating with the Israeli authorities. Israel itself, however, cannot be terrorized into disappearing of its own accord; yet removing Israel from the map has long been the proclaimed goal of the Arab terrorist movement.

Terrorism can be employed more successfully in colonialist situations than in Palestine because a colonial power suffers the disadvantage of fighting the battle away from its own base, and also because a colonial power, having a country of its own to which it can withdraw, is under no compulsion to fight to the bitter end. The Israelis, though termed colonialist by the Arabs, are fighting on home territory, and they have no other country to which they can withdraw; they fight with their backs to the sea. They can be goaded into a self-defeating reaction, but unless they permit that to happen, nothing can be done to their domestic public opinion that is likely to destroy them.

The Arab terrorists therefore have turned elsewhere, and have attacked the arteries of world transportation in hopes that a world indifferent to the merits of the Arab-Israeli dispute will turn against the Israelis in order to end the annoyance of a disrupted airline service.

In doing so they have strayed across a frontier and into the eerie world of Mr. McLuhan, and they have transformed terrorism into a form of mass communication—but communication aimed at the whole world and not, as in the case of Algeria, mostly at the indigenuous population. Theirs is a campaign that needs publicity in order to succeed, and therefore they have come to operate within the ambit of contemporary public relations and communications arts: the world of cinema, camp fashion, and pop art, in which deadlines and prime-time are the chief realities and in which shock value is the chief virtue. If audiences throughout the world react with horror, and turn against the political cause in whose name so many innocent people have been harmed and killed, the strategy will have backfired. So far they have not done so and it has not done so.

It is a corruption of the human spirit for which all political sides are responsible. The left-wing journalist Paul Johnson wrote an article some months back arguing that left-wing movements are as much at fault as anybody else for accepting the murder of the innocent as a legitimate means for the pursuit of political ends. He quoted the sixteenth-century humanist Castello, "who was lucky to escape burning by both Catholics and Protestants, and who pointed out in his tract for toleration, *Whether Heretics Are To Be Persecuted?*, that no certitude of righteousness justifies violence: 'To kill a man is not to defend a doctrine, it is to kill a man'." Appalled at the welcome accorded by the United Nations to the leader of the Arab terrorists, Johnson wrote that, "Step by step, almost imperceptibly, without anyone being aware that a fatal watershed has been crossed, mankind has descended into the age of terror."

VIII

If this is an age of terror, then it has become all the more important for us to understand exactly what it is that terrorism means. Terrorism, as has been seen, is the weapon of those who are prepared to use violence but who believe that they would lose any contest of sheer strength. All too little understood, the uniqueness of the strategy lies in this: that it achieves its goal not through its acts but through the response to its acts. In any other such strategy, the violence is the beginning and its consequences are the end of it. For terrorism, how-

ever, the consequences of the violence are themselves merely a first step and form a stepping stone toward objectives that are more remote. Whereas military and revolutionary actions aim at a physical result, terrorist actions aim at a psychological result.

But even that psychological result is not the final goal. Terrorism is violence used in order to create fear; but it is aimed at creating fear in order that the fear, in turn, will lead somebody else—not the terrorist—to embark on some quite different program of action that will accomplish whatever it is that the terrorist really desires. Unlike the soldier, the guerrilla fighter, or the revolutionist, the terrorist therefore is always in the paradoxical position of undertaking actions the immediate physical consequences of which are not particularly desired by him. An ordinary murderer will kill somebody because he wants the person to be dead, but a terrorist will shoot somebody even though it is a matter of complete indifference to him whether that person lives or dies. He would do so, for example, in order to provoke a brutal police repression that he believes will lead to political conditions propitious to revolutionary agitation and organization aimed at overthrowing the government. The act of murder is the same in both cases, but its purpose is different, and each act plays a different role in the strategies of violence.

Only an understanding of the purpose for which such an act is undertaken can enable us to know the nature of the act. When Julius Caesar was murdered in the Roman Senate, it was an assassination of the traditional sort, intended to eliminate a specific figure from the political scene; but had he been killed there by the representative of a subversive sect, intent on plunging his dagger into the first Roman leader he encountered in order to provoke a certain political response from the Senate, it would instead have been an act of political terrorism.

It is because an action of the same sort may be undertaken by two different groups with two quite different ends in view that terrorism is so often confused with guerrilla warfare, for terrorists and guerrillas often seem to be doing the same sorts of things. Both of them, for example, often sabotage transportation facilities. When T. E. Lawrence led his classic guerrilla warfare campaign against Turkish rule in Arabia, he systematically dynamited railway tracks and bridges. Lawrence's strategy was later explained by Winston Churchill as follows: "The Turkish armies operating against Egypt depended upon the desert railway. This slender steel track ran through hundreds of miles of blistering desert. If it were permanently cut the Turkish armies must perish." And Lawrence therefore rode on camel-

back across the sands to destroy the enemy army by blowing up its transportation facilities. In recent years those who say that they wish to destroy the state of Israel have also blown up transportation facilities in the Arab desert; in this case, jet airplanes belonging to civil aviation companies. Yet if thereby they were to permanently cut the airline networks of TWA or BOAC they would not cause the Israeli army to perish. Indeed the fate of such civil aviation companies is a matter of indifference to the terrorists. Lawrence the guerilla leader attacked a railway because he wanted to destroy it, whereas Arab terrorists attack an airline even though they do not want to destroy it.

The distinction is of more than academic importance. The French lost their empire over Algeria when they mistook terrorism for guerrilla warfare. They thought that when the FLN planted a bomb in a public bus, it was in order to blow up the bus; whereas the real FLN purpose in planting the bomb was not to blow up the bus, but to lure authorities into reacting by arresting all the non-Europeans in the area as suspects.

The terrorist is like a magician who tricks you into watching his right hand while his left hand, unnoticed, makes the switch. It is understandable that the French authorities in Algeria became totally obsessed by the need to stamp out criminal attacks, but it was fatal to their policy to do so, for the violent attacks were merely a subsidiary issue. The tiny FLN band of outlaws could have blown up every bus in all of Algeria and never won a convert to their cause of independence. Failing to understand the strategy of terrorism, the French did not see that it was not the FLN's move, but rather the French countermove, that would determine whether the FLN succeeded or failed.

It may be the case that the current Israeli policy of attacking Arab terrorist bases in southern Lebanon is another example of concentrating too much attention on preventing terrorist actions and too little attention on foiling terrorist purposes. The Israeli policy is certainly understandable on many grounds, and valid arguments can be adduced in its support; but the weakening of an essentially benevolent Lebanese government, as well as the further estrangement of world opinion, are results of the Israeli raids into Lebanon that may outweigh the value of using that particular approach to the problem of combating terrorism.

For the Israelis, threatened by enemies outside of their society, the problem is an enormously difficult one. For societies threatened only by enemies from within, it is considerably less so. The very wicked-

ness of terrorism makes it a vulnerable strategy in such a society. Other strategies sometimes kill the innocent by mistake. Terrorism kills the innocent deliberately; for not even the terrorist necessarily believes that the particular person who happens to become his victim deserves to be killed or injured. It is horrifying not merely because of the deed that is done but also because at first the deed seems pointless. If you want to make war on the United States on behalf of Puerto Rican independence, why blow up a historic tavern in New York's financial district? What has Fraunces Tavern got to do with Puerto Rico? Why not attack the alleged forces of occupation in Puerto Rico instead? If you opposed by force and violence the continuation of U.S. aid to South Vietnam, why threaten to destroy the Smithsonian Institution? What had its plant collections and its ichthyological specimens to do with American policy in Southeast Asia? The destruction seems so purposeless that it is a natural reaction to turn on those who perpetrate it in hatred and in anger.

The tragedies that befall great public figures can sometimes seem to have been deserved; but when a man on the street is killed at random on behalf of a cause with which he had nothing to do, it is a different matter and provokes a different reaction. In a homogeneous society, at any rate, it leads to a reaction against the terrorism, and it renders it vulnerable to a campaign that politically isolates it in order to physically destroy it, for the nature of the attacks tends to demonstrate that terrorists are enemies of the people rather than merely of the government. It is for this reason that Che Guevara, as a theoretician and practitioner of guerrilla warfare, warned against the strategy of terrorism, arguing that it hinders "contact with the masses and makes impossible unification for actions that will be necessary at a critical moment."

Even in the international arena, terrorist movements are vulnerable when their actions alienate support. This was tacitly recognized by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) when on January 29, 1975, it announced that henceforth it had decided to treat hijacking of airplanes, ships, or trains as crimes and would impose death penalties on hijackers if their actions led to the loss of life. Whether the PLO will indeed abandon its campaign of terror against international transportation remains to be seen. Yet the declaration of its intention to do so is in itself significant, for it suggests a realization that a point has arrived when a public identification with terrorist activity will harm rather than help. This is because terrorism is so much more evil than other strategies of violence that public opinion sometimes can be rallied against it.

Indeed, in view of its inherent weakness, it is remarkable how many political successes have been scored by the strategy of terrorism in the last few decades. Its success seems to be due in large part to a miscomprehension of the strategy by its opponents. They have neglected the more important of the two levels on which terrorism operates. They have failed to focus on the crucial issue of how the manner in which they, as opponents, respond affects the political goals of the terrorists. Discussion instead has centered on the criminal justice aspects of the question: prevention and punishment.

Much has been written, for example, about the technological defenses that have been developed or could be developed against terrorism in order to prevent it from occurring. This can be a highly useful line of approach, as the successful use of electronic surveillance devices at airports seems to have demonstrated. It may even be advisable to require that any new technologies that are developed from time to time should incorporate some sort of internal defense against attack, much as environmentalists argue that pollution control devices should be incorporated in equipment and its cost charged to the manufacturers. Yet no technology is perfect, and there will always be somebody who will manage to slip by any defenses that can be created.

Prevention of terrorism in non-technological ways scarcely merits discussion. Perhaps one day the social sciences will teach us how to drain the swamps of misery in which hatred and fanaticism breed, but at the moment that day seems far distant. The hollow formalism of the law offers, if anything, even less help. Ingenious schemes for new international tribunals and procedures have been proposed, and they completely miss the point. The manifest unwillingness of many governments to use existing legal remedies against terrorism shows that the real problem is the lack of a will and not the lack of a way. For example, it was only when an attack was staged at the Paris airport that the French Minister of the Interior, in January of 1975, proposed to negotiate an international convention to provide for the punishment of terrorist acts. It is not any kind of genuine solution, in any event, but it will be interesting to see if Michel Poniatowski perseveres in even so ritualistic a response as this after the fleeting memory of injured national pride fades from view. There are all too many who object to terrorism only when they are its victims.

Far more effective than the reaction of M. Poniatowski was that of the French press. There were suggestions in the newspapers that the pro-Arab policy of the French government should be reversed because it had failed to prevent the attack at Orly airport. Within days

the Palestine Liberation Organization strongly condemned the attack. It also announced that it had taken measures to punish persons who engaged in the hijacking of airplanes, boats or trains. What the French journalists had correctly intuited was that the locus of the struggle was not at the Orly airport: it was at the Elysée Palace and at the Quai d'Orsay.

The overriding questions are not legal or technological; they are philosophical and political. Terrorism is the indirect strategy that wins or loses only in terms of how you respond to it. The decision as to how accommodating or how uncompromising you should be in your response to it involves questions that fall primarily within the domain of political philosophy.

IX

Those who are the targets of terrorism—and who are prepared to defend themselves by doing whatever is necessary in order to beat it—start with a major advantage. The advantage is that success or failure depends upon them alone. Terrorism wins only if you respond to it in the way that the terrorists want you to; which means that its fate is in your hands and not in theirs. If you choose not to respond at all, or else to respond in a way different from that which they desire, they will fail to achieve their objectives.

The important point is that the choice is yours. That is the ultimate weakness of terrorism as a strategy. It means that, though terrorism cannot always be prevented, it can always be defeated. You can always refuse to do what they want you to do.

Whether to pay the price of defeating terrorism is increasingly going to be a major question in our time. The answer is relatively easy in most kidnapping and ransom situations: experience has shown that blackmailers and extortionists usually are encouraged to try it again if you give in to their demands the first time. So, if you can do so, you should accept the consequences, however terrible, of standing firm in order to avoid an infinite sequence of painful events.

But the price of doing so is constantly rising, as technology increases the range and magnitude of horrible possibilities. Terrorist outrages, when they occur, are bound to become more deadly. Increasingly, we will be under pressure to abridge our laws and liberties in order to suppress the terrorists. It is a pressure that should be resisted.

In our personal lives we sometimes have to choose between these alternatives: whether to live a good life or whether to live a long life. Political society in the years to come is likely to face a similar

choice. An open society such as ours is especially vulnerable to terrorist violence, which seems to threaten us with ever more dreadful and drastic fates. Have we the stoicism to endure nonetheless? Will we be tempted to abandon our political and moral values? Will we be willing to go on paying an ever higher price in order to defeat the terrorists by refusing to respond in the way they want us to?

Of course it would make things easier if terrorism simply would go away. It seems unlikely to do so. The weapons are at hand, and they probably will be used, for terrorism will never cease until the day when the Old Man of the Mountain loses his last disciple. The old man was grand master of the sect called the Assassinations (hashish-ins) because of the hashish which he gave them. The old man, according to Marco Polo, used to drug his young disciples and transport them while they were asleep to his secret pleasure garden, persuading them when they awoke in it that it was paradise itself. Drugging them again, he would transport them back to the everyday world while they slept. Never afterward did they doubt that their Master could and would reward them with eternal paradise after death if they did his killing for him while they were alive. And so they did do his killing for him.

If anything, the modern world seems to breed more and more votaries of this peculiar sect. They seem to thrive and multiply everywhere in the world, bomb or machine gun in hand, motivated by political fantasies and hallucinations, fully convinced that their slaughter of the innocent will somehow usher in a political millennium for mankind. "*Voici le temps des ASSASSINS*," as Rimbaud wrote in the dawn of the industrial age; and we do indeed live in the time of the Assassins.

PARADISIA AND DOMINATIA: SCIENCE AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD

By Michael J. Moravcsik and J. M. Ziman

WITH European industrial civilization comes European science. It is a package deal. The question whether a culture thus superseded or repressed had its own form of science has become purely academic: the process of economic growth and social development is entirely predicated on the "rational materialism" of post-Renaissance Europe and its North American colonies. This fact may well be deplored, but can scarcely be denied. The very word technology, denoting a practical technique that has been studied and transformed in the light of scientific rationality, betrays our values and intentions as it displaces the crafts from town and village, from workshop and field, throughout the world.

Nevertheless, European science, both intellectually and practically, diffuses very slowly and unevenly into the culture of a developing country. This is not because it is firmly resisted by alternative metaphysical systems to which it seems antagonistic, but because the actual agents of diffusion are weak and uncoordinated. In Western Europe and the United States, scientific knowledge is a natural product as well as a fuel of the advanced industrialized society; in a country such as *Paradisía*—the pseudonym conceals no particular country, but refers perhaps to a whole class of medium-sized states such as Ghana or Iran, Korea or Peru—it is a foreign import, an exotic plant that has not yet established and seeded itself in new soil.

Modern science comes into *Paradisía*, from distant Europe or the United States, along three distinct channels. In the first instance, historically speaking, it came through the *academic* channel, into schools, colleges, and universities. Whether these institutions are hundreds of years old or are quite modern is irrelevant; the natural sciences were not introduced into the academic curriculum in Western countries until the nineteenth century, and did not play a very large part in formal education until quite recently. *Paradisía* took its time in following the lead of the powerful metropolitan country—shall we call it *Dominatía*?—in whose political or at least cultural sphere of influence it then lay captive, so that the teaching of physics and chemistry, botany and zoology, in a few secondary schools and colleges, was perfunctory and of little practical significance. Until the Second World War, the only genuine academic centers of scientific knowledge and practice would have been in some small schools of engineer-

ing, medicine and agriculture, where external standards of technical expertise could be imposed by expatriate professional practitioners.

The expansion of secondary and higher education in Paradisia in the past 30 years is immensely impressive, and much has been changed. In particular, the creation or expansion of fully fledged, independent universities, offering bachelor's and master's degrees in all the major academic disciplines, has transformed the opportunities for advanced instruction in the basic sciences. The student of a sophisticated subject such as nuclear physics or genetics need no longer go abroad as he once did for even the most elementary training. On the campus of his national university he will find Paradisians with doctorates from MIT or Cambridge, Paris or Moscow, in precisely these subjects. Yet the number of students who actually receive such instruction is often pitifully small, perhaps no more than a few dozen graduates in science in the whole country each year—a fraction that can only be expressed, like the concentration of a trace impurity in a chemical compound, in parts per million of the total population.¹

Some aspects of scientific technology enter Paradisia along the *technical* channel, carried by a flood of imported or locally manufactured industrial products—automobiles, transistor radios, pharmaceutical and agricultural chemicals, electric power plants, etc. Starting with elementary practical skills, such as driving a bulldozer or installing plumbing, there is a natural progression through the expertise of the motor mechanic, machine-tool operator, or electronic technician, to the more “intellectual” tasks of the civil and electrical engineers or factory managers. Daily life in Paradisia (especially in the cities) has become dependent on such people, who are in very short supply. At the lowest levels the need is met by self-taught practice or crude apprenticeship, but the facilities for rational technical training at the middle level are almost nonexistent. Deploring this defect—but not regarding it as any of their business to cure—the multinational corporations that dominate trade in sophisticated industrial products bring in their own technical experts for after-sales service, or set up complete “turn-key” factories where almost every operation is automated or prescribed in a manual for the benefit of unskilled local operatives. Indeed, motivated by prestige, the rulers of many developing countries demand sophisticated and even fully automated production methods, despite their capital intensity in the midst of unemployment. The “science” that infects Paradisia along this channel is often quite

¹ For figures of researchers per million population, see M. J. Moravcsik, *Science Development*, Bloomington (Indiana): International Development Research Center, 1975, Chapter 3B. For the leading scientific countries the number is 1,000–3,000, while for Paradisia it is perhaps 20–100.

out of touch with a coherent, rational, applicable body of knowledge.

Finally, science is injected into Paradisia through a third channel—government organizations dedicated to particular technological applications and deliberately charged with specific “missions” to serve as sources of modern scientific ideas for economic, agricultural, medical and industrial development in particular technological areas. Typical of such organizations would be an Atomic Energy Commission with the task of bringing all the benefits of nuclear energy to Paradisia. With its own little research reactor (usually a gift from a benevolent great power), reasonable technical facilities, a fair degree of autonomy within the government machine—and a substantial fraction of the total science budget—this is often the only real center of modern scientific technique in the whole country. By training its research workers abroad, and through its affiliations to the International Atomic Energy Agency, it maintains adequate links with the scientific world at large.

Even though the research that is done in such an establishment may be of very low quality by international standards, it may serve as a vehicle for a broader scientific effort than its nominal mission would suggest. But for all the political goodwill, high hopes, and considerable expenditures that have gone into such organizations, they have made very little impact on the general social development of countries such as Paradisia. Indeed, the over-ambitious promise—which naturally could not be fulfilled—to transform the economic and cultural situation by the magic wand of a highly sophisticated scientific technique has done a great deal of harm, discrediting “science” in the eyes of politicians, intellectuals, and practical men.

In all that follows it is important to keep in mind that these three channels carry little traffic, and are almost unconnected with one another. Of course, if one were content to stay in the superficial world of words and titles, one might get the impression that science development has a prominent role in Paradisia. Like almost all developing countries it has at least one organization proudly proclaiming the importance of science. To reinforce this impression, speeches and pronouncements on development policy, both in Paradisia and in the many organizations for international aid, abound in the reaffirmation of the importance of “science-and-technology” or “R and D.”

Behind the facade, however, one often finds no more than the fragments of a scientific community, disorganized, disunited, of limited professional competence, poverty stricken, intellectually isolated, and directed toward largely romantic goals—or no goals at all. This is a harsh judgment, especially when applied to the activities of a small

group of exceptionally hard-working, sincere, and dedicated people, and to the results of high-minded efforts over several decades by essentially well-meaning organizations such as international agencies and government bureaus. Indeed, the truth about the state of science in many developing countries is so hard to bear that it does not easily pass the lips of the proud Paradisian himself nor of the courteous foreign expert enjoying the hospitality of a short visit. The printed word on development carries scarcely a hint of what is so often said in private among close friends and colleagues.

And yet the task to be undertaken is not hopeless. The example of Japan, whose industrial power is now matched by the intellectual resources of a first-class scientific community, beckons on such great nations as India and Brazil. Since the Second World War, Australia and Canada have "taken off" scientifically, and are no longer mere intellectual provinces of more powerful empires. In countries as politically diverse as Argentina and Romania, centers of scientific excellence are beginning to make their mark on the international scene. Just as the category "developing country" includes a great variety of economic, environmental, cultural and political circumstances, so also it may cover a very wide range in the conditions of science, technology and higher education.

In the present discussion, it is taken for granted that European science should become a dominant cultural force throughout the world. But there are many thoughtful and good men who assert that development of this kind is by no means beneficial in ultimate human terms and who oppose science itself as the very source of the malady. This point of view is not untenable, although it makes too little of the irrationality and possible inhumanity of alternative metaphysical systems, and does not allow for the decoupling of the cognitive, cultural and attitudinal content of science from many of its current applications. If we ignore this attitude here, it is not because it is absurd or despicable but because it is very far from what is demanded by enlightened Paradisians who see very clearly that without the help of science the road leads only to disaster. And it is not our business, here in comfortable Dominatia, to tell them that they cannot have what we so manifestly enjoy.

II

In the effort to discover the reasons for the disparity between aspiration and achievement in science in Paradisia, one becomes aware of a combination of factors, involving, on the one hand, a lack of understanding of the nature of science and its evolution, and, on the other

hand, a confusion in the goals and processes of development. To these must be added indifference to some of the crucial potential elements in scientific progress, and organizational and administrative practices which are quite mismatched to real needs.

The attitude of politicians, economists, and even of many scientists toward the role of science in development is clouded by fundamental misconceptions. After an initial period of euphoria, in which it seemed that all the practical problems of poverty, hunger and economic backwardness would be solved at a stroke by the new understanding that would flow from the establishment of modern science in an old country, a reaction set in. The rhetoric was displaced by skepticism and cynicism: despite lip service to the contrary, there is now widespread disbelief that science can contribute significantly to development, except at the level of immediate practice.

This skepticism is largely due to the extended time scale and subtlety of both the development process in general, and the contribution of science to it. In all walks of human life, short-term considerations tend to win out over potential long-term benefits. This tendency is epitomized in the use of the word "relevance," which has come to mean direct connection with an immediate material problem. In this sense, scientific research is often felt to be "irrelevant" for the less-developed countries by comparison with problems like providing food for today and tomorrow.

Taking a broader view, however, national development must be seen as the process whereby the material, spiritual, cultural and psychological well-being of the country and its citizenry is improved and assured into the future. To carry out this process, one must tend both to the needs of this year and to the foreseeable requirements of the next few decades. Furthermore, one must cater for both material and non-material needs, of which the former are but instruments for the fulfillment of the latter. No society, whatever race, religion, ideology or century it belonged to, ever considered the only purpose in life to be to provide its members with food and creature comforts. The nature of non-material aspirations changes from society to society, and has its own evolutionary dynamic, becoming what we call the history of mankind. In considering the role of science in our own epoch, in relation to many different countries with very varied cultures, we must always think of development in this broad sense. This will become very clear when we discuss the factor of morale.

What then is the justification of science in Paradisia in this enlarged concept of development? As is often the case with important and successful human activities, a number of different arguments com-

bine into a broadly based and solid rationale. One might start with the long-term character of science and education. Most of those who doubt the relevance of science to present conditions in the developing countries will agree that these countries are likely to need indigenous scientific activity three or four decades from now. That is to say, Paradisia ought by then to be able to share in the give-and-take of research in the pure and applied sciences, contributing to and drawing knowledge equitably from the international pool. If such a level of respectability and solvency in the world marketplace of knowledge cannot be achieved overnight, it is a realistic goal for half a century hence.

The development of a viable national infrastructure in the sciences is a lengthy process, even where it is favored by material, cultural and social factors. In both the United States and Japan, for example, it took several decades to progress from an embryonic, imitative and subordinate scientific infrastructure to significant power in world science. In the less favorable initial circumstances of many developing countries, the same process can scarcely be more rapid. Thus the process must be started immediately. As the elderly French marshal told his gardener, when informed that an ornamental tree would take 100 years to grow to full stature: "Then we have no time to lose; plant it today!"

Yet there are still those who seem unconvinced of the urgency of the need for an indigenous scientific community in a country such as Paradisia. With scientific knowledge and technological know-how available for all on the world market, would it not be easier to import and use whatever is needed, without building "local production facilities" in these commodities? This commercial metaphor is appropriate, since the essence of this argument is an appeal to the principles of classical liberal economics—the open market, free trade, economies of scale, and the division of labor. Let the great knowledge factories of the advanced countries export their great surpluses of information, fact and theory, in exchange for cocoa, bananas, oil and copper, and eventually, in exchange for industrial products manufactured in the newly developed nations.

At the most elementary level, this analogy is entirely fallacious. Scientific knowledge lacks many of the necessary attributes of a commercial commodity, and cannot be fairly bartered for material goods and services.² It is not possible simply to "import" science and technology in the absence of an indigenous scientific and technical com-

² For a more direct attack on the attempt to represent knowledge as a quantifiable economic category, see J. M. Ziman, Book Review, *Minerva*, July 1974, p. 384.

munity. And even if this were possible, it would be unsatisfactory and undesirable for economic, political and psychological reasons.

In importing scientific and technical information (for example, through patents), one first needs to identify the purpose for which importation is necessary; then one must select appropriate items from a wide and varied catalogue; finally one must acquire, absorb and adapt existing science and technology to the task at hand. These processes cannot be carried out effectively without a substantial indigenous scientific infrastructure. This is evident, for example, from the history of Japan, where the large-scale importation of scientific techniques in recent times was preceded by decades of development of an indigenous scientific and technological community.

Particular stress must be laid on the adaptation of science and technique to meet *local* needs. New research, applied and basic, may have to be performed locally or regionally before the major problems faced by a given country on account of its particular geographical location or social history can be dealt with. Rice cultivation in Southeast Asia, soil desalination in Pakistan, ranching in East Africa, deep-sea fishing in Peru are examples of important human activities which cannot be understood and improved merely by the application of general biological and ecological principles taken from the international scientific literature.

Beyond the solution of specific material problems, the existence of an indigenous scientific community is even more essential for science to achieve a broad social impact. For example, the natural sciences are an essential component in education for the medical, engineering and teaching professions. In principle, such education could be carried out by persons whose only contact with science was a one-time university degree. Practice shows, however, that without the benefit of continued personal involvement in scientific research, such people not only quickly fall behind the fast-growing content of the sciences but also become divorced from the spirit of science as the art of problem-solving. Evidence of this is unfortunately all too obvious on the Indian subcontinent, where the stifling system of rote learning and regurgitation for examinations is closely connected with these ubiquitous shortcomings in the science instructors. It is not surprising that the doctors, engineers and teachers educated in such a system lack initiative and imagination in their professional work.

The educational role of the natural sciences goes far beyond the training of particular professionals. The development process as a whole is based on the assumption that change in time is a regular and desirable feature of social life, that human fate can, at least to some

extent, be shaped by the application of knowledge and effort, and that the experience of others before us can be helpful to us in making further progress. By contrast, the traditional milieu of a less-developed country often is imbued with a static view of life, a fatalism in which events are determined by incomprehensible extra-human factors, and a compulsion to repeat previous practices rather than improve them. Thus, contact with modern science, with its expanding and cumulative character, can have a very broad cultural and attitudinal impact. To put it another way: those who oppose development on the material plane as a challenge to traditional culture are quite right to see science as a fifth column sapping this culture at its spiritual roots.

There is, however, yet another facet of science which takes us back to the earlier discussion of non-material aspirations. In post-Renaissance European culture, the pursuit of scientific knowledge is considered to be more than a means to a better material life: it is an important medium for higher activities made possible by the partial satisfaction of our immediate needs. The immense efforts made to answer "irrelevant" questions concerning the nature of the Universe, the origins of life, the laws of sub-atomic physics or the topology of n -dimensional algebraic varieties are not directed toward greener grass, more lavishly buttered parsnips, or better mousetraps; they are actuated by religious and aesthetic impulses of harmony, coherence, comprehension and intellectual order by which all who partake of our civilization are bound to be moved.

In this context, it is essential to realize that the huge gap between Dominatia and Paradisia is as much psychological as material. When we talk about the continued dependence of the less-developed countries on the advanced countries, we do not mean only that formal political authority has become economic dominance; we mean that the advanced countries continue to exert an overwhelming influence on the rest of the world in intellectual, cultural, social and spiritual ways. This non-material dependence is quite as demeaning, frustrating—and ultimately alienating—as economic and political exploitation. For this reason, continued scientific dependence on the advanced countries is an unacceptable future for any self-conscious developing country. We would be wise to encourage genuine competition (and cooperation) in our own game, rather than risk the very real possibility of repudiation of the whole scientific enterprise by the majority of mankind!

Finally, we come to the factor of morale. In the enormous effort to close the gap, a crucial element is a belief that the task can be accomplished and that it is a purpose of human life worth sacrificing

for. This inner strength and spiritual fortitude is a potent force in all human activities. While high morale may rest primarily on philosophical and other non-material factors, it can be strengthened by instances of success. In the matter of social development, scientific achievement can well serve as an indicator of such success. Thus, the Nobel Prize of Raman or Houssay is tangible evidence that India or Argentina can compete favorably with the United States in some areas of scientific research, even if it is not likely to catch up in the near future in steel production or in the number of TV sets. It must be admitted that the recent Indian detonation of a nuclear device, diplomatically deplorable and militarily irrelevant as it may be, has had the same effect on the self-image of the Indian scientific and technological community. Such spectacular successes are not necessarily expensive and yet help bolster the morale of the country across the whole broad front of development.

In summary, the conventional wisdom that fails to see an effective role for science in many countries at their present stage of development misses the point in several respects. It conceives development only in immediate and narrowly material terms. It also thinks of science in narrow terms, failing to appreciate the broad impact of its problem-solving attitude and its cumulative, optimistic, self-reliant spirit on the development of a country. This same conventional wisdom underestimates the time and effort needed to plant science firmly on new soil, and thus neglects the long-term task of establishing an indigenous scientific infrastructure in the less-developed countries—an objective that should, in reality, have the highest priority.

III

What are the major defects of science in Paradisia, and what are the obstacles to curing them? Here again, it is necessary to have a good grasp of the meaning of science as a multifaceted human activity, and to dig deeply beneath the surface, to uncover the real weaknesses and to devise genuine remedies.

The greatest obstacles to science development are the obstacles to social and economic development in general—poverty, ignorance, and maladministration. It scarcely needs to be said that the material facilities—laboratory apparatus, workshops, repair services, technical staff, buildings, secretarial assistance, power supply, transport, chemical supplies, electronic spare parts, climatic protection, computers, audio-visual aids, photographic equipment, books, experimental animals, electron microscopes etc., etc., etc.—are grossly inferior, in almost all scientific institutions in Paradisia, to what would be re-

garded as appropriate in Dominatia. Yet this does require continued emphasis, for there are many scientists in the advanced countries who lack the personal experience, or the testimony of their foreign colleagues, or the small quantity of imagination required to grasp this point. Modern science in Dominatia is affluent and competitive; the profligate style of its operations, geared to the anxiety of the professional scientist to "get there fustest with the mostest," is a luxury that cannot be extended over the whole scientific community in a poor country with a low standard of living and a very modest tax base. It is very difficult indeed to do good science, at the international standard, on one-tenth of the real resources available to one's contemporaries elsewhere. There is little consolation in the thought that the Cavendish Laboratory, in the great days of Lord Rutherford, spent only a few thousand pounds a year on material facilities; the comparison is with the physical sciences in the United States today, where the overhead costs, per Ph.D., run to something like \$50,000 per year.³

It is important, also, to realize how unevenly such facilities may be distributed among scientific institutions in the same country. As we have already observed, money for equipment and other technical resources tends to flow more freely into the "mission" channels within the government machine than it does to equally qualified scientists in academic circles. In India—a land notable for princely wealth alongside utter destitution—there are several laboratories as lavishly equipped as any in Europe or the United States, in the same cities as universities where even sealing wax and string put a burden on the departmental budget. Such inequities, and the lack of corporate identity among those who allow them to exist, are further obstacles to science development.

A constant topic of complaint among scientists from all developing countries is the administrative climate in which they must do their work. The standard pejorative term is "bureaucracy"—by which is meant a whole complex of time-wasting, irrational and rigid procedures, accentuated by a hierarchical and authoritarian decision-making apparatus, that hinder the simple spontaneous initiatives demanded in active research.⁴ Because the results of an experiment cannot be foreseen, the needs of future research cannot be anticipated over the long time scales that become customary in more routine ad-

³ For figures on the cost of research per researcher in various countries, see M. J. Moravcsik, *op. cit.*, Chapter 6B. For India, for example, the comparable figure is \$8,000 per year.

⁴ Edward Shils has described the problem well. "The organization of laboratories . . . will have to make provisions to avoid the frustration of this scientific disposition by the dead hand of a desiccated and embittered older generation or by an unsympathetic and non-understanding bureaucracy." "Scientific Development in the New States," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Feb. 1961, p. 48.

ministrative tasks. But the very absence in the general culture of the attitude of mind characteristic of science makes these needs incomprehensible or deeply suspect in the political sphere, so the unfavorable climate persists against all protests.

And behind the administrative morass of the scientific and academic institutions, the governmental system stretches away into regions of more opaque motive and deeper ignorance, headed often as not by politicians, high civil servants, businessmen, or soldiers who do not even understand the difference between fundamental research and technological development, or the connection between the two.

Then we must also look at the scientists themselves and their response to the difficult circumstances in which they find themselves. After all, the fundamental deficiency is the lack of adequately trained people at all levels—technicians, lecturers, research workers, professors, directors of laboratories, and even ministers of science and education. As we have already remarked, secondary school, college and university teaching of science is not very inspired in Paradisia. The teachers themselves are so ill-trained that only the best pupils feel the excitement and grasp the meaning of their subjects. Up to the level of the bachelor's or master's degree, teaching is often pedantic, and learning may be little better than memorizing standard bookwork. Practical laboratory and field work is hampered by lack of equipment and other resources. The student emerges from such a course with a few technical tricks and only the vaguest notion of what it is all about. It is not surprising, therefore, that those lucky few that then go abroad for graduate study find the research training leading to a doctorate very heavy going. Personal problems of living in another country and having to grapple with a foreign language do not make it any easier. The experience of Ph.D. supervisors in advanced countries is clear: the graduate student from a developing country *can* reach the same scientific level as his contemporaries in all branches of sophisticated modern science, provided that he is given plenty of time to break away from the habits of rote learning and become a self-reliant and independent research worker.

Generally speaking, the young scientist who returns to Paradisia with a Ph.D. from a reputable institution in an advanced country is competent to do research *in the sort of institution where he was trained*. But science in Dominatia is quite different from what is possible, at the present time, in Paradisia. Although he may be perfectly familiar with the general economic and social conditions of his country, the returning scientist is seldom prepared for the extremely hard task that lies ahead of him. Disillusionment, defeat, flight abroad, or

cynical engagement in academic politics are familiar symptoms of this deficiency.

The real problem with his training is that it is much too narrowly technical. With a Ph.D. in, say, algebraic botany, the newly trained scientist sees himself as a professional algebraic botanist (specializing in cubic roots!) and can imagine no other goal than to set up a research laboratory in this topic in the University of Paradisia or in some appropriate division of the Paradisian Council for Science Research. Although he may be reasonably self-winding within his own field, he still lacks self-confidence and self-reliance in both the practical and intellectual spheres.

Thus, on the one hand, he may not be accustomed to improvising experimental equipment with his own hands: his early education, perhaps as a relatively well-to-do member of Paradisian society, is unlikely to have encouraged the development of simple practical skills, while research in Dominatia is performed with sophisticated, expensive apparatus purchased ready-made. One of the most depressing sights to be seen on a brief courtesy visit to a university or government laboratory in a developing country is a large and complicated piece of apparatus, such as a spectrophotometer, or a liquid helium plant, that was bought at considerable sacrifice to support the research of some bright young man returned from abroad, and is now lying under dust sheets, out of repair for lack of maintenance or discarded when that same bright young man took a job back in the United States. By the same token, the best evidence of a sound scientific basis is an experiment going ahead competently, with home-made equipment—not at the primitive level of sealing wax and string, but simply constructed in the departmental workshop, incorporating pieces of technical bric-a-brac, such as meters, pumps, radio sets etc., that can be easily picked up in any contemporary city.

On the other hand, the conventional graduate school program is seldom seen by the student as training in the general art of research. He is not encouraged to regard himself as competent to undertake investigations and to solve problems of all kinds within the widest scope of his discipline. The remarkable experiences of the Second World War, when nuclear physicists demonstrated their skills in the interpretation of aerial photographs, and zoologists made important contributions to radar technique, are quite forgotten. The cobbler, he would say, must stick to his last: on with the determination of cubic roots by the method of algebraic botany.

This is an extremely important point, for it brings us to one of the gravest weaknesses in the development of science in countries such as

Paradisialia—the extraordinary incoherence and inconsequence of the research that is actually attempted, especially in academic circles. There is seldom any effort to link a research topic with any local industrial, agricultural, geographic or otherwise practical issue, or to direct it toward significant ends within the discipline itself.

There is no tradition of purposeful research, mainly because there are no external users around to convey their needs and wants to the scientists, and there is no established culture of such links between the academic and the practical. Thus the doctrine of academic freedom, according to which every professor should be quite at liberty to work at any scientific topic that pleases his fancy, is carried to an extreme. As Stevan Dedijer has said, “Even ‘applied’ research becomes pure research in developing countries because there is no application.”⁵

The student who wins an overseas scholarship is not directed into a particular line of research that might be strongly favored in the future, but is encouraged to apply for a place at the most prestigious university in Dominatia, to take a Ph.D. in whatever happens to be the current fad in advanced science. After a few years, the young men return to staff the department, and begin to compete for facilities for a miscellany of unconnected research topics. The very obvious human difficulties of arranging cooperation under such circumstances are heavily compounded by the attitude of technical specialization and expertise that is now characteristic of the scientific life.

One can go further, to uncover a most unpleasant psychological phenomenon—the justification of the esoteric by its own evident uselessness. Like a member of Thorstein Veblen’s Leisure Class exhibiting his power by his extravagant “conspicuous consumption,” the Paradisian professor, completely out of contact with local needs and local culture, persuades himself that he must be doing a very important job by the very fact that, on the face of it, it is entirely irrelevant. By the transcendence of its claims to give some ultimate benefit to humanity, he protects his research, which is incomprehensible even to his colleagues, from assessment in terms of common sense.

As we have already emphasized, the criterion of immediate relevance should not be applied too strictly to the program of scientific research in a developing country. What may seem a grave practical problem today may look quite insignificant in 20 years’ time. But in the effort to establish science in a new cultural environment a choice must often be made between many possible lines of research. In the circumstances such a choice ought not to be made on the basis of ill-

⁵ Quoted by Dilip Mukerjee, in A. B. Shah (ed.), *Education, Science Policy, and Developing Societies*, Bombay: Manaktalas, 1967, p. 376.

informed and wildly uncertain guesses as to what will prove to be scientifically important in the future, but with concern for its immediate or potential applicability to material problems or connection with local cultural or environmental features of the country. But this obvious principle comes into conflict with the debased metaphysic and value system of the conventional Dominatian graduate school, where technical specialties and highly fashionable "breakthroughs" are exalted, at the expense of a general philosophy of science as a means of satisfying our insatiable curiosity concerning nature in all its aspects and the solution to practical human problems. The most pathetic request to be heard on a visit to Paradisia comes from scientists asking: "What research should we be doing?" The only proper answer to this is reminiscent of Cornelius Vanderbilt's reply to the man who asked about the cost of running a yacht: "If you have to ask that question, then you are not competent to undertake it!" But this is only a symptom of the failure to internalize the scientific attitude and the scientific method, which are equally applicable to, and obtain equal satisfaction from, the solution of all apparently difficult problems and unanswered questions.

IV

The weaknesses of science in the less-developed countries are not due entirely to poverty, an unfavorable cultural environment and deficiencies of education; the individual scientist also is isolated from his fellows by a lack of solidarity within the local scientific community and weak links with the outside world.

Science is a collective undertaking. There is much truth in the cliché that the progress of science is like building in brick; the contributions of individual scientists throughout the ages are laid one on another, the bricks in each course being created to rest upon those previously built into the structure; without constant cooperation among the bricklayers, progress is slow and the architecture goes awry. Such is, indeed, the fundamental source of the creative power and objectivity of the "scientific method."⁶

This objectivity underlines another characteristic of scientific activity, namely *universalism* or (in this wicked world of sovereign states) *internationalism*. To the earth-bound layman, there is something almost indecent and treasonable in the ease with which scientists from different countries, political systems and philosophical outlooks can communicate and interact with one another on scientific matters.

⁶ See Robert K. Merton, *The Sociology of Science*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973, and J. M. Ziman, *Public Knowledge*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1968.

Scientists have an international language (a jargon compounded of mathematical symbols and Broken English), commute tirelessly to countless international conferences, communicate through truly international journals, and migrate from country to country with very slight disruption of their scientific output. That is not to deny that they are men of our times, subject to all the imperatives of nationalism and patriotism and to the terrors and wrongs of war, tyranny and exile; but the work about which they care and their true ties of community are directed outward to the "invisible college" of their scientific discipline. Without such ties and the recognition of their research by significant other scientists, they are afflicted with anomie, and wither on the vine. In this whole discussion of science in developing countries, the key word is *isolation*. On account of the collective, cumulative and relatively objective character of the natural sciences, constant contact with fellow scientists is a necessity for fruitful scientific work. Such contact includes ready and quick access to journals, reports and reprints, interaction with visitors, attendance at conferences, opportunities for short visits to other institutions, periodic sabbatical leave to be spent at important centers for basic and applied research, opportunities for collaboration in research with scientists in other institutions, etc. In all such activities, scientists in the less-developed countries are handicapped—by poverty, by geographical distance, by political and administrative barriers.

It is hard to grasp the significance of this isolation without feeling it for oneself. The tough-minded experimental physicist from Dominatia, on his first visit to Paradisia, is not unprepared for the lack of technical facilities, and can imagine himself rolling up his shirt sleeves and improvising his own apparatus. But how can research be possible in a country where the *Physical Review* comes a year late, where the best library has no more than tattered copies of the undergraduate textbooks of a generation back, where the last visit of a foreign physicist was 18 months ago, where there is nobody within 500 miles who can understand or criticize the work one is doing, where there has never been a conference or a seminar where research results are discussed, and where the next opportunity for foreign travel seems at least two years in the future? It is easy to predict that the scientific productivity even of our Domination colleague would decay rapidly to zero under those conditions!

As we shall be arguing below, the international scientific community could do a great deal to open up channels of communication with scientists in the less-developed countries. But the improvement of *local* communications and cooperation within the small scientific com-

munity in each country cannot be catalyzed from outside. Whatever the social and psychological causes, science in Paradisia is gravely weakened by the lack of a corporate spirit among the few serious scientists in the country. Pretentiously titled research councils and academies do not, in fact, succeed in welding the research of individually weak groups into a rational program. The academic, technical and mission channels by which science diffuses into Paradisia have little connection with one another. Government laboratories do not collaborate with universities, and neither party seems to concern itself about imported technology. Personal rivalries and institutional conflicts that almost seem to spur creativity in the much larger scientific community of an advanced country are crippling within a small group with very limited resources. This is a subject on which it is difficult to make general remarks, for the historical and cultural circumstances differ markedly from country to country, and the outsider rarely has the opportunity to discover the facts and comment fairly. To recall an old scandal, however, there is no doubt that great harm was done to Indian science in the 1930s by the schism that tore apart the Indian National Academy of Sciences under the dictatorial presidency of Sir C. V. Raman—an episode that exemplifies the dangers of authoritarianism in a small group that lacks a corporate identity and yet does not interact strongly with society at large.

V

The establishment of science in the less-developed countries is a heavy burden on the scientists of those countries. So heavy is it, indeed, that many of them cast the load from their own shoulders, and emigrate to the major centers of research in the advanced countries. Given their personal circumstances, who is to blame them? Being accustomed to job mobility ourselves, and not scrupling to buy their services as students, technical assistants or colleagues, we are in no position to preach to them on patriotism and their duty to their own people.

But we certainly owe more sympathy and understanding to those who stay in, or return to, Paradisia to work at science. When it comes to the plight of scientific colleagues, former students, the authors of scientific papers that they cite, participants in their conferences, Dominatian scientists seem to close their minds. The technical scientific press, for example, is almost completely silent on the issues discussed in the present article.

The first thing to be done, then, is to bring this whole matter into the public consciousness of the scientific communities of the advanced

countries. It is not our job to tell the scientists of Paradisia how they should go about their work, but we should certainly create a platform for a wide debate on these controversial issues. In the last 30 years, many actions have been taken on the basis of a very poor understanding of the nature of science and of development. Many of these misconceptions spring from romantic notions about research, or grossly optimistic assumptions about its potentialities, that can be traced back to the ideology current among scientists of a previous generation. Perhaps, with the rise of movements for social responsibility in science, we are not now ruled by that ideology in quite such narrow terms. But it lives on unreformed, in many distant countries, among the influential elders of government and academic science, who are now under strong attack from younger scientists who resonate to the radical critical call.

Although the critics are often no wiser than those whom they attack, this controversy is, nevertheless, the first sign of genuine vigor and spiritual health in the scientific communities of many developing countries. But the matter is, as we have tried to point out, not at all simple, and first-order, short-range slogans like "relevance" and "academic freedom" need to be qualified, compromised and brought into a coherent synthesis if there is to be real progress. Although each instance of the debate has its local reference, it is really a matter of worldwide concern, in developing and advanced countries alike. A well-informed public discussion in the international scientific press, at international conferences, in the international agencies, and within the scientific communities of the major advanced countries is called for, to build up an appropriate doctrine—a body of principles, examples, priorities and ideals—to replace the stale and shallow clichés of "the conventional wisdom."

It must be emphasized again that science is not an industrial organization or bureaucratic institution; it grows and lives by close interpersonal relationships—collaboration and competition, teaching and learning, mastery and apprenticeship. To the extent that science in the developing countries is a natural extension of the international scientific community, it must depend on just those person-to-person links that make this community a reality. Scientists in the advanced countries have a responsibility to inform themselves of the circumstances of their foreign graduate students and to direct them into fields of research that will not be futile and sterile when they return home. They have a duty to respond favorably to requests for advice, and to put themselves to trouble to lecture and teach abroad, *in partibus infidelis*, as they would to their Domination students. A small number

of academic scientists in Europe and North America do indeed have high standing in this respect, as sympathetic and understanding friends of science in the developing countries, but this cannot be said of the scientific community as a whole.

In this context, it is perhaps worth remarking that the United States is at a disadvantage compared with Britain and other former colonial powers where there is a long tradition of expatriate teaching, technical and medical work, and research in Third World countries. In almost every department of a British university one may find academic staff who have taught in Nigeria, or practiced a profession in Kenya, or spent some years in an administrative post in India or Pakistan. This tradition is now decaying, as each developing country fills its professional and governmental positions with its own citizens. But there still remain valuable channels of personal contact, such as the custom of sending professors from Britain to many Commonwealth universities as external examiners to maintain academic standards and to advise on curricula.

Although a small but growing number of American scientists have had opportunities to observe science in developing countries at first hand, it is more difficult for them to appreciate the problems and the needs. And one must not suppose that a prestige visit by a Nobel laureate, giving two popular lectures, dining with the Minister of Education and the Rector of the University and then flying on, is an adequate substitute for months or years of patient teaching by a younger, less-celebrated scientist, who may finally come to understand how his temporarily adopted country really works. No single act of deliberate policy could do more for science in the less-developed countries than a political, administrative and fiscal device that opened up a wide range of temporary scientific appointments, by fellowship or exchange visit, in such countries, and made them attractive to young scientists in the advanced countries as a normal stage in a research career.

VI

A particular responsibility for the state of science in Paradisia rests upon those Paradisian scientists who have emigrated and who now work in the advanced research laboratories and universities of Dominatia. The phrase "brain drain" is an unkind metaphor which misrepresents a very complex political, economic, and psychological phenomenon.⁷ The case of an academic research scientist, for example, may be quite different from that of a physician or engineer, in that,

⁷ See, generally, Committee on the International Migration of Talent, *The International Migration of High-Level Manpower*, New York: Praeger, 1970.

in spite of evident need, there may be no opportunity at all for him to employ his talent in his own country, and little to be gained for his fellow-countrymen if he were to attempt to do so. Furthermore, the intrusion of politics into scientific activities also can result in the uprooting of talented researchers into migration or exile, as recent examples in Argentina, Chile, and Cuba demonstrate. Apart from general factors of standard of living and personal freedom which may make this form of exile preferable to life in one's native land, one should perhaps see this as a symptom rather than a cause of the weakness of science in Paradisia.

Nevertheless, patriotic duty cannot be entirely shrugged off, and the time may come when return seems a credible personal policy. It seems best if this can be arranged in parallel with others of like mind, so that a group of experienced scientists come back to Paradisia as a research team, forming the nucleus of a viable new institution, as has happened recently in Brazil and in the Republic of Korea.

But what happens next? The sociology of this characteristic human situation has not been carefully studied, but one can observe two significant features. On the one hand, jealousy and tension can arise between the returned prodigal and the "good boys" who have stayed at home (or returned after taking a Ph.D. abroad). Since the latter know the local political ropes and have been digging themselves well into the establishment, the return of a distinguished scientist from long exile may lead to nothing but the frustration of high hopes and the stifling of his own creative talents. On the other hand, such a person brings with him an invaluable commodity—personal knowledge of the way in which science in an advanced country really works. We have spoken of the "diffusion" of science into the less-developed countries; it must be recognized that what is transferred is a sensibility, a style of action, a system of interpersonal relations which cannot be learnt from books but which is only acquired by many years of immediate experience. One of the dangers of trying to spread science too quickly is that these characteristics of the scientific method will not be adequately internalized by, shall we say, the Ph.D. with no more than three or four years in a graduate school, and are not, therefore, carried safely back home. If he is modest and thoughtful, wise and strong (poor fellow—it is a hard task!), the Paradisian who comes back to a senior appointment after many years at Bell Labs or Berkeley, at Oxford or Saclay, can bring into his university department or research laboratory the high standards of scientific achievement and the rationales of technique, education and administration that one takes for granted in a modern scientific institution.

VII

The scientific community is loosely organized and governs itself through a variety of institutions such as professional institutes, learned societies, academies, etc., from the local and national level up to such international federations as the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU). It is through such bodies that cooperative efforts on behalf of science development in the Third World should properly be directed.

Unfortunately these organizations take almost no interest in such matters. The multidisciplinary American Association for the Advancement of Science, other than occasionally holding a meeting in Mexico City, has yet to show results of activity in science development in spite of a sizable grant from the Rockefeller Foundation to explore the possibilities in this direction. The American and British Institutes of Physics are not directly involved in international scientific cooperation, while the American Association of Physics Teachers has half a dozen activists working on volunteer overtime on an annual budget of a few hundred dollars. A similar situation prevails in national organizations of chemists, biologists and other scientists. The National Academy of Sciences in Washington and the Royal Society in London are somewhat more active, but mainly because they are the official channels through which some governmental aid funds are distributed.

This state of affairs is not altogether surprising. Naturally enough the dominant concern of scientific communities in advanced countries is to further the progress of science (i.e., the acquisition and application of scientific knowledge) in the short run at a maximal rate. Consequently, they operate on the "rich get richer and the poor get poorer" principle: those individual groups, institutions, and countries which are already proficient and successful in doing science are made the primary foci of the benefits of the worldwide scientific infrastructure, and those which are just starting and have little achievement to show are neglected. The proposition that science could advance much faster if the "other" three-quarters of humanity made a proportionate contribution to the scientific community cuts little ice. And although scientists are often involved in political and social matters entirely outside their range of competence, they generally show little interest in the suggestion that the internal practices of the international scientific community could be altered without significant detriment to their own work but with major benefit to the eight percent of the community that happen to reside in less-developed countries. Through their lack of imagination and their utter self-interest, the

leaders of the scientific community miss the opportunity to make momentous social and political contributions to humanity.

An enormous contribution to science in the developing countries could be made simply by enforcing equity within the world scientific community—that is, by treating the scientist in Paradisia on an equal footing with his colleague in Dominatia. To illustrate the present lack of equity, consider scientific communications. Access to journals in Paradisia is limited because the most important journals are published in the scientifically advanced countries, because they are expensive and must be paid for in hard currency, and because they are heavy and quick access by airmail costs more. Reports and reprints reach Paradisian research centers only sporadically, because most of these documents originate in scientifically advanced countries, are expensive to ship abroad, and are produced only in limited numbers which usually are sent to the most prestigious research groups, i.e., those in advanced countries. Scientific conferences are usually held near the major world centers of scientific activity, so that scientists from developing countries have difficulty in finding sufficient travel funds to attend them.

Moreover, at conferences with attendance by invitation only, scientists from the less-developed countries are under-represented since they have not had the opportunity to accumulate the visible credentials (i.e., published papers) that would seem to justify such invitations. Scientific centers in the developing countries are infrequently visited by other scientists because they are geographically remote from the standard interconference travel itineraries of the majority of scientists.

The same strictures apply to science education, the tools of scientific research, science organization, scientific manpower development, and to all other aspects of the scientific enterprise: the less-developed countries are not only far behind, but are handicapped in their access to the communal tools which are needed to make further progress. It is not sufficient, within the world community of science, to give the rich and powerful precisely equal opportunities with the poor and weak to spend their money and cast their votes. Only a deliberate policy of internal social justice can keep this community together in what may be a very hard and divisive political era. What would be the annual cost, for example, of sending free copies of the major scientific journals to all accredited scientific institutions in the less-developed countries? Perhaps ten million dollars (who knows?), which is only a tiny fraction of yearly expenditure on scientific information in the advanced countries. The problem is not whether it *ought* to be

done, but in deciding which of many appropriate social institutions—industry, government, the professional organizations, etc.—should actually bear the cost.

Unfortunately, at the international level where such matters should really be discussed, the professional organizations are weak, poorly financed and politically divided. Scientists from the less-developed countries themselves should be much more vocal and aggressive in shaping policies and plans within the world scientific community. It is regrettable that the existing literature and activity concerned with the problems of science in development are dominated by contributions from scientists outside these countries, and that representatives of Third World science seldom plead their case before meetings of the international scientific community.

VIII

Since science development is a worldwide task, whose characteristic problems are not confined to a single country or region, a large effort surely ought to be made by the international agencies established under the aegis of the United Nations. The Office of Science and Technology at the U.N. headquarters is concerned with international agreements having scientific ingredients, and the other specialized agencies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization are charged with the progress and propagation of science-related technologies and practices. These agencies certainly contribute a great deal to the diffusion of scientific knowledge along "mission" channels to the less-developed countries, but their activities do not impinge directly on the growth of indigenous science in those countries. In a complete survey one might also mention regional organizations, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Organization of American States, which are active in some aspects of science policy, scientific exchanges and communications.

In principle, however, the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is supposed to be the primary organ for scientific cooperation and development. It has programs in science education, including some efforts at curriculum development, and in science policy, which generate poorly distributed documents (occasionally of high quality), and a few formal and repetitive conferences. In fact many of its activities are grandiose in conception, technically ill-informed, inadequately financed and largely irrelevant to the immediate if mundane needs of scientists and technologists in the less-

developed countries. As with most of the U.N. agencies, UNESCO programs are hampered by the need to satisfy political conditions—"neutrality" and parity of national prestige—and by a heterogeneous international civil service of very uneven quality, so that the projects that finally see the light are often noncontroversial, unimaginative and a poor value for the money that is spent on them. Very few of the U.N. science activities directly involve rank-and-file scientists from the advanced countries, or even from the developing countries, upon whom the main burdens and responsibilities for their own science development must finally rest.

An exception, which might serve as a model for other institutions, is the International Center for Theoretical Physics (ICTP) in Trieste, Italy, which is maintained jointly by UNESCO, the IAEA and the Italian government, (with important contributions from the U.N. Development Program [UNDP], the Swedish International Development Agency, the Ford Foundation and other agencies). The ICTP provides a place where working scientists from the developing countries can stay for several months at a time, carry out research, participate in advanced courses and seminars, and make personal contact with the leading members of the international scientific community.⁸ Despite a modest budget and limited administrative resources, the ICTP has already performed a valuable service as the means by which many of the younger physicists in some of the less-developed countries have been kept alive professionally in their own countries. It is also unique as a high-level scientific institution where scientists from the developing countries gather together in their own right; it has been interesting to observe the growth of a corporate awareness of their common problems in this group over the past decade, and the extent to which the romantic view of science for its own sake has been modified by the demand that it should be directed to more immediate human goals.

Unfortunately, the ICTP stands practically alone as an international institution dedicated to the creation of strong indigenous science in the less-developed countries. Similar institutions oriented toward the experimental sciences would require larger funds and more sophisticated administrative and technical bases. The existing international research institutes connected with the Third World—the International Centre for Insect Physiology and Ecology in Kenya, and the International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines—are not perhaps on a sufficiently large scale to show their full possibilities.

It is interesting to note, however, that the idea of creating very large

⁸ See J. M. Ziman, "The Winter College Format," *Science*, Jan. 29, 1971, p. 352.

and sophisticated international research institutes to tackle particular technical problems is now very fashionable, and budgets to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars are glibly sketched out by high-level committees. Whether many of these splendid dreams will come to fruition remains to be seen; what we must ask is whether these will be, once more, mere offshoots of the scientific establishment of the advanced countries, or whether they will make a contribution to science development in the broadest sense.

National governmental development agencies often have much larger financial resources than parallel international organizations, and hence could be a vigorous source of assistance to less-developed countries in building their science. Yet in general such agencies are dominated by narrow, short-term thinking, focused primarily on technology, and usually enjoy a monopolistic position in their country which encourages a monolithic structure reluctant to experiment. Although science development is within the mandate of many of them, it remains very much on the periphery of their concerns. These agencies have failed to involve a significant number of scientists in their activities, either from the "donor" or from the "recipient" countries. As a result, many of the programs that do exist fail to be of real help to the working scientist in Paradisia.

IX

The gist of our argument is simply stated: insufficient thought and effort is being given to creating and maintaining indigenous scientific activity in the less-developed countries. The actions of the countries concerned are uncoordinated, and are often based on very poor grasp of the real issues. The world scientific community is negligent of the plight of this small fraction of its members. The international agencies lack the resources, and the big aid programs, such as those of the U.S. government, lack the understanding, to act effectively. A highly significant fraction of general social and economic development, with enormous long-term leverage, is being left to the mercy of a variety of haphazard forces—political whim, crude economic theory, intellectual fashion, administrative convenience.

It is evident, however, that this is not a problem that can be solved simply by the expenditure of very large sums of money under the guidance of a committee of science policy experts. When we talk of a "scientific community" in Paradisia, we refer to a few hundred highly individual, highly trained and intellectually independent people, whose attack on the problems of nature cannot be commanded like the advance of a battalion of infantry. Only careful personal attention to

their aspirations, needs and capabilities can really help them or direct their energies in the right directions. The cost of such attention is much higher in professional scientific grasp and human understanding than it is in dollars and cents. How much easier it is for a leading scientist in Dominatia to advise his government to give a \$50,000 instrument to the University of Paradisia than it is to spend a few days there, explaining tactfully that the experiments proposed for this instrument are now obsolete and suggesting worthwhile alternatives! How much simpler to use the Paradisian graduate student as another hand in a Big Science research team than to devise a Ph.D. topic that will train him to build his own apparatus and to think for himself!

The prevailing style of social and political action is thus quite unsuitable. It involves large institutions, organizational charts, massive budgets, and professional administrators. This style can be highly successful in managing a project which is purely technical, which has primarily in-house or directly contracted extramural components, and which operates on a large budget. But science development has no reliable technology, cannot be done in-house, cannot rely on large contractors, and does not, and need not, operate on huge budgets. It is a program aimed at improving social and human conditions, for which the administrative machinery for "putting-a-man-on-the-moon" is entirely inappropriate. The proper aim is to encourage and stimulate the latent potential at the grass roots of the world scientific community. If only ten percent of the world's scientists could be effectively involved in cooperation with the scientific communities in the less-developed countries, a great stride would have been taken across the gap.

But in addition to the mobilization at the grass roots of the worldwide scientific community itself, there is also a need to reorient the existing developmental organizations toward the actual need of science building in Paradisia. Such a reorientation would involve both fresh action and fresh research on which such action can be based. We need a better quantitative assessment of scholarships and fellowships for scientists from the less-developed countries to study in the advanced countries, or of the cost to distribute the major learned journals to all the institutions that ought to have them. We must have a better understanding of the ways multinational corporations could contribute to science development, or of the ways the U.N. agencies could bolster science in the less-developed countries by farming out their research activities to universities and research institutions in those countries. We would want to have a realistic estimate of

the cost of research facilities needed to reattract to their home countries Paradisians who now are working as trained scientists in Dominatia. Generalities about these questions are available, but hard information to serve as a basis for specific action is scarce.

It is insufficient to relegate these investigations entirely to developmental organizations. Here also, the involvement of individual scholars is needed, whether scientists themselves, or economists, historians, sociologists, or political theorists. At the moment there are very few of these who regard the worldwide social phenomenon of science development as a worthy subject for research. As a result, whatever decisions are taken by developmental organizations are, by default, often based on a combination of preconceived academic notions, wishful thinking, and administrative convenience.

It is not the purpose of this article to suggest specific organizational frameworks for the reorientation advocated here, even though the perceptive choice of such frameworks is essential to success. Preceding such a choice, we must have a widespread awareness of the problems of science development and their great urgency. That is the aim of this discussion.

BLACK AFRICA AND THE ARABS

By Ali A. Mazrui

BLACK Africa and the Arab world have been linked by a fluctuating pattern of economic and cultural connections for at least 12 centuries. In the secular field the Arabs have up to this time played two major roles in black Africa: first as accomplices in African enslavement, and then in the twentieth century as allies in African liberation. In the past several years they have built this alliance into a comprehensive political partnership, aimed at maintaining a solid front, particularly with regard to the Middle East and Southern Africa. The critical question for the future is whether the Arabs will also become partners in African development.

The relationship between Arabs and black Africans has always been largely asymmetrical—with the Middle East usually the giver, and black Africa usually the receiver. Throughout the history of their involvement in black Africa the Arabs have been both conquerors and liberators, both traders in slaves and purveyors of new ideas. Trade and Islam have been companions throughout, with the crescent following the commercial caravan, the muezzin calling believers to prayer from the marketplace.

The Arab slave trade was a significant part of this commerce from the ninth through the nineteenth centuries. While the transatlantic slave trade on the West coast of Africa was certainly larger and more important, the activities of Arab slavers on the Eastern seaboard lasted a few decades longer—until they were officially outlawed in the late 1800s. Thus Islam may have been somewhat compromised in East Africa by the nature of its purveyors (who, in addition to slaving, also created Arab city-states along the East coast). European colonization did, at any rate, arrest the spread of the religion in East Africa more effectively than in the West. In the East African countries of Kenya, Uganda and Malawi, Islamization came to an almost abrupt halt in the face of the Euro-Christian challenge.¹ In West Africa, on the other hand, Islam has continued to expand in spite of the impressive countervailing efforts of Christian missionaries and of the technological prestige of European civilization. A number of West African countries, including Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Mali, and Niger are now predominantly Muslim, as is the northern part of Nigeria.

¹ Somalia, to be sure, remains a major Muslim enclave in Eastern Africa, and Northern Sudan is both Arab and Islamic.

In both West and East Africa the Arabs also made an enduring linguistic contribution. The most widely spoken non-European languages in sub-Saharan Africa are the Arab-influenced Swahili (in East Africa) and Hausa (in West Africa). Swahili, now adopted as a national language by Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda (and spoken as well in Zaïre, Rwanda and Burundi), has come to pose the most serious indigenous challenge to the role of English as a lingua franca in Africa; the first experiment by black Africans in creating an African language capable of serving modern political, philosophical and scientific needs will probably be based on its use. Perhaps over 20 percent of the basic vocabulary of the language comes from Arabic—including the name of the language itself and much of its political vocabulary (like words for “president” [*raisi*], “minister” [*waziri*], “law” [*sharia*], “department” [*idara*], and “politics” [*siasa*]). The growth of both Swahili and Hausa may provide a good model for future relations between the Arabs and black Africa, for they have been enriched by Arab culture without becoming enslaved by it.

The cultural and economic penetration of the Arabs in black Africa was partially curtailed by the presence of the Europeans there from the fifteenth to the twentieth centuries. These Christian traders and colonizers were, however, themselves very much aware of the interconnection between the Middle East and Africa. As the British historians Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher remind us, “the idea that the security of Egypt depended upon the defence of the Upper Nile was as old as the Pyramids,” and the British Foreign and Colonial offices attached great importance to the unity of the Nile Valley from the mid-1880s onwards. Robinson and Gallagher point out the effect of this doctrine on Lord Salisbury, who in 1889–90 decided that if Britain was to hold on to Egypt it could not afford to let any other European power gain access to any part of the Nile Valley. They go on to assert that in so doing Salisbury took what was perhaps the critical decision for the British in Africa—solidifying their involvement in both Egypt and East Africa simultaneously.²

In some form or another the doctrine of the unity of the Nile Valley persisted in the British official mind until well after the Second World War. Indeed, when the Egyptian revolution took place in 1952, the British colonial government in the Sudan, ostensibly sharing power with Egypt in a condominium, felt the shock waves. The British governor in Uganda stayed in close touch with British authorities in the Sudan during the time of crisis, as well as with fellow governors

² Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher with Alice Denny, *Africa and the Victorians*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961, p. 283.

in Kenya and Tanganyika, and the British resident in Zanzibar. Concern about the consequences of the revolution was felt by white settlers and governments in black Africa well beyond the Nile Valley.

The radicalization of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian leader, increased apprehension among white settlers in Kenya, the Rhodesias, South Africa, and the Portuguese colonies. Nasser's support for African nationalists south of the Sahara, as well as his increasing flirtation with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and other communist countries, deepened the anxieties of the white settlers south of the Sahara and the colonial governments there.

Although the white settlers in Eastern and Southern Africa then began to sense a potential radical alliance between Arab and African nationalism, the attitudes of most black Africans toward the Middle East at that time were either indifferent or hostile. The Arab slave trade featured prominently in the version of African history taught by English schoolmasters in East Africa, for the British liked to justify their colonial presence in East and Central Africa by arguing that the original motivation was to suppress the Arab slave trade. With one stroke colonial policymakers could discredit both the Arabs and Islam, while at the same time giving their own imperial presence a high moral justification.

The Arabs, however, under Nasser's leadership, did perceive the interrelationship between the Middle East and Africa and began to play a role as allies in Africa's liberation. It has been pointed out often enough that Nasser, in his *Philosophy of the Revolution*, envisioned Egypt as the center of three concentric circles—that of the Arab world, that of the Muslim world, and that of Africa. Nasser committed himself and Egypt to the task of participation in matters connected with all three circles. As he put it:

... we cannot, in any way, stand aside, even if we wish to, from the sanguinary and dreadful struggle now raging in the heart of the continent between five million whites and two hundred million Africans. We cannot do so for one principal and clear reason—we ourselves are in Africa.³

Nasser proceeded to give material and propaganda support to a variety of nationalistic and dissident groups from African colonies south of the Sahara. Egypt opened its doors to African students, providing scholarships in subjects ranging from engineering to theology. Some scholarships were for militant insurrectionists from places like Cameroon, Kenya, and South Africa.

In the early 1960s, as most sub-Saharan African nations gained their

³ Gamal Abdel Nasser, *The Philosophy of the Revolution*, Economica English Edition, Buffalo: Smith, Keynes and Marshall Publications, 1959, p. 74.

independence, black Africans began to respond to Arab overtures, moving increasingly in the direction of partial solidarity with the Arabs. But responses varied according to positions on the ideological spectrum. In general, black radicals from quite early on had recognized the Arabs as Third World compatriots and identified with them. One of black Africa's foremost ideologists, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, showed some awareness of these bonds even in his more conservative days during the first two years of Ghanaian independence. As Nkrumah became more radical he was less inclined to recognize the Sahara as a legitimate political divide. Symbolically, Nkrumah even married an Egyptian woman to emphasize the solidarity of the African continent.

Yet for a while Nkrumah's support for the Arabs was circumscribed, particularly as a result of Israeli economic aid. As late as 1960, Nkrumah, in a speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations, called upon the Arabs to recognize realities—implying that since Israel was a reality, the Arabs might as well recognize its existence in spite of any presumed injustice committed at the time it was created. But shortly afterward Nkrumah's foreign policy moved further to the left, into closer accord with radical African leaders Sékou Touré of Guinea and Modibo Kéita of Mali.

In 1961 Nkrumah participated with Guinea, Mali, Morocco and Egypt in a conference at Casablanca, whose final communiqué described Israel as a "tool of neo-colonialism." Although Nkrumah denied that he had been pressured to sign this communiqué, Ghana's economic relations with Israel remained unchanged for a short while, but the relationship got progressively less warm thereafter.

Arab spokesmen, in their enthusiasm, prematurely asserted that after the Casablanca conference Israel had become an African problem as well as an Arab one. Such an assertion would have made better sense ten years later in 1972 and more especially in 1973. Nevertheless, Nkrumah's participation in this denunciation of Israel was an important milestone on a journey across the Sahara. The desert was shrinking politically: in addition to Nkrumah, Touré and Kéita, by the mid-sixties Julius Nyerere of Tanzania was also showing a responsiveness to the Arab cause, though still with some ambivalence.

II

Why were radical Africans already moving toward greater sympathy for the Arabs? A number of factors are relevant here. In the first place, Israel was considered too much a part of the Western world. On the one hand, it appeared to be virtually the fifty-first state

of the United States, with a massive American commitment to its preservation, and massive American contributions to its maintenance and upkeep. In that respect Israel seemed a piece of the West deposited deep in the heart of the Third World.

Another factor was the Israeli connection with white-dominated Southern Africa. In the early sixties, this had not seemed particularly apparent, or important, to most black Africans. At that time, as the Arabs were beginning to rediscover their ties south of the Sahara, the Israelis were making a comparable bid for black African support. The Israelis used their financial and skilled manpower resources with some brilliance. Even before Ghana attained independence, Israel was providing technical assistance and training to the Ghanaians. Subsequently, Israel entered into special agreements of cooperation with a number of African states: in 1960 with Mali, Upper Volta, and Madagascar (now the Malagasy Republic); in 1961 with Dahomey; in 1962 with the Ivory Coast, Uganda, Gabon, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Cameroon, Gambia, and Burundi; in 1963 with Nigeria and Tanzania; in 1964 with Togo and Chad; and in 1965 with Kenya.

But then the Israelis began to be hampered by their bedfellows. South African contributions constituted the second largest nongovernmental external financial increment to Israel's funds. The money from South Africa came from the white Jewish community in that country, which was itself one of the richest sectors of South Africa's society. Israel, while sometimes genuinely interested in identifying with the liberation forces in Africa, nevertheless found itself aligned instead with the opponents of the African freedom fighters. The voting pattern of Israel in the United Nations has demonstrated how much a part of the Western world that nation is, and how influenced by its connections with Southern Africa its policies have been. When nationalist opinion in much of Africa was aroused against Moise Tshombe's bid to pull Katanga out of the Congo (and protect Western mineral interests in that province), Israel sided with Tshombe in many U.N. votes on the issue. The Arabs were not slow in pouncing on this Israeli ambivalence. In the words of one Arab publication at the time:

If the Israeli Chiefs really supported the Africans, why did they not announce their support for the legal power in the Congo [Lumumba's government then], the body on whom depends the victory of the Congo over her imperialist enemies? Instead, the Israeli Chiefs supported Moise Tshombe, Prime Minister of Katanga.⁴

⁴ *The Arab Observer*, Vol. 1, No. 21, November 13, 1961, p. 18.

As the first decade of African independence was coming to an end, there must have been some serious rethinking within Israel about its African policies. Things were not moving as smoothly as the Israelis would have preferred, African votes in the United Nations were often hostile to the Israelis, and, as we have noted, the record of Israel's own voting on issues of white supremacy in Southern Africa could have been much more liberal. A decision was made in Israel to offer financial support to African liberation movements, similar to the decision by the World Council of Churches to aid liberation movements with resources for education and medical facilities.

But as soon as Israel made that offer, its vulnerability to pressures from South Africa was revealed. The South African government intimated in no uncertain terms that if Israel provided financial support to African liberation movements, the money which Israel annually received from South African Jews would no longer be permitted to leave South Africa. The financial cost seemed heavy from Israel's point of view. Although the Israelis had not hesitated to aid Africans struggling against their own governments in places like Biafra and Southern Sudan, it now became extremely difficult for the country to give assistance to Africans fighting against the white regimes of South Africa, Rhodesia, and the Portuguese colonies. As the Israelis hovered on the horns of the dilemma, however, to their apparent relief it was resolved by a firm rejection of the offer by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the African liberation movements.

After the October War, Israel strengthened its ties with South Africa, upgrading its mission in Pretoria to full ambassadorial status. The Israeli government stated in regard to this action: "Our rejection of apartheid is unchanged, but we feel that Israel should have normal diplomatic relations with all countries, including South Africa." Then, while black African states were protesting the tour of a British rugby team in South Africa in 1974, the Israel Philharmonic Orchestra accepted an invitation to tour there.

The South African government sees its relationship with Israel as both a modest political alliance and a modest economic partnership. The South African Consul-General in Tel Aviv, Charles Fincham, asserted in 1974 that "the Soviet push into this part of the world, which also affects South Africa," was one of the reasons for improved relations between South Africa and Israel. In the economic field, the South African Iron and Steel Corporation signed an agreement in 1973 with Israel's Koor enterprise "for the construction of joint steel works in Israel." Trade between Israel and South Africa expanded further in 1973. During that year, South Africa's exports to Israel

actually tripled (from \$11.6 million in 1972 to \$32.4 million), while Israel's sales to South Africa went up from \$8 million to \$11.8 million in the same period.

Until the coup in Lisbon, Israeli links with Portugal also continued to be disturbing from an African point of view. Israel's dependence upon Portugal was revealed in 1973 during the October War, when West European countries would not permit the United States to use their bases and the Portuguese allowed the use of the Azores for the American military airlift. Thus, the Israelis were not in a position to vote in favor of a November 1973 U.N. resolution favoring the insurgents in Guinea-Bissau, although they had voted for an analogous measure the previous year.

In addition to Israel's material links to South Africa and Portugal, the existence of the country was capable of being interpreted as a form of colonization not fundamentally different from the settling of white people in Southern Africa. Paradoxically, the internal political system of Israel has been one of the most genuinely socialistic in both the Middle East and Africa. A high degree of compassion and egalitarianism has characterized the Israeli polity. Welfare socialism has interacted with welfare liberalism (with, of course, a deep attachment to Jewish nationalism). It is true that many Oriental Jews have suffered handicaps socially and economically compared with the European Jews in Israel, and recent movements like the Black Panthers of Israel are the manifestation of a nation deeply disturbed and losing some of the high moral fervor which had characterized Zionism in the earlier years; but even after we have taken account of these internal cleavages, the record of domestic rule within the country compares very well with what has been achieved anywhere else in Africa and the Middle East.

Despite this, however, the old commitment to create a Jewish state has produced unintended similarities with certain aspects of the official ideology of white-dominated South Africa. Israelis by the early 1970s had become terrified of the prospect of ever becoming a "bi-national state." The population of the country was already ten percent Arab, and territories acquired in the 1967 war had brought under Israeli control additional Arab populace (though not necessarily additional Arab citizens). In South Africa the ideology of apartheid is also based on a profound distrust of a bi-national state, and the policy of Bantu homelands is rooted in a form of ethnic or racial exclusivity similar to that which caused Israel to fear the mixing of Jews and Arabs into one country.

Indeed, after the creation of Israel in 1948 many white settlers in

Southern Africa began to identify with the Israeli predicament.⁵ Israel emerges in their imagery as a courageous and industrious immigrant community which has managed to defy a hostile environment and survive with honor. This hero-image of Israel has been important both for white South Africans and more recently for white Rhodesians. A Minister for Defense in South Africa once extolled Israel in the following terms: "They stand alone in the world, but they are full of courage." *Die Burger* draws similar inspiration from Israel's example of victorious loneliness: "We in South Africa would be foolish if we did not at least take account of the possibility that we are destined to become a sort of Israel in a preponderantly hostile Africa, and that fact might become part of our national way of life."⁶

In June 1967 the response of white Rhodesians to Israeli successes was also enthusiastic and empathetic. Israel was small, the Arab countries and their populations were large; and yet the Arabs had proved to be militarily impotent in the face of Israel. By the same token, Rhodesia was small, the African continent was large and its population impressive; and yet Africans were militarily impotent in the face of Ian Smith's government. The white Rhodesians also explicitly identified themselves as "the Israelis of Africa," surrounded by hostile and less distinguished neighbors.

Israel's immigration policies are, in fact, much more like those of South Africa and Rhodesia than they are like the democratic policies of the United States. South Africa and Rhodesia try hard to attract as many whites as possible to go and settle in their countries; Israel tries hard to encourage Jews to immigrate into Israel. (However, it is worthy of note in this context that Israel has rejected black American Jews when they applied for entry there. Israel also excluded the Falasha Jews of Ethiopia until the eve of the October War. The racial elements implicit in such immigration policies could not escape the notice of the more radical of the black nationalists both in Africa and the United States.)

Israel's ethnic exclusivity, tied directly to the political logic of establishing a *Jewish* state, is the moral problem which many Western

⁵ Many white gentiles in Southern Africa are paradoxically both anti-Semitic and pro-Israel. Afrikaaner nationalism does share characteristics with Hitler's National Socialism, including some distrust of the Jews. This distrust of local Jews among white South African gentiles has been aggravated by Jewish liberalism. The Jews in South Africa are among the least racist and the most liberal of the whites of that part of the world. Both because of their liberalism and because of their relative economic success even by the standards of white people in South Africa, the domestic Jews have sometimes had to confront strong social prejudice among fellow white people in the region. Yet those same anti-Semitic whites were capable of strong sympathetic identification with Israel.

⁶ Cited by Colin and Margaret Legum, *South Africa: Crisis for the West*, London: Pall Mall Press, 1964, pp. 107-108.

intellectuals have been psychologically unable to acknowledge. The bulk of the Palestinian refugees should be morally eligible to benefit by Israel's "law of return." The Arab Palestinians belong to Palestine at least as fundamentally as millions of American and Russian Jews are supposed to do.

In addition, Israel's policy has given rise to forms of repression against Palestinians living outside Israel which sometimes do bear comparison in their immorality with what has happened in South Africa. Between 1967 and 1973 the government of Israel gave orders for or approval of the killing of hundreds of Palestinians, the majority of whom were civilians, in the refugee camps. Following the killing of the Israeli athletes at the Olympic games, Israeli planes killed more than 300 Palestinians living in Lebanon. The bulk of the world was more shocked by the death of the 11 people in Munich than by the scale of revenge which the Israeli government itself ordered in the air-raid bombing of Syria and Lebanon after the Munich tragedy. Of course, the Israelis saw themselves as being in a state of war and therefore considered it fair game to bomb tents of refugees if Palestinian fighters were recruited from those tents. What must be recognized, however, was that the Israelis were in a state of war partly because of Zionism's logic of ethno-cultural exclusivity.

But there were two additional factors behind black radical identification with the Arabs. One was the mystique of Pan-Africanism, according to which the African continent was viewed as a whole. People like Nkrumah and Nyerere genuinely regarded Algerians, for example, as fellow Africans. The other stimulus to black radical identification with the Arabs was the place of the Arabs in the vanguard of anti-imperialism in the Third World. Countries like Egypt, Syria, and Algeria have been major participants in movements for Third World liberation. Even Libya—although animated more by Islamic fundamentalism than by modern revolutionary ideology—pursues the cause of greater autonomy for Third World peoples with an impatience that places it in the mainstream of Third World militancy. Similarly, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are far from radical either in terms of nationalism or socialism; yet their concern for the Arab cause and for the welfare of Palestinian revolutionaries has made even these countries at least potential militants vis-à-vis the West.

The Arab nations are placed advantageously to rebel against the global stratification system because most of them severed links with their former European rulers more completely than did other Africans and Asians. Most other Third World nationalists, ranging from

Nkrumah to Nehru of India, succumbed to the temptation of maintaining formal links with the former metropolitan power, but the Arabs maintained only informal connections—they were too self-consciously Arab to apply for admission either to the British Commonwealth or to the French Community. All these factors are relevant in explaining why many black African radicals, who themselves would have severed the links of their own countries with Britain or France had there not been certain difficult historical constraints, were drawn sympathetically toward the Arab cause.

III

But from 1972 onward the picture began to change more fundamentally. By a curious destiny black Africans were identifying more fully with North Africa at the time precisely of some of the worst droughts in history in countries bordering the Sahara: the desert's physical growth accompanied its political shrinking. Never in modern history had there seemed to be as much solidarity between Arab Africans and black Africans as emerged, however inconclusively, in the course of 1972 and 1973.

Although he could not then be considered radical in his orientation, General Idi Amin started the new trend when he broke off Uganda's relations with Israel on March 30, 1972. The case of Uganda introduces a distinct issue—the political hazards which Israel incurred by its involvement in military training programs in Africa. At the invitation of Idi Amin's predecessor, Milton Obote, the Israelis established themselves in Uganda as consultants and advisers on military affairs. Inevitably they cultivated friendships among both the politicians and the soldiers. Preeminent among the friends Israel made in Uganda was Idi Amin, who was second in command in the armed forces when the Israelis first came in 1964, and who later took full military command in 1966. In January 1971 Idi Amin captured supreme authority in the country itself when he overthrew Milton Obote in a military coup.

Circumstantial evidence does support Obote's claim that Amin's success in the coup, in spite of his having only a minority of Ugandan soldiers on his side, was partly attributable to brilliant advice from some of his Israeli friends. The tactics which enabled him to control the mechanized battalion in Uganda, and tilted the balance of effectiveness toward his minority of supporters and away from the majority of pro-Obote soldiers, probably owed a good deal to the advice of sophisticated Israeli tacticians.

Later Amin developed a fear of the Israelis—"Those who helped

to make me can help to break me." And yet he could not get rid of them as long as the Sudanese Civil War was still being fought, for he had relatives and allies among the Southern Sudanese Anyanya whom the Israelis were aiding in their fight against the government in Khartoum. In February 1972 a peace settlement for the Sudan was at last reached between contending Sudanese parties at a meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. (Reports from Southern Sudanese sources at that time indicated that the Israelis were almost the only ones of their major advisers who were opposed to the peace settlement.)

It has been suggested by Israeli officials in Tel Aviv and by observers elsewhere that Amin became anti-Israel as a result of visiting Libya. The sequence of the causality should probably be reversed. Amin visited Libya because he was already calculating the expulsion of the Israelis and therefore it made good economic and diplomatic sense to extract advantages from Israel's enemies. Amin did owe the Israelis considerable amounts of money, but this would seem a subsidiary factor which the Israelis later decided to exploit in their own face-saving operation after their expulsion from Uganda. By the end of April 1972 there was not a single Israeli left in the country—even those civilians who had been doing superb developmental work in rural areas and overcrowded schools.

On November 28, 1972, Chad also broke off diplomatic relations with Israel, partly to reduce Arab involvement in Chad's own civil war, which pitted a Christian government (then under President Tombalbaye, who has since been assassinated in a military coup) against a Muslim separatist movement. Then on December 31, 1972, the People's Republic of the Congo followed suit, adding a new radical African state to those which had opted to sever relations.

By 1973, even before the October War, other African countries had become disenchanted with Israel for various reasons, ranging from a growing belief that Israel had indeed become a mini-bully in the Middle East to actually strained relations between Israeli technical assistance personnel in individual countries and the people or authorities of those countries. Niger broke off relations in January 1973, followed closely by Mali. In May, Burundi joined their ranks and then Togo in September. And then in a speech to the United Nations just prior to the October War, President Mobutu Sese Seko surprised the world by doing likewise. He explained that he had been forced to choose between a friend, Israel, and a brother, Egypt, and also criticized Israeli territorial expansionism. The President explained his country's feelings about the break thus:

We have taken this decision at a great risk, because many of our officers—and

I myself—have received military training at the hands of Israeli officers who came to our country at our expense. By declaring this decision to the world from the largest Jewish city in the world [New York City], I mean to stress the fact that Zaïre will never back down and will carry out the duties of African cooperation.

Some commentators who should know better (including African journalists) have suggested that Africa broke off relations with Israel for the sake of cheaper oil from the Arabs. Such an analysis distorts the sequence of events. By the time the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) dramatically raised the price of oil, much of Africa had already sided with the Arabs on the Palestine question. As we have seen, the trend against Israel in black Africa started in 1972, and had converted even Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaïre to its side before the outbreak of the October War, while the energy crisis did not hit the world until about the last ten weeks of 1973.

Countries like Guinea and the Congo broke off relations essentially for reasons of ideological radicalism; Niger did it partly because of religious identification with the Arabs; Tanzania believed in the Arab cause on its own merits. And “moderate” states like Kenya, the Ivory Coast, and Ethiopia (under Haile Selassie), which broke with Israel toward the end (soon after the war), did so partly because they did not want to be isolated from continental African diplomatic trends or break ranks with other members of the OAU.

At this time new forms of alignment between African and Arab states were emerging within the United Nations itself. The Afro-Arab political alliance was dramatized in two highly controversial decisions of the General Assembly in 1974: the decision to invite Yasir Arafat of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to the Assembly and the vote to suspend South Africa from the General Assembly for the rest of that session. In the context of this quid pro quo arrangement, acclaim for Arafat was deemed acclaim for “liberation movements everywhere.” Into the Assembly came the PLO; out went South Africa. In the chair of that session, significantly, was Algeria, a strong activist in both pan-African and pan-Arab politics.

IV

In assessing the future prospects of the Afro-Arab alliance, it would be surprising if a few black African states did not resume diplomatic relations with Israel before long, with those which broke off relations last resuming them first. Many others, however, will not. Beyond the question of Israel, both centrifugal and centripetal tendencies in the alliance are apparent. A central problem in the Afro-Arab relationship, as we have seen, is the lack of symmetry in the interpenetration

between the Middle East and black Africa. Black Africa has been penetrated culturally as well as economically—but has not managed to accomplish adequate counter-penetration. Black dependency might well result in black frustration.

Whereas the spread of Islam through East and West Africa provides a cultural bond, it also, in some cases, serves to reinforce separatist tendencies. In Nigeria in the last decade before independence, Muslim Northerners—fearful of the political militancy of Christian Southerners—talked seriously of secession. The word “Pakistanism” entered the vocabulary of West African politics. Nnamdi Azikiwe, who later became Nigeria’s first President, formulated the fear of balkanization expressed by this term:

It is essential that ill-will be not created in order to encourage a Pakistan in this country. The North and the South are one, whether we wish it or not. The forces of history have made it so.⁷

Ironically, separatism moved southward after independence, into Azikiwe’s community, for it was Ibo Christians rather than Hausa Muslims who eventually sought to break up Nigeria. And many Christian missionary organizations moved to the support of Biafra, almost seeming to regard the Nigerian Civil War as a re-enactment of the crusades—a religious war rather than an ethnic confrontation. In reality the religious factor in the Nigerian Civil War was at most subsidiary, and certainly not fundamental.

Southern Sudan and Eritrea provide two contrasting models of separatist movements. The Southern Sudanese secessionists, who fought for 17 years, were primarily non-Muslims, often led by Christian compatriots, and strongly supported morally and materially by Christian organizations all over the world. The Eritreans, on the other hand, are primarily Muslim, and have been in rebellion against a long-standing Christian theocracy which has only just been superseded by a military government.

The non-Muslim bid to secede from the Sudan has failed, but autonomy has been obtained for the South. While the Muslim bid to pull Eritrea out of Ethiopia still rages, it is unclear whether a “Sudanese solution” may be found for Eritrea or whether the province will gain full independence. In any case, however, a protracted war could result in tensions between blacks and Arabs, Muslims and non-Muslims, all over Africa. While it seems likely that the religious factor will be played down by the propaganda machines of both sides, the danger of large-scale continental cleavages is certainly there.

⁷ Nnamdi Azikiwe, *A Selection from the Speeches of Nnamdi Azikiwe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961, p. 102.

The secessionist movement in Chad is, like that in Eritrea, a rebellion by defensive Muslims against a perceived "Christian threat" or hegemony. The death of President Tombalbaye and the military takeover of April 1975 have left the basic issues still unresolved.

In Africa as a whole, however, it would be misleading to emphasize only those cases where Muslims and Christians have made uncomfortable bedfellows. We should not forget that while the United States was trying to make up its mind in 1960 about whether to elect its first Catholic president, the Muslim voters of Senegal had already affirmed their support for their Catholic leader, Leopold Senghor. Islam in Africa has sometimes shown levels of magnanimity higher than those it has attained in its ancestral home in the Middle East.

The prestige of a religion is often positively correlated with the political or economic power of those who profess it, and with the rising power of the Arab world in international diplomacy the prestige of Islam in Africa seems to be on the way up. OPEC is about two-thirds Muslim in composition. Its two most influential members—Saudi Arabia and Iran—are, respectively, the heartland of Sunni Islam and of Shi'a Islam. The revived influence of the Muslim world in international politics will have consequences for Africa.

But for the time being it remains to be seen what use the oil-rich Arab countries will make of their opportunities. Some black Africans expected special rewards from the Arabs following their break with Israel. The rise in oil prices of course placed African economies under severe strain, and when OPEC refused to consider a two-tier price system for Africa, frustrations ensued. In Nairobi in June 1974 it was even suggested in the East African Legislative Assembly that the Nile River be diverted by the East African states so that they could then sell its water to the Arabs, in exchange for barrels of oil. Not every speaker in the Assembly seemed to realize that any attempt to divert the Nile would be a declaration of war on the Sudan and Egypt. (There would of course have been little rationality in East Africa's entering into military hostilities against the countries that are on the Nile Valley, for they are not the countries which have oil to sell.)

Fortunately, all this frustration in East Africa went no further than talk. While unofficial political commentators argued with passion, East African governments remained cool, collected and reasonable. The argument was made that the Arabs had already paid back this particular political debt well in advance. Just as most black African states have no diplomatic relations with Israel, most of the Arab world has no diplomatic relations with South Africa and Rhodesia.

Black Africa has decided to treat Israel as a common enemy only recently, however, while most of the Arab world has treated South Africa as a common enemy for many years. Arab countries like Algeria, Egypt and Libya were supporting black liberation movements in Southern Africa years before black Africa recognized the Palestinians as a people with a grievance.

Like Henry Kissinger, however, the black Africans advocate consolidating their political alliance with an underlying economic partnership. Just as Kissinger has urged Europe to bear in mind the health of the American economy when the European Community formulates trade and fiscal policies, Africans are asking the Arabs to strengthen the Afro-Arab political alliance by exploring the possibilities of an interregional economic entente. At present this is still in a rather rudimentary stage, and black Africans must adopt a wait-and-see attitude for the time being.

V

These potential frictions in the Afro-Arab relationship are both expressed and dealt with in the Organization of African Unity (OAU), to which nearly half the members of the Arab League also belong. In 1974 two major potential functions of the OAU in Afro-Arab relations were revealed. The organization is, on the one hand, becoming a mechanism by which the Arabs can politically influence black Africans. On the other hand, it is also evolving into a mechanism through which black Africans might seek economic concessions from the Arabs.

There is little doubt that the Arabs have attempted to create conditions under which they can exercise greater political influence in the organization. This was dramatized at the Mogadishu summit conference of the OAU in June 1974, in the election of a new Secretary-General. The newly elected president of the organization was the President of Somalia, a largely Muslim country. But in addition the Foreign Minister of Somalia also was encouraged by the Arabs and other friends to stand for election as the next Secretary-General; if he had been successful, it would have been the first time that both offices were held by citizens of the same country. The Foreign Minister of Zambia stood as a rival candidate for the Secretary-Generalship. One ballot after another was taken, but each ended in stalemate—with all the Arab states voting for the Somali candidate, and virtually all the English-speaking black states voting for the Zambian candidate. Had it not been that the French-speaking black states were themselves divided between the Somali (Muslim) and the Zambian (Christian)

candidates—with some positive correlation between voting behavior and religious affiliation even here—this issue could have split the African continent neatly between black and Arab. In the end, a third candidate was chosen to break the deadlock. At least among the English-speaking black states there was some bitterness. The behavior of the Arab states in their lobbying for the Somali was interpreted as an attempt to put the OAU under either Arab or Muslim control.

This conflict was again played out at the eleventh annual meeting of the African Development Bank in Dakar in May of this year. At that session the delegates were unable to elect a new president of the Bank because they were bitterly—and almost equally—divided between a Ghanaian and a Libyan candidate.

Where they fear coercion the black Africans are resisting Arab pressures; but at the same time they are applying some of their own, as they attempt to use the OAU and its various organs to lay claim to Arab largesse. The bulk of Arab oil comes from outside Africa—from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. The bulk of Arab surplus petrodollars are also in the hands of these non-African states. But it is hoped that the OAU might become a mechanism for pressuring Africa's own Arabs to act as a lobby for black African interests in the Arab world as a whole.

Algeria among the Arab oil producers seems most genuinely pan-African rather than merely pan-Islamic. Its relatively radical orientation has made it more responsive than the other oil-producing Arab states toward Third World solidarity regardless of religion. In terms of material support for Southern African liberation movements, Algeria is more forthcoming than the great majority of African states, both black and Arab. Algeria, and of course Nigeria, are the strongest voices for African interests within OPEC.

Elsewhere on the organizational front, it has been proposed to establish special links between the Arab League and the OAU. Within the Arab League the strongest voices for black African interests are Algeria, Somalia and the Sudan—Somalia being the first non-Arab country to become a member of the Arab League. It is also conceivable that before long there will be a black African sitting at sessions of the Arab League as a representative of the OAU. What are developing are the beginnings of institutions for diplomatic interaction between the Arab world and independent Africa. The politics of the Arab League are interacting with the economics of the OAU.

The Arabs as a group have attempted to respond to African pressures through various gestures. After the October War an oil embargo was imposed by Arab oil-producers on all exports of oil to South Af-

rica, Rhodesia, and Portugal. A committee of the OAU was set up to assess the unintended consequences of the Arab oil boycott and the new oil prices on the fragile economies of African states. Meeting with representatives of Arab oil-producers in 1974, members of this committee were assured of unlimited supplies of oil, but they did not, regrettably, obtain special concessions on prices.⁸ Instead, the Arabs planned to open a special Arab Bank for African Development, initially with \$200 million in capital, to be used for types of development which could partially offset some of the consequences of the high Arab oil prices. Further meetings between Arabs and Africans on issues of oil production and oil prices were to be held periodically.

Much of the inter-bloc discussion in 1974 was about multilateral aid-money from Arab sources, channeled through special banking institutions, for development projects in Africa. Performance at this level has been slow and haphazard. So far the OPEC countries are estimated to have disbursed about \$37 million to the new Arab Bank for African Development, and about \$150 million to the Special Fund for Africa, which is administered through the Arab League.

But while the debates about multilateral aid and two-tier oil pricing have continued, general performance in the field of bilateral aid from OPEC members to Third World countries has been improving. By April 1975 Western aid officials—who had been skeptical about OPEC efforts in aid—were revising their estimates. In the words of Maurice J. Williams, chairman of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), “in speed and effectiveness the aid record [of OPEC countries] has been impressive.” By early 1975 that aid already accounted for a sixth of official development aid from rich to poor countries. According to these figures of the OECD Committee, the oil states gave 1.8 percent of their gross national product in 1974, compared with 0.33 percent in the Western industrial states, and 0.21 percent on the part of the United States.

The main aid donors among the OPEC group were Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Venezuela. Partly because OPEC is largely Islamic in composition, and partly because the “Fourth World” of poorest countries is disproportionately Muslim, about 80 percent of aid from oil-exporting countries has gone to Muslim countries and over half of this to Arab nations. Within Africa, the principal Muslim recipients of bilateral Arab aid have

⁸ While it would be eminently justified, a two-tier pricing system should, in any case, include the entire developing world. It is not often remembered that India supported the Arabs in the Middle East for 20 years before the majority of black African states were converted to the Arab side.

been the Sudan and Somalia, with small amounts to Mali, Mauritania, Senegal and Guinea. Uganda (which is not a Muslim country although its head of state is Muslim) had received approximately \$20 million in official aid from OPEC sources by the end of 1974.

In addition there is a significant area of unofficial aid. This includes aid to Muslim minorities in otherwise non-Muslim countries. The range of such minorities includes the Muslims of Sierra Leone, Kenya and Ghana (mainly aid for education), the Muslims of Chad and Ethiopia (partly military and partly welfare purposes) and the Muslims of Dahomey and Upper Volta (mainly educational and for missionary work). By its very nature, unofficial aid is difficult to compute. But many delegations from Muslim Africa go fund-raising to the Arab world every year, and few come back completely empty-handed. And many African Muslims go to schools and colleges in the Arab world—from Cairo to Kuwait, from Baghdad to Algiers, from Riyadh to Tripoli.

It must be acknowledged, however, that black Africa's share of OPEC assistance funds has been modest.⁹ If the aspirations of much of black Africa are not to be frustrated, Afro-Arab relations clearly cannot reduce themselves to inter-Muslim relations, nor can economic interaction between Africa and the Middle East be limited to small and sporadic aid flows. Multilateral aid and bargaining as well as interregional trade need to be institutionalized in the years ahead.

Like the issue of slavery—another form of black energy—the present importance of oil is posing new questions about the future relations among the Arabs, the Africans and the Western world. At least since the Middle East war of 1973, the Middle East and Africa have edged a little closer toward becoming a single international subsystem. There are, as we have seen, hazards in the relations between Africa and the Middle East, as well as unfulfilled promises. A good deal will depend upon the Arab world's capacity to transcend the temptations of power and influence and to maintain a broad solidarity with Africa as a sound foundation for an Afro-Arab diplomatic and economic front.

⁹ According to World Bank estimates, OPEC bilateral aid disbursements to black Africa in 1974 amounted to only about six percent of total OPEC bilateral aid disbursements.

NUCLEAR SPREAD AND WORLD ORDER

By Lincoln P. Bloomfield

UNTIL a year or two ago we were entitled to believe that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) could successfully hold the line at five nuclear weapons powers, if only a few holdout countries would sign or ratify it. Two events have thrown into serious doubt the ability of present policies to stem the further proliferation of nuclear weapon capabilities among additional nations.

The first event was the Indian “peaceful” nuclear explosion in May 1974, which jumped the firebreak between the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council—who are also the nuclear weapons powers—and all other nations. That barrier had held for ten years since the first Chinese detonation in 1964.

What seemed to undermine the earlier mild optimism that the NPT could do the job was not that “nuclear-weapons-capable” countries such as Sweden, Canada, Switzerland, Australia, Netherlands, Italy, Poland, Argentina, Brazil, Japan, and West Germany, or even nations in conflict like Pakistan, Taiwan, South Africa, South Korea, Israel, or Egypt were on the verge of exploding their own nuclear devices (though many think Israel is in fact the “seventh” nuclear weapons power). It was rather that the general climate of expectation about what was likely to take place had changed significantly. Many now believe that there *will* be Nuclear Weapons Power numbers 7, 8, 9, ad infinitum. Members of the international professional strategic community have already been discounting the future and shifting their planning to ways of living in a world of many nuclear weapons powers. The crucial new reality is thus not merely the existence of a sixth (or seventh) such power; it is above all the altered prediction that influential people around the world are making as a consequence.¹

Having one more “nuclear-capable” power does not change the world. But what could change it would be a snowballing, fatalistic belief that becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy unless it is countered by a different belief that is equally potent.

The second event was the worldwide energy crisis. Predictions of numbers of future nuclear power plants now far exceed the figure planners had been using prior to the Arab oil embargo of 1973–74.

¹ An informal poll of leading U.S. nonproliferation experts meeting privately in March 1975 showed 14 out of 21 anticipating the existence of one to four additional nuclear weapons powers in the next decade. Four experts expected seven to ten more “bomb powers,” and none predicted that the line would be held at six.

The amount of plutonium to be produced over the next decade will be enough to put a major dent in the energy shortage—and to make thousands of atomic bombs.

These two portentous shifts in perception and planning came at a time when 55 of the 90 or so countries that have signed the 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty attended its May 1975 five-year Review Conference in Geneva. Just prior to the conference, and doubtless in anticipation of it, ratification had been completed by five West European states and South Korea.

The conference concentrated on tightening up technical controls and safeguards over the rapidly growing worldwide nuclear power-generating industry as well as the flow of nuclear fuels, uranium and plutonium, that go in and out of peaceful atomic reactors. The hair-raising specter of nuclear blackmail by hijacking and sabotage sharpened the delegates' concern for better means of guarding against capture of nuclear materials by terrorist groups.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is even now doing a competent, though limited, job of inspecting peaceful reactors to catch (or at least discourage) clandestine diversion of plutonium or enriched uranium. Most of the countries that are able to supply nuclear fuels and reactor technology, notably the United States and the Soviet Union, have agreed among themselves to export only to recipient countries that adopt IAEA safeguards (though last year's U.S. offer to Israel and Egypt showed Washington still unwilling to require inspection of older facilities as the price for new help).

All in all, many laudable efforts are going into strengthening the NPT "regime," which is clearly the best answer so far to limiting the further spread of nuclear weaponry. The great majority of nations, and certainly of human beings, clearly support its goal. A few people may remain comfortable with the scenario of dozens of countries, some at war with one another, newly enabled to destroy humankind by the millions, even to trigger the apocalypse of superpower strategic war. But overwhelmingly the rest of us cling to the conviction that, as someone put it, "when you have five, or even six, idiot children, it's time to practice birth control." Certainly no one can quarrel with this concentration on the contingent problem of clandestine nuclear activities, aimed at preventing cheating as well as making peaceful nuclear technology more readily available under safeguards.

But now that the Review Conference is out of the way, it is time to raise the sobering possibility that all this activity, while essential, will not be enough. For what has never been adequately dealt with, probably because it seemed politically insuperable, is the inherently dis-

criminatory nature of the present system.

II

In our epoch, the evidence is everywhere of the dominant role of national status-seeking and the drive to "feel equal." An entire philosophy of resentful Third World economics bears the telltale name "dependency theory." Third World proposals for a "New Economic and Social Order" reflect a veritable obsession with eradicating the stigmata of inferiority. The walls of every international conference room, from OPEC to the U.N. General Assembly, resound with strident demands for equal status. At the symbolic level (which Harold Isaacs reminds us is anything but trivial²) there are few nations, however poor or tiny, that cannot boast of a flag airline, diplomatic limousines (usually longer than that of the U.S. Ambassador), international hotels, supersonic jets—and nuclear power reactors.

Even at the superpower level, no serious negotiation with the Soviets on strategic nuclear arms was possible until Moscow felt it had acquired "parity." And if final proof were needed, even those Indians most critical of their government for other deeds or misdeeds unanimously express pride over its achievement in exploding a "peaceful" nuclear device.

It is against this backdrop that the NPT regime has to be assessed. The cold fact is that, without exception, every single aspect of the nuclear nonproliferation system is discriminatory. Indeed, the more successful the NPT system, the more absolute the distinction between those who have nuclear weapons and those who do not.

The most obvious distinction is of course that between five (or six) nations possessing the means of mass nuclear destruction, and the remaining hundred and forty or so which do not and, according to the proposed rules of the game, never will.

This distinction carries the further division between openness to verification by the Vienna agency's inspectors (for all nonweapons' countries) and secrecy for all the great powers' reactors, even their peaceful ones. The exception is the United States, which has offered to open its peaceful reactors, though of course not its military ones, to IAEA inspection. Conversations in Moscow in the spring of 1975 confirm the insistence of the other nuclear superpower on increased controls for everyone *but* the great powers.

Article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty commits the superpowers to good-faith efforts toward nuclear disarmament, but few outside Moscow and Washington believe the process was seriously

² Harold Isaacs, "Nationality: End of the Road?" *Foreign Affairs*, April 1975.

begun with the 2,400-launcher agreement of Vladivostok in 1974.

Brazil for one (and India before it) apparently believes that some of its economic development projects could benefit from peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs). The United States now argues that peaceful nuclear explosions are bad for others, since we don't find them cost-effective for us. If other countries still want PNEs they are free to come, hat in hand, to Washington, Moscow, London, Paris, or presumably Peking, as supplicants for Big Brother's technical fix.

Security guarantees were offered in 1968, but they are subject to the veto, and moreover it seems absurd to guarantee only against nuclear attack when countries can be devastated by nuclear powers using conventional weapons.

As for the spent fuel rods coming out of nuclear reactors and requiring reprocessing in expensive plants to recover the residual plutonium, the position Washington has taken is that we will do the reprocessing for our clients. But of course India, once deciding to acquire a nuclear explosion capability, built her own chemical separation plant and thus bypassed the controls the donor—Canada—had put on the power reactor that produced the used fuel rods.

In all of these ways the system provides that the "first-class" nuclear states not only have a monopoly on the weapons, but also on the international decision-making about peaceful uses.

In the same vein, it is a fact that all current anti-proliferation policies, however worthy, are in the realm of denial. More than that, except for the inspection performed by IAEA inspectors, these policies are overwhelmingly on a nation-to-nation rather than a multilateral basis. Both of these features—denial and nation-based action—may actually reinforce the possible trend toward proliferation to the extent that the trend arises from a sense of inequality, resentment against what is perceived as discrimination, and a desire for equivalent rights and status.

The irony is that while we live, *pace* Marx, in an age of international class struggle, the international "ruling class" of nuclear weapons states (led, *pace* Lenin, by the U.S.S.R.) demands its right to exclusive status unto perpetuity. In an era dominated by demands for identity, respect, equity, and participation, it seems reasonable to ask whether, with the best will in the world, the present NPT system of discrimination, denial, and second-class citizenship will in fact achieve its aim of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. For if my reasoning is correct, it is considerations of prestige and non-discrimination that in an age of rampant nationalism stand as the chief obstacles to universal agreement on nonproliferation.

III

It follows that the chief danger in the years ahead is not that any given country will secretly cheat in its nuclear bookkeeping—which is what the present international system seeks to inhibit. It is that a country will *openly* decide to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, for reasons which since time immemorial, and today as never before, drive nations to seek prestige, influence, and above all equality.³

Of course, if all countries were to sign and ratify the Nonproliferation Treaty, and the Treaty regime were greatly strengthened, the problem would presumably be solved. But this is a tautology: in fact, a dozen key “threshold countries” have *not* fully joined, countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Israel, Japan, Pakistan, Egypt, Spain, and South Africa, whose importance to international peace and stability is obvious. India may not actually fabricate a bomb; but neither is she likely to take a “morning-after” pill that will return her to pre-1974 nuclear innocence. Each new nuclear weapons country tends to stay that way. Even the present safeguard procedures may become inadequate as new technical options, such as the breeder reactor and high-temperature gas reactor, call for much more intrusive inspection.

Yet if the conclusion is correct that the problem of proliferation is as much psychological as it is technical, political, or military, current incentives to take the pledge are insufficient. No matter what the rhetoric, a world in which five or six nations control the weapons technology is by definition discriminatory; a system which leaves all the decision-making in their hands is by definition paternalistic. Clearly there is an unfilled need for a more attractive option than either accepting the monopolistic position of the “nuclear OPEC,” or going it alone.

It follows that to provide not just negative but also positive incentives to the principal holdouts, additional measures need to be developed that go beyond technical safeguards, important as these are. In the classic language of criminology, efforts at nonproliferation need to aim not only at means and opportunity—means which are universally increasing while opportunity for open violation of the spirit of the treaty remains unhindered—but also at the motives for going nuclear as a political act.

Such measures would have to confront directly the political and

³ On April 1, 1975, in introducing a bill calling on the Argentine government to build a nuclear bomb, one legislator declared: “Recent events have demonstrated that nations gain increasing recognition in the international arena in accordance with their power.” The example he cited was China, deliberately ignored by the great powers until she went nuclear.

psychological foundations of the potential drive toward further nuclear spread. Perhaps no steps even in this direction would deflect leaders determined to acquire weaponry they believe will give them an edge, even if strategic analysis proves them overwhelmingly wrong. But to the extent the drive is primarily motivated—as I believe it to be—by nonstrategic and to that extent non-“rational” feelings and perceptions, the countries that presently hold the power and the institutional leadership will now have to open their minds to some hitherto “unrealistic” answers to the central question: What policies by those who favor the Nonproliferation Treaty are most likely to change the climate surrounding nuclear spread back to one in which the normal expectation is continued nonproliferation?

A comprehensive answer to this question must be two-tracked. On the first track it is still essential to pursue the goals of effective controls and safeguards—“disincentives” to going nuclear.

But the second track, to which little attention has been given, is to reduce the political and psychological incentive to become a nuclear weapons power.

How is this to be done?

IV

The logic of the situation requires that an expanded nonproliferation strategy focus on tangible ways to give the outsiders a far more genuine sense of participation in the system. It is obviously not enough to say to them, with the late President Kennedy, “Life is unfair.” Deep-rooted feelings of political alienation and resentment can be overcome only by greater true equality. There must be shared opportunities to gain prestige through participation in decision-making, which in turn requires that responsibilities be much more broadly allocated than under the present two-class system. The operative hypothesis is that a seat at the top table of nuclear institutional diplomacy is the price the “monopolists” must pay to others who agree to forgo a seat at the top table of nuclear weaponry.

When we speak of “participation” we are no longer dealing in symbols but in the hard currency of political power. And if the number of those becoming involved in decision-making about international nuclear activities is to grow to include at least the “near-nuclear” countries, here too we come to the end of abstractions, and into the creation, design, and operation of political forms and structures appropriate to the problem.

Are we then talking about a new Baruch Plan? Nuclear disarmament? World government?

The Baruch Plan of 1946 (based on the so-called Acheson-Lilienthal Report) called for "managerial control or ownership of all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security," along with "power to control, inspect, and license all other atomic activities." That program entailed internationalization of the whole vertical structure starting with uranium ore, through isotope-separation plants, processing of fuel, and, *a fortiori*, the making of nuclear weapons, which were to be totally banned without national veto.

Soviet antagonism to supranational schemes in a U.S.-led world, the weakness of the United Nations in an era of cold war, and despair at the prospects of nuclear disarmament, all made a dead letter of the Baruch Plan approach. Even apart from political unreality, international ownership of the entire vertical industrial nuclear structure, from mine to power generator, is inconceivable today given the enormity and complexity of that structure compared with 1946. Uranium is everywhere in the ground, and soon nuclear reactors will be in virtually every country in the world. In addition, to link progress toward nonproliferation to effective nuclear disarmament (as the Baruch Plan did) would ensure the former's automatic failure. It was hard enough to negotiate SALT I and II over a five-year period, and these leave enough weapons in superpower hands to destroy the planet many times over. Our puzzle is how to change the system enough to get a better political-psychological base under nonproliferation *without* having to work a total transformation in man or in the basic geometry of his political world.

What *can* be done is to turn the 1946 Plan on its head, so to speak, and, while candidly admitting the possibility of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons in national hands, to concentrate on internationalizing, to the extent necessary, the nonweapons aspects of the fuel cycle that represent key avenues to further weapons proliferation. The text could well be Henry Kissinger's comments that a "new international structure" has to be built "not on the sense of preeminence of two power centers, but on the sense of participation of those who are part of the global environment."⁴ It is a mark of our recent loss of confidence in international institution-building that neither Secretary Kissinger nor many of those concerned with nuclear spread have seriously tried to implement such insights with the kind of thinking that made the mid-1940s a relatively Golden Age of international political inventiveness and institution-building.

Even in this age of limited vision, the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, for instance, went a good distance toward draining tension

⁴ See *The New York Times*, October 13, 1974.

from the two-class Atlantic Alliance structure by the device of sharing in planning on a matter vital to all. Similarly, a partial approach to nonproliferation would seek to create a changed political environment in which some key elements of peaceful nuclear activities were actually regulated by the international community, and in which important nonweapons countries were full participants in international decision-making. If this were achieved, the political motive to go nuclear arising from resentment at discrimination would be significantly diminished. And so also would the technical means to do so.

V

Four things can be done within the framework of a partial approach. None of them requires nuclear disarmament, a working collective security system, or total international ownership à la Baruch—all of which seem far-fetched in the present world of nationalism. But the partial approach would call for some degree of change in the operating international political and economic ground rules. Starting with the least threatening or “revolutionary” steps, candidates for significantly greater international control are: (1) the reprocessing of plutonium from reactors; (2) peaceful nuclear explosions; (3) nuclear fuels, notably those based on plutonium and highly enriched uranium; and (4) more distantly, the uranium enrichment processes. Success with the first steps would generate momentum toward next steps. But each step taken, beginning with the first, would have enormous significance for nonproliferation.

First, plutonium which is sufficiently pure to be used in a light-water reactor—or a bomb—requires in most cases processing in a chemical separation plant that separates it from unspent uranium and other materials contained in fuel rods which have been irradiated in a reactor. For most of the reactors being built, where the spent fuel rods are reprocessed is where weapons-grade plutonium could also be produced.

The number of spent fuel rods that will be moving about in the years to come is staggering. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates there will soon be between 7,000 and 12,000 shipments annually between reactors and reprocessing plants. By the early 1980s this will mean that the present nonweapons countries will have available to them annually 26,000 or so kilograms of Plutonium 239—enough to make 50 atomic bombs a week if they choose to. Thus plutonium need only be extracted from the spent fuel rods through reprocessing techniques which, as India has shown, can be readily built at least on a small scale.

This seems an excellent candidate for immediate internationalization. Not many reprocessing plants have yet been built, thanks to the expense, which runs to the hundreds of millions of dollars. The United States has arranged to have recipients of U.S. nuclear fuels send their spent fuel rods for reprocessing to the United States (or in some cases a third country). Little of this is actually being done yet, and the present is thus a good time to rethink the system. For current arrangements simply perpetuate the politically pernicious system of patronage and multiclass citizenship.

A series of internationally controlled facilities, along with internationally regulated and protected transport of this lethal material to and from plants, would represent "community" control of a process that is crucial to all, but is currently held by the "nuclear monopolists." It would upgrade vital safety and ecological considerations by standardizing the process. And it would ensure economies of scale by means of consolidated facilities, located on economically rational rather than political-nationalistic grounds. This is clearly a case where a planned regional approach makes sense (as on a regional scale Eurochemique, an agency of the OECD, today reprocesses the spent fuel rods of OECD members in Europe). Regionalization also reduces the danger of domination or capture and, more positively, spreads control facilities and thus participation.

A second candidate for genuine international management is peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs). As I suggested earlier, the value of PNEs for engineering purposes is highly controversial. Various groups of U.S. scientists have tried hard in recent months to persuade their Soviet counterparts that on the basis of the American "Plowshare" experiments, PNEs are uneconomic, dangerous—and a spur to proliferation. Moscow today seems as divided as Washington was a decade ago between skeptics and enthusiasts, and may still want to use PNEs to reroute rivers, dredge canals, and move mountains.

Both India and Brazil have talked of the need to retain the "PNE option," given that their only choice was between asking for great-power help or going nuclear themselves. Recognizing this incentive, some modest efforts have been made to implement the NPT's promise of international procedures to ensure the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions. The current U.S. position calls for "internationally approved facilities," national in nature although sprinkled lightly with U.N. or IAEA holy water. In fact the Mexican government—a pioneer in innovative NPT thinking—seven years ago proposed internationalization of the PNE program. Officials of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) justi-

fably point out that both Argentina and Brazil—two current NPT holdouts—supported that 1968 initiative; perhaps even India would have found it hard to justify her unilateral explosion if the Mexican initiative had been followed up.

Proposals to internationalize PNEs have usually foundered on military security grounds reflected by the question, "Would you want to give an atomic bomb to Waldheim?" There are, as always, pros and cons to this question, including the danger that creation of a new facility for peaceful nuclear explosions might persuade countries to believe it to be a good idea and thus encourage them to acquire the capability nationally. Against this is the more likely contingency of other countries doing what India did: acquiring a nuclear capability on the pretext—or genuine belief—that peaceful nuclear explosions may contribute to their economic development.

Given the great importance of creating a new political-psychological climate for nuclear power, it would seem more important to move to internationalize these peaceful capabilities than to temporize further on debatable technical and engineering grounds. Even if such explosions prove to be uneconomic, the purpose of designing a truly international facility will have been served if, through its symbolism, it contributes to the belief on the part of nations that there is a real promise of a new and fairer international order involving nuclear power, in which all will be assured of receiving benefits.

But a changed approach would also have to be for real. An "international PNE facility" would not affect the stockpiles of nuclear weapons in the hands of the big powers. But it must give to countries that hold back from the NPT on grounds of status and autonomy a greater sense of participation in a far less discriminatory system.

The technical and security issues in a joint international PNE service are complex but not insurmountable. The challenge would be to find a political-technical mix between the extremes of "giving a bomb to Waldheim" and continuing to require proud nations to come to Washington or Moscow to appeal for the technology for peaceful explosions. As a first approximation, the technology for a reasonably clean and efficient nuclear device could be set at the lowest level of common technical knowledge between the United States and the Soviet Union, a level that is probably fairly sophisticated. To reach that point, a joint research project could be undertaken to define and engineer such a "state of the art" device.

Security precautions would of course be required to ensure against risks of theft or sabotage. Some of the means already in existence include making explosive devices unwieldy, utilizing multiple elec-

tronic "keys," and applying such proven measures as the warhead security procedures of the U.S. Air Force.

By keeping the technology simple, it seems plausible that the facility could operate at the threshold of common technical knowledge and still be genuinely multinational in composition, security, and decision-making. This is the chief point—that the essentially political decisions about rendering PNE services, including policy questions of cost, personnel, priorities, timing, and the like would be made by an international board consisting of all the nuclear weapons powers plus the principal near-nuclear powers.

Already some countries such as Australia and Canada have endorsed proposals for international arrangements for peaceful explosions. This is a case where leadership could best come from those states most affected by the problem rather than from Washington. But what needs to come from Washington (and Moscow and London and Paris and Peking) is a willingness to implement their words about equality and world order.

This brings us to the third point. Looking ahead to a climate in which steps have been taken to share at least some important peaceful nuclear responsibilities and privileges, it may become possible to consider the means by which the international community could get a handle on the basic element of the process—the uranium itself.

Given the widespread existence of uranium in natural local formations in many parts of the world, it is out of the question to transfer title of uranium ore, even of high (say one percent to two percent) concentration, to the international community. But a partial plan might in its later stage provide for international title over all processed uranium-based nuclear fuels, which would include all enriched uranium and all plutonium. All such fuels would be defined as "public goods." Compensation to present owners for fuels now in process would be made through a bond issue to be amortized over a period of years from the proceeds of future sales to power and research plants. Licenses would be issued for extraction and primary processing and shipping, and efficient surveillance and record-keeping would be maintained to ensure that shipments went to their intended destinations. The control process would be supported by fees from licensing.

The legal principal for plutonium, and for high-grade uranium, would be that these "goods" have the same international legal standing as the seabed beyond the likely 200-mile economic resources zone. Under international rules the seabed and the seas above it represent "the common heritage of mankind" whose exploration will, with any luck, be licensed and regulated by an international authority. Sim-

ilarly, an international authority would license and regulate national or private production of enriched uranium. The international community would also prescribe standards for the handling of enriched uranium and its insertion into the power reactor network. IAEA inspection would be performed at *all* nuclear power reactors using both U-238 and U-235.

One reason for deferring this step is that historically some weapons-grade fissionable material is produced by power reactors and some by military reactors. This kind of complication would be bypassed by taking the larger arms-control step of ending production of all fissionable material for military purposes. We should return to the 1966 U.S. proposal for a cut-off in the production of all weapons-grade material and the transfer of substantial military stocks of U-235 and plutonium to peaceful uses.

The final element of the scheme is to bring under international control the means of enriching uranium. The expensive and complex isotope-separation method of gaseous diffusion may in time be replaced by much less expensive and complex techniques such as gas centrifuge technology, lasers, and the South African nozzle process. The last stages of an agreed partial plan would require that all means for generating enriched uranium be regarded as a public utility. Private or national ownership under licensed international supervision would continue in the first stage, but by the final stages such plants would be publicly owned and operated either directly or under international license. Compensation would be as above.

VI

Each step in the suggested plan entails empowering an international authority to do an increasingly complex job. Where to start?

One approach would be to start with the principal nations willing to proceed now rather than to await universal agreement. For instance, China and France might not join at the outset, but agreement might be reached among a substantial number of nations to designate international reprocessing facilities and outline a workable system of control and management under the IAEA—or as a separate agency.

If a “coalition of the willing” could be formed by the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and India, plus most of the key “threshold powers,” a partial community with embryonic common institutions could be set up among them, creating a standard to which the unwise could be encouraged to repair. Whether the new authority is a specialized agency of the U.N. family, or a new agency, or attached to the IAEA, is far less important than that the membership in the first

instance include most of the present nuclear supplier powers and, above all, most of the crucial *potential* nuclear powers.

Alternatively, the proposal could be put to the United Nations and to the IAEA to be adopted and implemented by the existing organizations. The IAEA, the U.N., or the parties to the Treaty could decide to create blue-ribbon panels of experts to study and report, by a specified deadline, recommendations which a reconvened NPT Review Conference might consider.

In proceeding to increase the power of the international community, a step-by-step process is essential, with a final stage that does not put the entire plan in jeopardy because of its obvious absurdity or its failure to take into account persistent characteristics of the human condition. Such a phased plan could specify one function on which work should begin without delay, e.g., international reprocessing facilities; the urgency of this step is underlined by the proposal of Iran—a full party to the Treaty—to build its own separation plant. Stage Two could create an international facility for PNEs. Stage Three, control over refined fuels of a specified type. And Stage Four, international control or ownership of uranium enrichment facilities. Or steps could be taken on each of these fronts in each stage, with modest steps in Stage One, and completion across the board in Stage Three or Four.

To begin with, however, in the spirit of the proposal, consultations should begin with others so the plan can become theirs as much as it would be ours. Those others must include the present nuclear weapons powers. But above all it must involve those whose decisions, both on capabilities *and* intentions, will be the fateful ones. For all parties, even the partial approach calls for a leap of imagination. But so does living in a world of proliferated nuclear weapons where every minor international quarrel could become genocidal.

MAKING NUCLEAR ENERGY SAFE AND SECURE

By William O. Doub and Joseph M. Dukert

BETWEEN now and the end of this century there is no realistic hope of meeting world energy needs without a substantial increase in the use of nuclear energy; commercial nuclear reactors are bound to multiply three- or four-fold even over the next 10 to 15 years. Commercial nuclear materials must be safeguarded against diversion or misuse by nations or individuals. At the same time, nuclear reactor designs and associated fuel cycle facilities now in common use present both real and public-perception problems as to their safe operation and the safe storage of the radioactive wastes they generate.

More and more these problems are seen to be global concerns. By far the greatest risk in the expanded use of nuclear energy is that it may contribute to the spread of nuclear weapons. Such nuclear proliferation was the main subject of the Review Conference just concluded in Geneva, five years after the coming into force of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). But the question of nuclear proliferation, vital as it is, is only part of the overall problem. Basically, the question is whether, and if so how, the use of the "peaceful atom" can be expanded to meet the world's energy needs without incurring unacceptable public risks of any sort. Although experts like to draw a technical distinction between "safety" and "safeguards"—and only the latter came in for extensive review at Geneva—in fact the regulation and control of the whole nuclear fuel cycle is often so closely related as to be almost impossible to divide into discrete parts.

Obviously, much of the problem of additional nuclear-weapons countries is political in nature: if a nation is determined, as India was, to demonstrate the ability to build its own nuclear weapons, probably no international framework can prevent it from doing so; the raw materials and the technology exist, to the point where no amount of international policing consistent with present concepts of national sovereignty—let alone the acute sensitivity of many nations today—can prevent nations from developing and exploding "devices" which are for all practical purposes weapons. To deter such decisions remains a matter of "high politics," concerned partly with the damping of regional rivalries, and in considerable part with the actions and attitudes of the superpowers and other nuclear-weapons nations with respect to their own nuclear capabilities.¹

¹ See George H. Quester, "Can Proliferation Now Be Stopped?" *Foreign Affairs*, October 1974.

But at the level of practical action and day-to-day operation, it is also vital to have as strong a multinational framework as possible for the control of nuclear facilities and materials. Only through such a framework can nations, especially those which want nuclear facilities but not weapons, have confidence that others are playing the game fairly; only through such a framework can both safety and safeguards be steadily improved; and only so, in the long run, can the world hope to achieve a bearable balance between expansion and risk. It is the thesis of this article that the basis for such a framework already exists, in the International Atomic Energy Agency headquartered in Vienna, and that a major task for the next two to three critical years is to expand and solidify the functions and operations of the IAEA. We conclude with the proposal that there be established Regional Nuclear Centers to handle the expanding world need for key nuclear fuel cycle facilities, and that such facilities be placed under the safety and safeguards surveillance of the IAEA.

II

The IAEA came into being in 1957 as an affiliated agency of the United Nations, with the dual function of promoting the peaceful application of nuclear energy and of trying to avoid the diversion of fissile nuclear materials into weapons production. Although its roots lay in President Eisenhower's "atoms for peace" initiative of December 1953, from the first the organization had the full support of the Soviet Union, as well as the participation of a large number of nations including those with some nuclear capacity and those which looked primarily to receiving nuclear materials and facilities. The first Director-General of the IAEA was an American, former Congressman Sterling Cole. One of the first American representatives to the IAEA, who served for nine years, was Henry deWolf Smyth of Princeton, a former AEC Commissioner and author of the Smyth Report. From the beginning, the staffing and operation of the Agency have been serious, professional, and to a remarkable degree non-political. As the U.N. membership and voting patterns have expanded and changed, the IAEA has gone on little affected (except in size). Today, its members total 106 countries, and the Director-General is a Swedish scientist, Dr. Sigvard Eklund, who has served in that position since 1961.

For its first ten years, the IAEA focused primarily on its principal goal of spreading the peaceful fruits of nuclear technology—radioisotopes for medicine, agriculture and industry, reactors for research and power. According to the ground rules laid down by the cooperating superpowers which made the birth of IAEA possible, the Agency

has never been in a position to limit or influence the military programs of the countries already possessing nuclear weapons. IAEA has no disarmament or arms-control function, (although nothing in its Statute would prevent its exercise of such responsibilities if, for example, they grew out of a future SALT negotiation). But safeguards against diversion have always been an aspect of the worldwide security structure to which IAEA was expected to contribute.

Initially this safeguarding role was limited to "source" and "special nuclear material"—i.e., natural uranium and uranium containing various degrees of enrichment in the fissionable isotope U-235—and equipment supplied under IAEA aegis, including the fissile material contributed to worldwide research by the United States during President Eisenhower's administration. Gradually IAEA's status as an official international inspector was extended to other transfers, in which the supplier nation and the receiving nation or group of nations signed authorizing accords with the Agency. The greatest expansion of IAEA's safeguarding duties came with the NPT, which named the Agency specifically to monitor compliance with its provisions.²

Acting under this charter, the IAEA is now authorized to conduct inspection operations in at least 92 countries, with an inspection staff of approximately 70 technical personnel and a budget for this function of about \$5 million (out of a total Agency budget of \$35 million). It is, to put it bluntly, a shoestring operation at present; let us return in a moment to its technical adequacy and to what would be needed to expand and strengthen safeguard operations.

Even if its own operations have remained on a relatively small scale, the IAEA has been an important catalytic force in the framing and extension of proper standards for safeguarding nuclear operations. In the latter stages of the negotiation of the NPT in the late 1960s, President Johnson made an offer to open U.S. domestic commercial nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection. This offer was reaffirmed last September, on behalf of President Ford, in a speech by Dr.

² Article III of the NPT specifically requires each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty to accept safeguards as promulgated pursuant to the Statute of the IAEA for "... the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. . . . The safeguards required by this article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere." The NPT specifies that safeguards shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technical development or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities.

The Treaty also requires that each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty "... shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article. . . ."

Dixy Lee Ray, then Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and it was understood that it was to take effect as soon as Japan and the EURATOM countries had completed ratification of the NPT. The offer was apparently motivated initially by two considerations: first, to assure other nations that surveillance would not hamper their industrial commercial nuclear development, and secondly, to demonstrate that any presumed interference with internal operations caused by IAEA inspections would not enable nuclear-vendor nations—specifically the United States—to gain a competitive advantage.

Today the conditions of the U.S. offer seem about to be met. In early May, just prior to the convening of the Review Conference, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, all members of EURATOM, deposited their final ratifications; similar action by Japan seems imminent. Hence, although the American nuclear industry has always been less than enthusiastic with respect to the idea of full-fledged IAEA inspection in this country—so that there may be some foot-dragging—it now seems imperative and wholly desirable that IAEA inspections take place at U.S. commercial installations. In considerable degree this would reduce the validity of the argument that the “haves” are unwilling to accept international inspection for themselves, while insisting on it for others.

Now, of course, the question is whether other nuclear-weapons countries will follow the American lead and accept IAEA inspection—an obligation from which they were exempted in the original NPT. Britain has in the past followed a course parallel to that of the United States, and can be expected to continue to do so. France and China, of course, are not NPT signatories; France, however, has declared that she will conduct herself as if she were, with respect to commercial operations as well as exports, and her civil program is under EURATOM safeguards. The Soviet Union, unfortunately, has a long tradition of resisting any foreign inspection whatever, and has given no sign of change. But even if the U.S. action should not be emulated, it is an important step forward, which will add considerably to the prestige and stature of the IAEA.

The same is true of another major, and little-noted, action of the past year that came *through* the IAEA but technically not *from* the Agency. Since a total of 36 member-states of the United Nations have failed to sign the NPT—while another 15 have signed but not ratified—the application of IAEA safeguards has been in continuing danger of being breached or neglected on a wide scale. As a direct result of these considerations there came about last August an informally co-

ordinated initiative by ten nations representing the majority of present nuclear supplier states, including both the Soviet Union and the United States. In virtually identical letters to the Director-General of the IAEA, delivered on August 22, 1974, the ten nations separately undertook to tighten controls on their own individual exports of certain items to any country which is not a party to the NPT. Thereafter, any receiving country will be required to accept IAEA safeguards, promise not to use the material in nuclear explosives (even for peaceful purposes), and provide assurances that the imported items will not be re-exported in a way that could circumvent NPT objectives. Although the move still leaves loopholes (e.g., France has not yet agreed to go along), it is especially important in that its impact goes far beyond the categories of uranium and plutonium alone. The new restrictions apply to a carefully constructed "Trigger List" which includes complete reactors, reactor components, and certain important materials—such as "heavy water" and "nuclear grade graphite"—which are essential to some types of reactors.

With this agreement among most of the major suppliers of nuclear power plants, the IAEA is now in a much stronger position than ever before. While presently primarily directed at the problem of safeguards against diversion by a recipient nation, the expanded IAEA role could potentially embrace—the present writers believe that it *should* embrace—agreed standards for protective measures against terrorists and for safe operation. Let us now look in turn at each of these areas of present or potential operation.

III

Any discussion of the problems of safety and safeguards—whether against diversion by nations or diversion by private individuals or groups—requires a short technical preface on the stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. In brief:

1. Most nuclear reactors today use uranium enriched to a maximum of roughly 3.5 percent. While this is well below the percentage required for weapons-grade material, the enrichment process used is of course the same for both, the material being put through the separation process additional times to raise its enrichment level. Thus, *enrichment facilities* could be a major point of diversion. In practice, up to the present, the cost and power requirements of enrichment facilities have meant that only a few major individual countries have them—chiefly the nuclear-weapons countries exempt from IAEA inspection (unless they follow the U.S. lead mentioned earlier). The major multinational enrichment facilities of EURODIF and EURENCO,

which are currently under construction, use different technical processes; however, these facilities will be under IAEA safeguards.

If some new and vastly simplified enrichment technique should be developed, it could be a different story. However, despite recent reports about the application of laser techniques, we do not believe these have been adequately demonstrated for commercial use in the foreseeable future.

2. Once the raw uranium is enriched to the necessary degree for reactor fuel, there is the stage of *fuel fabrication*, where uranium is formed into pellets and encased in tubing to form fuel assemblies. At this stage the uranium itself remains a perfectly homogeneous mixture of different types of uranium nuclei, which cannot be separated chemically. The mixture works perfectly well in releasing heat gradually within a reactor, but could not be built into a nuclear bomb.

3. During *reactor operation* itself, the fission process produces highly radioactive by-products in the fuel that would be extremely hazardous to a would-be terrorist or hijacker.

Thus, by the time economic and technical considerations dictate that the assemblies should be replaced by fresh fuel bundles, each ceramic pellet contains a mixture of some remaining Uranium-235, (the bomb-making kind), a considerable amount of unused U-238 (the more common kind), a variety of plutonium isotopes, and a bizarre hodge-podge of other by-products—some of which are intensely radioactive. This “spent” fuel is shipped in heavily shielded casks to storage pools or nuclear reprocessing plants. Short of that point, it is virtually immune to hijacking because of the sheer bulk and weight of the casks (normally 30 to 100 tons) and their own “self-protecting” radioactivity inside the massive shield.

4. Most critical is the stage of *reprocessing*. The spent fuel contains only reduced amounts of the original U-235, but new and significant amounts of plutonium, which of course is potential bomb material. After the fuel bundles have been dismantled, chopped into pieces, and dissolved in vats, it is not difficult from a chemical standpoint to separate the uranium from the plutonium and both of these from the highly radioactive waste residue; but the entire process must be carried out by remote control within expensive concrete “hot cells.” In the case of India, what was done was to take the spent fuel from a Canadian-supplied research reactor (which was not subject to IAEA safeguards) and then to build a small chemical reprocessing plant to extract the plutonium.

However, in practice, very little reprocessing of commercial fuel has actually been carried out to date, at least in the West. Most of the

spent fuel produced by commercial reactor operations remains intact in storage pools. Only a small number of fresh fuel bundles have been produced from mixtures of recycled plutonium and uranium—just enough to demonstrate that such fuel can be used satisfactorily in commercial power plants.

There might be a tendency to delay reprocessing indefinitely if it were not of such great potential importance both as to economics and to environmental protection. Starting in the 1980s, recycling of plutonium can reduce the world's need for fuel enrichment capacity by 10–15 percent, cut uranium mining requirements by 20–25 percent, and simplify the disposal of the highly radioactive wastes by compressing them into physically and chemically inert solids. All this is true *without* considering the advanced reactors specifically called “breeders.”

5. Finally, there is the problem of *transportation* and *physical security of containers* at each of these stages. As noted, the spent fuel material being moved from the reactor to the reprocessing facility may be dangerous but it is not of weapons grade in the form in which it is transported. In the event that reprocessed fuel including plutonium is used in reactors in the future, however, its transportation would include weapons-grade materials.

This simplified description of the nuclear fuel cycle demonstrates that safeguards can concentrate on strategic points; they do not have to cover every move, since diversion is only physically or chemically possible at a few key stages. Hence, under the present distribution of enrichment facilities, fuel fabrication plants, and commercial reactors, even the small IAEA inspection force can in practice do an effective job. It does this by auditing records, by studying the plans of nuclear facilities, and by periodically examining the sites themselves. The Agency also uses automated remote monitoring devices and places seals on equipment and shipments to ensure that nothing goes into or comes out of them without being detected. IAEA inspectors normally announce their visits in advance, but there are also provisions for unscheduled inspections. Furthermore, when large quantities of plutonium or highly enriched uranium are being processed, the inspectors may actually remain in residence around the clock at the facility. Through a comprehensive “Blue Book”³ laying down the regimen for on-site inspections of various types of facilities, the standards and techniques for inspecting reactor operation have been developed to a

³ *The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, INFCIRC/153, IAEA, May 1971.

high point. For enrichment plants—because of the relative newness of the undertaking—safeguarding methods are less fully developed, and improvements are needed.

Essentially, IAEA offers the ability to detect diversion of bomb material within a relatively short time—and thereby to discourage it from taking place. It is true that any nation could ignore the mild sanctions of the IAEA itself—the worst the Agency can do is expel a member and call its violations to the attention of the U.N. Security Council—but it is equally accurate that *any* treaty obligation might be evaded. The Agency is a warning system rather than a policeman.

What are the problems for the future? They are not, we believe, primarily technical; with foreseeable improvements, IAEA inspection can remain abreast of the job. Rather, in addition to increased commitment, the real problems are now those of money and manpower.

What will be needed in the years to come for a credible and effective safeguards program? And how can it be funded? The “Blue Book” ground rules were set up several years ago, and some U.S. experts now suggest that greater access (and thus more inspection time) might be needed in the future. However, the maximum times allotted in that document can probably be used as safe averages for projections. Thus, the authors use a rule of thumb that a team of four inspectors—devoting roughly 50 percent of its time to actual on-site inspection—could cover a dozen reactor units each year. In the case of a medium-sized reprocessing plant, however, the same group might have to devote its full time to that single operation. All things considered, further calculations indicate that the safeguard staff of IAEA must rise sharply—but that it need not exceed 500 by 1985. A reasonable budget then, *for safeguards alone*, might be in the neighborhood of \$50 million annually. In terms of percentages, this would represent an extremely rapid growth curve; but in absolute terms of dollars and manpower it is really quite modest.

Dr. Fred C. Iklé, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has been outspoken in urging greater U.S. financial support of the IAEA; and he is confident that Congress will recognize the value of such expenditures. But the funding of an international operation of this sort introduces special complexities. With the basic IAEA budget divided among member-states under the “U.N. Formula”—which now sets the U.S. share at slightly more than one-fourth of the total—there is no precedent for a single country like the United States unilaterally to bring about such a dramatic increase in an international activity, no matter how willing and anxious the Ad-

ministration and Congress might be.

The dilemma could be resolved in part by making voluntary contributions "in kind," which is the way most IAEA technical aid is handled. This seems a logical way to help the IAEA meet its growing responsibilities in research and development work on safeguards. Ideally, the cost of safeguards should be shared by a multitude of nations. Furthermore, there are dangers in trying to maintain such an important function on the uncertain base of purely voluntary contributions.

Fairness probably requires that there should be some relationship between the amount a nation pays and the extent to which it benefits from the application of nuclear power. Thus, U.S. Representative Mike McCormack has toyed with the idea of what might be called an international "safeguard insurance premium" to be based on the energy capacity of each power reactor and to be paid by the user nation. Using the rough calculations cited above, the inspection cost per reactor might range in 1985 from about \$130,000 per year for the largest reactor being built in this country to half that or less for the smaller units now contemplated by a number of countries overseas. If these costs were counted as part of each reactor's operating expense, they would be minor; yearly fuel costs for a large power reactor are commonly measured in tens of millions of dollars.

Financial support alone is not enough, however, to assure the development of a competent inspection corps. Any international bureaucracy is subject to the pressures of political favoritism; and even if this were not the case there might be problems in recruiting an adequately multinational staff of the size and talent envisioned. Here again, the necessity of enhancing IAEA's prestige becomes obvious. The appeal of service for a limited period (perhaps two or three years) in an international "Safewatch Corps" must be transmitted by every reasonable channel to the pertinent academic and industrial communities around the world. Professional advantages of the assignment might be explained, but the service to the cause of peace and order also needs to be stressed.

It appears, then, that with a major multiplication of its present effort the IAEA can provide adequate safeguards against undetected diversion of nuclear materials by nations. If there are to be difficulties, they will arise in connection with the expansion of enrichment and reprocessing facilities; to this theme we shall return.

IV

What, then, of the protection of nuclear materials against diversion

by criminals or political terrorists? Here the primary measures being taken today are on a national basis; the IAEA has not yet assumed a direct role, although its so-called "Gray Book" (entitled *Recommendations for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material*) gives some technical guidance, and has recently been reviewed and strengthened. In fact, the subject has been approached in a very gingerly way by the United States and other major nations, not merely because some nations consider it a domestic political problem but for the reason that the techniques used in this country and elsewhere to protect commercial nuclear materials closely parallel those used to guard weapons themselves. (These include security checks, multiple electronic barriers, armored vehicles with two-way communication, and self-immobilizing features to prevent hijacking.) At least until recently, it has been argued that to reveal the specifics of these measures to an international organization would increase the risks of some penetration of the U.S. security system.

At present, however, the U.S. position appears to be changing. Addressing the U.N. General Assembly in September 1974, Secretary Kissinger proposed that the IAEA take the responsibility for drafting "an international convention for enhancing physical security against theft or diversion of nuclear material"—to include "specific standards for protecting materials while in use, storage, and transfer." And in the same speech the Secretary said that the United States would make "specific proposals to strengthen safeguards to the other supplier countries." In accordance with this last suggestion, reliable sources now report that Washington may soon propose a conference of representatives from the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France, Germany and others to discuss specifically international transport of nuclear materials, with the discussion probably extending more generally to minimum standards for physical protection in other respects.

If such a conference is held—as it should be—the problem will be to get an adequately frank international discussion of the measures various countries have developed individually. Here, too, the IAEA may have a role; for example, one way to accomplish the desired results might be for all major supplier nations to supply releasable data to an internationally respected "think tank" such as the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Vienna, where scientists with nuclear know-how from both communist and Western countries are already working together in cooperation with IAEA. At any rate, the problem of potential hijacking is now sufficiently serious to warrant a previously rejected frankness on all sides.

V

As noted earlier, safeguards against unauthorized diversion and the issue of safety of operation present problems that, while conceptually distinct, may contain technical factors that overlap. Nonetheless, it is often important for the purpose of analysis to keep the two concepts separate.

In the field of nuclear safety, much like physical security, the IAEA has never had the firm charter it has enjoyed from the outset in respect to safeguards. Yet as a practical matter of carrying out its job of spreading peaceful nuclear technology, the IAEA has necessarily become engaged in safety matters and has quietly built a record of accomplishment. For example, in 1972, acting on a reported disregard of safety procedures in the operation of a research reactor within its safeguards jurisdiction, the Agency inspected and found deficiencies and thereafter adopted a policy of inspecting each such reactor at least annually. These inspections now use Agency-promulgated minimum safety standards.

Another relevant example is the field of radioactive-material transport. Most shipments of radioactive material have little or nothing to do with the reactor fuel cycle; the great majority consist of items used by medicine, agriculture and industry. It would be absurd to treat a small amount of "tracer" material (which a patient will eventually swallow during diagnosis or treatment) in the same fashion as a cask of spent reactor fuel; the framing of sensible regulations demands that the thousands of different materials be distinguishable. Recently the IAEA produced a system of categorizing radioactive materials which will presumably become universal: the U.S. Department of Transportation, for example, agreed to adopt the system by reference in its regulations. There is still room for differences among nations in the substance of internal transport regulations; and space here does not permit an analysis even of those currently in effect in the United States. (They are remarkably strict and have proved effective.) But now at least—thanks to the IAEA—the various sets of regulations share a common international language. Negotiations to bring them into accord—whether by bilateral or multilateral agreements—have been facilitated enormously; and this is only an early hint of what an organization like the IAEA might accomplish in the future.

The Agency is engaged now in a two-year study of the safety criteria used by different member-nations in regard to the operation of nuclear power plants. Some countries, including Japan, follow the U.S. reg-

ulatory lead closely; but others have quite divergent philosophies. In the Soviet Union, for instance, far less importance is attached to the need for the design of the mammoth steel-and-concrete "containment shells" which surround every commercial U.S. power reactor. The attitudes of the French and Germans—both important international suppliers—show similar inconsistencies in approach. It would be too much to expect the IAEA to reconcile the various national regulatory codes into a single set of standards; differences in reactor design would be enough to make that impossible even if national sensibilities were not involved. But the Agency may be able to stimulate discussions (and eventual agreement) on underlying safety criteria. This would undoubtedly offer a greater measure of safety assurance and reliability to all users of nuclear-generated electricity. The international exchange of operating data, including that on problem areas, is already taking place. The discussion of reactor-safety specifics within the forum of the IAEA has been little publicized, but its importance is bound to increase in a world whose citizens will count nuclear power plants in the thousands within one generation.

Today, while there is concern over the assured safety of the transportation and use of nuclear materials, public worry over nuclear safety focuses mainly on the storage of radioactive wastes. Is there an answer to this problem, and can the IAEA usefully contribute to its formulation and implementation?

The radioactive wastes in question have in fact been produced in large quantities by the weapons-production programs of the United States and other nations over nearly 30 years. The problem is by no means a new one related to the now-foreseeable spread of commercial nuclear reactors; for scale only, it may be noted that if the number of reactors increases at the highest rates now predicted in any responsible forecast, it would probably be at least 30 years before they produced as much waste as weapons programs have already produced. But the fact that the problem is not new does not mean that it is not formidable.

Up to now, the United States and other nations have taken different approaches to the problem. In this country, wastes are now stored primarily in solidified or liquefied form at ground level in heavily shielded containers—a technique adequate, it is believed, to contain the waste for hundreds of years. In Germany, however, a form of underground storage is being used, while in Japan consideration is being given to all forms of long-term waste disposal.

What seems clear is that none of the existing methods has yet come to grips with the tremendously long-term character of the problem,

since we are dealing with materials some of which will remain radioactive or toxic, or both, for periods running into thousands of years. It is in such terms that disposal in containers whose own survival is not totally assured, not to mention suggested disposal at sea, seems far too risky for the world as a whole.

The National Academy of Sciences in this country has repeatedly recommended that the solution should be solidification of the waste and disposal in tunnels deep in the earth. There are locations in the southwestern part of the United States where there are large beds of salt that are totally dry, self-sealing as to seismic disturbances and sure to outlast the radioactivity of the nuclear wastes. Under the NAS proposal, there would be a "pilot-plant stage" during which the waste casks could be recoverable; after a suitable test period the tunnels could be refilled with salt and permanently sealed—safe disposal for hundreds of millennia.

Such a proposal was, in fact, on the verge of being accepted by the Atomic Energy Commission as far back as 1973. Then Watergate paralysis throughout the upper echelons of government discouraged any action which might "make waves," and no action was taken to begin the project—which had been stymied once before in the spring of 1972 by the premature announcement of a site in Kansas that later proved to be impractical.

Now that the functions of the AEC have been divided between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), the whole matter is being restudied. When a decision finally comes, it will probably be essentially the same one that could have been promulgated two years ago; but now the date is likely to be 1976 or later. Meanwhile, the number of licensed commercial nuclear power plants in this country will have doubled—from about 35 at that time to approximately 70—while outside the United States, as has been pointed out, the pace of expansion will be even quicker. Pending a determination of the American position, it is perhaps idle to talk of international standards on this most difficult of all safety questions. The IAEA may, however, have a useful role to play in coordinating the sharing of information on solutions to the problem.

VI

It is time now to move from what has been said about the problems of safeguards and safety, and see if some wider conclusions may not emerge from looking at all the problems together.

We have already noted that for economic reasons a very substantial

expansion of reprocessing facilities will be needed in the next ten years in order to provide the necessary fuel for a growing world nuclear market. The need exists for a great many new enrichment plants as well. Yet at the same time we have noted that reprocessing and enrichment are presently, from the standpoint of adequate safeguards, the most critical of all phases of the nuclear fuel cycle—for the simple reason that it is only through reprocessing that plutonium is produced, while only enrichment can produce weapons-grade uranium. Finally, when it comes to the question of the safe storage of radioactive wastes, we have noted that the best solution presently visualized would call for the wastes to be solidified—and thus reduced very greatly in bulk—and committed to suitable deep geologic formations.

To these factors of economics, safeguards, and safety, one should add a dose of politics. If the necessary facilities for reprocessing and enrichment continue to be located in the present nuclear “have” nations—basically those with weapons, as well as developed nations like Japan and West Germany—then the sense of discrimination already acutely felt by the nuclear “have-not” developing nations can only be increased, and with it their urge to have a nuclear weapons capability of their own—if only for the psychological effect. If, as a second possibility, the construction of reprocessing and enrichment facilities is done by individual nations, “have” or “have-not,” as each may desire individually, then adequate inspection and regulation becomes more difficult if not almost impossible. A nation with either capability will have to be treated as the equivalent of a potential weapons nation.

There is a third possibility, however. It is one that many in this country and abroad, as well as American and Soviet “international civil servants” at the IAEA, have been studying from the standpoint of economic and technical feasibility. This proposal would be to establish a series of Regional Nuclear Centers around the world. Such sites might contain reprocessing facilities, fuel fabrication plants, and perhaps enrichment and waste handling facilities—in addition to some nuclear power units to generate electricity. The centers would provide service to a number of countries, and could be multinationally financed. They should be limited to countries which are parties to the NPT, and they would, of course, have to be safeguarded by the IAEA, which should also inspect their design and site selections, and be involved in their direct operation.

Reprocessing and enrichment are uneconomical enterprises unless they are tied to a fairly large number of power reactors—perhaps two dozen or more. In the case of many countries which do not now pos-

sess nuclear weapons, there is little economic or technical incentive to enrich or to reprocess. Yet several such countries do one or both on a laboratory scale, and others are considering the step, which could be a prelude to weapons-making. The existence and availability of such service facilities in various regions would help remove any lingering temptation to expand national enterprises. This, in turn, would contribute greatly to curbing the perils of diversion and enhancing public support for the "peaceful atom." At the same time, a concerted move to introduce Regional Nuclear Centers at a proper pace would have other advantages. It could eliminate reliance on too narrow a worldwide base for such services in the future and avoid bottlenecks in the international development of the nuclear fuel cycle.

We believe that this proposal makes sense. We have approached it, as it were, from the empirical standpoint: How can the necessary reprocessing be done with adequate safeguards and in a way most consistent with long-term safety? One might equally have come at the problem from a more political perspective: How can the "have-not" nations be made to feel honestly that they are not being discriminated against, but indeed have "a piece of the action"? Either way, the proposal is a sound one—as Professor Mason Willrich noted in congressional testimony in late April (after this article had been drafted), this is not a case where efficiency is at war with other considerations: rather, as he put it, the choice for a future pattern of nuclear power development lies between "economic efficiency and international security or economic nationalism and global insecurity."⁴

Just how multinational the structure of such Regional Nuclear Centers could be made, as a practical matter, is difficult to judge at this early stage. But it seems essential to us that the IAEA—whose staff has been a major source of the idea—should be engaged from the outset in the kind of creative planning that will be needed if the idea is to come to fruition.

VII

Apart from issues of materials diversion at key points of the fuel cycle, one of the most common sticking points in any discussion of enhanced international safeguards is the issue of "peaceful nuclear explosions" (PNEs). Some nations like India contend that their dedication to peace is a sufficient safeguard in itself. The Soviets argued that their own PNEs are distinct from test explosions of weapons and should be exempt from any limitation on the size of weapons tests.

⁴ Hearings before the U.S. Senate Committee on Government Operations on the Export Reorganization Act of 1975, April 24, 1975, mimeographed text received from the author.

While nuclear explosive technology is quite distinct from reactor technology, there is virtually no qualitative difference between a PNE and a weapon. The *use* of an explosive can be monitored, however, and it is on this basis that U.S. and Soviet negotiators are trying to arrange mutual reassurances about future PNEs. Nevertheless, they have not gone far enough to reassure the U.S. Congress and the rest of the world. In the authors' opinion, the time is ripe for both superpowers to allow IAEA observers to witness any future PNEs under the conditions described by the IAEA Director-General's Memorandum more than four years ago.⁵

That memo applied to PNEs which might be provided to non-weapons countries as part of the technical assistance pledged under the NPT. Formulated by a group of experts including five from the Soviet Union, the document makes clear that observers would not need "physical or instrumental or visual access to the internals of the nuclear explosive or . . . design information pertaining thereto." Part of their job, in fact, would be to make sure that such details were safeguarded. They would, however, be permitted to watch the detonation to make sure that it took place as scheduled, use simple instruments to determine its yield, inspect the site afterwards, and satisfy themselves generally that the explosion was carried out for the declared peaceful purpose and no other.

The question of whether or not the benefits of PNEs outweigh their costs is not germane to the observational agreements suggested here. Whether or not the reality of the perceived benefits of PNEs lives up to the expectations of some is a matter in large part still to be decided. Regardless of that ultimate decision, assurance that PNEs are actually "peaceful" will do much to enhance world security. It must be pointed out, however, that IAEA observation of PNEs is neither a new idea, nor necessarily foolproof. As Dr. Iklé has pointed out, a sophisticated MIRV warhead might quite possibly be tested under the guise of constructing a dam. What is called for here is a meaningful first step, not a complete solution.

VIII

In summary, the International Atomic Energy Agency is not without its problems. The Nonproliferation Treaty is far from a perfect treaty. Yet both have been workable and valuable in the past. In order for both to remain so in the future, there is no choice, in our opinion, but to strengthen systematically the stature, capabilities, and responsi-

⁵ "Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes—International Observation by the Agency," IAEA Board of Governors Document GOV/1433, 13 January 1971.

bilities of the IAEA. The best hope of linking substantial progress at the 1980 NPT Review Conference with arms-limitations agreements among the nuclear-weapons countries lies in the rapid achievement of this objective.

The United States and other nations must accept the realization that they individually cannot contain or assure the peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy. To put it bluntly, if the difficulties that have surrounded the U.S. "offers" to Egypt and Israel in 1974 prove anything, it is that attempts by individual supplier nations to impose safeguards and other conditions on the sharing of nuclear technology on an ad hoc basis will be viewed as discriminatory and thus unacceptable by recipient nations. Nor will attempts to impose such discriminatory agreements prevent the transfer of nuclear technology; nations seeking to take advantage of the peaceful uses of nuclear power will merely go elsewhere. On the other hand, it is naïve to suggest that any nuclear-supplier nation will accept the consequences of even a limited moratorium.

It may perhaps in one sense be fortuitous that the energy crisis facing mankind has occurred at this particular time in the evolution of nuclear power. The worldwide movement to nuclear technology focuses direct attention on the economic, technical, safety, and safeguards advantages of establishing a series of Regional Nuclear Centers in various areas of the world. Such centers, which should be multinationally financed, would serve to relieve national incentives to develop individual fuel cycle capabilities by providing service to a number of countries now entering the nuclear market. The IAEA should be involved in the selection of sites for such regional centers and in their design as well as operation.

There is no acceptable alternative: the safe exploitation of nuclear power on an international scale can only be accomplished within the framework of an international agency and universally applicable safeguards—and perhaps eventually safety standards. The proposals made in this article to strengthen the IAEA can do much to enable this U.N. agency to become a central tool, as well as a moral force, in ensuring that this vital imperative becomes reality.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor:

In April's *Foreign Affairs*, Alain Enthoven teases us with two questions on U.S. forces in Europe: "How many? Doing what?" His unsatisfying answer to the first question repeats the conclusion of his book (with K. Wayne Smith), *How Much Is Enough?*—i.e., don't change the forces we have there now, but keep them at 320,000. His second question seems to promise a sequel to the book, but he never answers it. He makes many pertinent points about what we should not be doing; but none as to what we should do, beyond reassuring our allies. In our opinion, he is only reassuring them that if his view of American "leadership" continues to force American solutions on European problems then we will deliberately prolong any Pact invasion of Europe so that NATO's potential ten million men can be mobilized and counterattack across the Allied territory that we have yielded. This would certainly seem to be the case if, as he says, "The Pact can probably put more weapons into battle for a short period and thus gain more shock power."

We concur completely in many of Mr. Enthoven's criticisms of our current posture in Europe: the destabilizing effect of our vulnerable and useless QRA forces; the false economy of our dual-capable forces; the total lack of any coherent plan or doctrine for the use of our tactical nuclear weapons. But as a 1960–68 architect of much of our European military policy, Mr. Enthoven was involved in the perpetuation of many of these weaknesses, especially in the lack of any doctrine for the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Ever since 1960, when then-Senator John F. Kennedy wrote (in *The Strategy of Peace*): "Inevitably, the use of small nuclear armaments will lead to larger and larger nuclear armaments on both sides, until the world-wide holocaust has begun," Enthoven has been the apostle of the firebreak theory.

In this article, Mr. Enthoven gives some indication that he might abandon his gospel and propose some constructive alternatives, when he writes, "I have my doubts about the logic of the argument, about whether tactical nuclear war is or ought to be inevitably tied in with strategic nuclear war." But if you are renowned as the father of a myth, it must be hard to disavow that myth. For then he goes on to cast doubt on his "doubts." It is unclear whether he is not sure that crossing the firebreak will lead to escalation or if he doubts that tactical doctrine should be closely linked to the strategic umbrella. In either case, he eventually manages to suppress both doubts. In the process he encourages a situation that makes the inevitability of escalation a self-fulfilling prophecy, by repeatedly arguing that it is all right to cut down to 1,000 tactical nuclear weapons because they would be backed up by strategic weapons—so Europeans would be confident that our strategic nuclear forces were coupled to their defense.

In reassuring Europeans that NATO's conventional parity with the Pact makes a conventional defense feasible (if we just won't "concede to the Warsaw Pact an easy victory gained by merely outlasting a few short weeks of NATO supply"), Mr. Enthoven clearly wants a longer war than Europeans want. For unexplained reasons (in case the conventional defense fails?), he would keep 1,000 tactical nuclear weapons, backed up, of course, with our full strategic arsenal. He does not say which tactical nuclear weapons he would keep, what their range should be, what their yields should be, or what their targets should be. He does say that he doubts the President would authorize their use—so he thereby prolongs the con-

fusion that has prevented our political and military leaders from giving guidance to those who should be resolving our doctrinal mess.

We do not foresee an attack on NATO by the Pact, but we do believe that Europeans could be coerced by more veiled Soviet threats of military action, so that it is essential for them to be confident of their own defense capabilities without having to destroy themselves in the fight. It must be acknowledged that nuclear weapons have been invented and that they have a vital role to play in tactical battlefield defense. If they are not used for deep interdiction or for blind retaliation they *can* stop an attack without inviting escalation. We would put the firebreak between tactical use on the battlefield and the strategic use that Enthoven wants "coupled" to the battlefield. Very low yields do make a difference; "smart" guidance does make a difference (for both conventional and nuclear warheads). We need doctrine that combines the best use of smart conventional SAMs, antitank weapons, etc., against dispersed attackers and smart, very low yield (subkiloton) nuclear weapons against massed attackers. Trying to defend against mass with mass ignores the attacker's ability to concentrate locally at the point of his choice; ignores the defensive advantage of accurately delivered subkiloton nuclear firepower; and invites the attacker to start the use of nuclear weapons by offering him lucrative troop targets.

Beyond reiterating his thesis that we should ignore tactical nuclear weapons, Mr. Enthoven seems to be saying that we should mass for a prolonged conventional war in Europe, and, if that fails, call in Poseidon MIRVs "for preplanned targets," and our strategic forces, which he has coupled to European defense. This is the "deliberate escalation" (in the worst sense of the word "deliberate") aspect of flexible response. Blind adherence to this 15-year-old strategy is a course that in our view is most likely to lead to the feared holocaust, instead of avoiding it.

The war games of the 1960s that Mr. Enthoven cites to prove his contention that use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe would lead to high casualty rates showed disastrous consequences because they followed his strategy. He asserts that tactical nuclear weapons have no part in "sustained purposive military operation." Good. We have no appetite for such operations against a nuclear-capable enemy. The goal of our proposed NATO defense posture is to reassure Europeans that the Pact will see no useful form of attack; but, if war does start, we will terminate it as quickly as possible.

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Mr. Enthoven replies:

Messrs. Bennett, Sandoval, and Shreffler are unhappy because my article did not lead to an important role for atomic weapons designers in the defense of Europe. They call for a vaguely defined NATO defense posture whose main benefit would be to generate a lot of employment at Los Alamos.

The writers have correctly identified the answer to my first question, "How Many?"; i.e., 320,000. I am sorry they couldn't find the answer to the second ques-

* The opinions expressed in this letter are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the opinions of the Laboratory, the U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, or the Department of Defense.

tion, "Doing What?" The main answer I offered was to help provide conventional forces equal in effectiveness to those of the Warsaw Pact. For example: "Making NATO's conventional forces fully effective within existing budgets and manpower ought to be the major goal of the Alliance."

I went on to argue that it ought to be possible to do this in spite of NATO's disadvantages (political and economic fragmentation and geography), because NATO spends more and is not badly outnumbered by the Pact. NATO has more active-duty military manpower; NATO has more total land forces manpower; and NATO tactical aircraft are about equal in number and distinctly superior in quality to those of the Pact. And NATO ought to be able to maintain an advantage in conventional weapons technology.

Bennett *et al.* do not make it clear precisely what myth I am the "renowned father" of. I suppose they are referring to a speech I made in 1963 in which I said: There is and will remain an important distinction, a "fire break" if you like, between nuclear and non-nuclear war, a recognizable qualitative distinction that both combatants can recognize and agree upon, if they want to agree upon one. And in the nuclear age they will have a very powerful incentive to agree upon this distinction and limitation, because if they do not there does not appear to be another easily recognizable limitation on weapons—no other obvious "fire break"—all the way up the destructive spectrum to large-scale thermonuclear war.

This is no myth. It is an important reality that has been borne out by 30 years of experience. And it is time that we reflect it more thoroughly in our posture. (Incidentally, while I would be honored to be considered the "father" of that analysis, I believe that fairness demands recognition that it was enunciated frequently in the early 1960s by men such as John F. Kennedy, Robert S. McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, John McNaughton, Paul Nitze, and Thomas Schelling, to name a few.)

With respect to my expression of doubts about the inevitability of "coupling" between tactical nuclear war and strategic nuclear war, my point was, as I said, "... that nobody can really know." There is no basis for knowing. One cannot deduce an answer by logic from evident premises. And we have no directly relevant experience. But, as I said in the article, there is good reason to believe that the danger of escalation, once any nuclear weapons are used, would be extremely high. The advantages of shooting first at the other side's vulnerable forces are too great. The statement by Bennett *et al.* that "If they [nuclear weapons] are not used for deep interdiction or for blind retaliation they *can* stop an attack without inviting escalation" certainly cannot be substantiated. Suppose, for example, that we were to initiate the use of nuclear weapons by using them to knock out a Soviet division deep in West German territory. Is it reasonable to suppose that the Soviets would accept that without replying in kind? Could they? And what would such an exchange do to our allies' will to resist?

Bennett *et al.* criticize me for "the lack of any doctrine for the use of tactical nuclear weapons." But there was no lack of trying. Many able people worked long and hard to make sense out of the role of tactical nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe. Secretary McNamara convened the Nuclear Planning Group to involve NATO defense ministers in the problem. My office recruited some excellent strategic analysts and sponsored numerous studies. Nobody could come up with a believable, acceptable plan for use of nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe. Why haven't Bennett, Sandoval, and Shreffler come up with one? Why haven't they at least asked themselves some of the tough questions? They say, "We would

put the firebreak between tactical use on the battlefield and the strategic use. . . .” What evidence do they have that anybody else will accept that? And have they paused to reflect that the Soviet “tactical” use of nuclear weapons would look pretty “strategic” to our West European allies?

I am prepared to conclude that 20 years of efforts to find an acceptable doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons in the defense of Western Europe have failed because one does not exist. The planned first use of nuclear weapons for the defense of Western Europe simply doesn’t make sense. It amounts to saying, “We’ll have to destroy this continent in order to save it.”

It remains for us to reflect that fact in the design of our posture. In a more affluent era, NATO could more easily afford the costly tactical nuclear posture Bennett *et al.* advocate. But the Soviets have been increasing their armed forces while we have been reducing ours. If we are to provide an effective defense, we must make every dollar count. And one of the best places to find money we need for front-line conventional combat power is by cutting back drastically on our costly, excessive, and largely useless force of tactical nuclear weapons.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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NATIONS IN CONFLICT: NATIONAL GROWTH AND INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE. BY NAZLI CHOUCRI AND ROBERT C. NORTH. San Francisco: Freeman, 1975, 356 pp. \$12.95.

Taking the period from 1870 to 1914 as case material, this controversial work will no doubt rank as a landmark in the quantitative analysis of international relations and specifically of the sources of conflict. In particular, it assesses the indices of power of the key nations and traces the origin of the war to the consequences of different paces of national growth—economic, demographic, and technological.

NONINTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER. BY R. J. VINCENT. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974, 457 pp. \$18.50.

This dispassionate and scholarly book examines the principle of nonintervention in international law and draws particularly upon historical assessment of American, Soviet, and U.N. policies and behavior to support the continuing validity of that principle. An important contribution.

MEETING AT POTSDAM. BY CHARLES L. MEE, JR. New York: Evans, 1975, 370 pp. \$10.95.

A highly readable but not particularly novel interpretation, more for the layman than for the serious scholar. The author sees the Potsdam meeting excessively in isolation from the events that came before and after during 1945; in the end, he lays the blame for the cold war on the shortcomings of Truman, Churchill, and Stalin in equal measure.

UNDERSTANDING WORLD POLITICS. BY KENNETH W. THOMPSON. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975, 234 pp. \$11.95.

Against the background of the current wave of confusion and pessimism, one of America's foremost students of international relations sets out his own intelligent blending of political realism and practical morality.

LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD. EDITED BY JOHN NORTON MOORE. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974, 648 pp. \$22.50 (Paper, \$8.95).

This symposium volume, though uneven, is a major contribution to the literature of the international aspects of civil war.

PEASANTS, POLITICS, AND REVOLUTION: PRESSURES TOWARD POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE THIRD WORLD. BY JOEL S. MIGDAL. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974, 300 pp. \$15.00.

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THE HANDLING OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES BY MEANS OF INQUIRY. BY NISSIM BAR-YAACOV. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1974, 370 pp. \$24.00.

A thorough treatment of a neglected yet important aspect of international peace-keeping.

THE TOTALITARIAN PARTY: PARTY AND PEOPLE IN NAZI GERMANY AND SOVIET RUSSIA. BY ARYEH L. UNGER. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974, 286 pp. \$13.95.

This is a well-documented study of totalitarianism at the grass-roots level and its effects on the everyday lives of people.

NEW ERA IN OCEAN POLITICS. BY ANN L. HOLLICK AND ROBERT E. OSGOOD. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974, 131 pp. \$8.00 (Paper, \$2.75).

THE TIDES OF CHANGE. EDITED BY ELISABETH MANN BORGESE AND DAVID KRIEGER. New York: Mason/Charter, 1975, 357 pp. \$12.50.

Two exceptionally useful volumes on an increasingly important subject. The first deals primarily with U.S. policy. The second brings together a wide variety of papers prepared in the 1971-73 period, but still timely.

LOCATIONAL APPROACHES TO POWER AND CONFLICT. EDITED BY KEVIN R. COX, DAVID R. REYNOLDS AND STEIN ROKKAN. Beverly Hills (Calif.): Sage Publications, 1974, 345 pp. (New York: Halsted Press, distributor, \$17.50).

A noteworthy effort to revive geopolitics in the guise of locational and spatial theories.

General: Military, Technological and Scientific

Andrew J. Pierre

TOO SERIOUS A BUSINESS: EUROPEAN ARMED FORCES AND THE APPROACH TO THE SECOND WORLD WAR. BY DONALD CAMERON WATT. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975, 200 pp. \$8.50.

An elegant essay of historical interpretation which argues that World War II, particularly during 1939-41, was a European civil war marking a breakdown of society. Watt faults the military for failing to adapt their thinking to changes in the technology of war; hence the use of Clemenceau's aphorism in the title.

WAR IN THE SHADOWS: THE GUERRILLA IN HISTORY. BY ROBERT B. ASPREY. Garden City: Doubleday, 1975, 2 v. \$35.00 the set.

A magisterial, lucid survey which begins with Darius bowing to the Scythian guerrillas, but in which Vietnam looms large (about half of the work's 1,622 pages). The author is a military historian.

SOLDIERS IN REVOLT: THE AMERICAN MILITARY TODAY. BY DAVID CORTRIGHT. Garden City: Doubleday, 1975, 317 pp. \$7.95.

A fascinating, and in some ways frightening, account of "the GI movement" and politicized dissidence within the U.S. Army during the Vietnam War. Resistance, the author points out, often went beyond underground newspapers and coffeehouses to mutiny and "fragging"—the use of grenades by enlisted men against officers.

POLITICAL TERRORISM. BY PAUL WILKINSON. New York: Halsted Press, 1975, 159 pp. \$11.95.

TERRORISTS AND TERRORISM. BY EDWARD HYAMS. New York: St. Martin, 1975, 200 pp. \$7.95.

These two works, by British writers, are remarkably similar—sweepingly historical and sociological in their analysis. Hyams comes, with some regret, to the conclusion that terrorism is not only successful but justifiable when there is insufficient social justice.

INDEPENDENCE AND DETERRENCE: BRITAIN AND ATOMIC ENERGY, 1945–1952. BY MARGARET GOWING. New York: St. Martin, 1975, 2 v. \$25.00 per volume.

The second installment of the official history of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority is a superb, scholarly work. Using documents hitherto not available, Gowing sheds new light on the British decision to become a nuclear power and on the tangled history of Anglo-American relations in nuclear matters between 1947 and 1952.

STRATEGY FOR TOMORROW. BY ANDRÉ BEAUFRE. New York: Crane, Russak, 1974, 91 pp. \$7.50.

The late General Beaufre was that rare combination of a distinguished military leader and a penetrating theoretician. This short work summarizes his highly personal views on the principal strategic issues of the nuclear era.

THE MILITARY IN THE THIRD WORLD. BY GAVIN KENNEDY. New York: Scribners, 1975, 368 pp. \$17.50.

What makes this book especially pertinent are several chapters on the flourishing arms trade from developed to developing countries and within the Third World. The author is an economist at Strathclyde University.

ARMS TRADE REGISTERS: THE ARMS TRADE WITH THE THIRD WORLD. STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell/Cambridge: MIT Press, 1975, 176 pp.

Reliable information on arms transfers is hard to come by. This is a useful, country-by-country, statistical survey of arms received between the mid-1950s and the end of 1973.

THE NUCLEAR TRAP: AN ESCAPE ROUTE. BY ROBERT E. WALTERS. Baltimore: Penguin, 1974, 215 pp. \$2.95 (Paper).

An iconoclastic argument that the world has been led into the trap of nuclear deterrence because of its wrongheaded adherence to Mackinder's heartland theory. The author's substitute would be the massive use of nuclear-powered undersea commercial cargo ships which would make the Arctic Ocean the new "Mediterranean of the world." Imaginative, yet unconvincing.

SEEMACHT UND AUSSENPOLITIK. EDITED BY DIETER MAHNCKE AND HANS-PETER SCHWARZ. Frankfurt/Main: Metzner (for the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik), 1974, 554 pp.

A thorough analysis of the relationship between seapower and foreign policy, which was given impetus by the increase in Soviet naval power. The essays range from questions of international law, technology, and the relationship between sea and air power, to detailed studies of the various ocean areas, such as the North Atlantic, and of the naval programs of individual countries.

WAR IN THE NEXT DECADE. EDITED BY ROGER A. BEAUMONT AND MARTIN EDMONDS. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1975, 217 pp. \$11.00.

Despite a somewhat misleading title, this is a good collection of 12 penetrating essays, ranging from future military technology to reserve forces.

WAR WITHOUT WEAPONS: NON-VIOLENCE IN NATIONAL DEFENSE. BY ANDERS BOSERUP AND ANDREW MACK. New York: Schocken Books, 1975, 194 pp. \$6.50 (Paper, \$2.95).

This stimulating theoretical work on non-violent defense should be of interest even to those who remain unconvinced.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SPACE PROGRAM. BY MARY A. HOLMAN. Palo Alto (Calif.) : Pacific Books, 1974, 398 pp. \$24.95.

An economist's thorough examination of the many ways in which the U.S. space program has interacted with our domestic economy. However, the author is too evenhanded to make the needed judgment as to whether it has all been for the good or the bad.

THE FUTURE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CIVILIZATION. BY VICTOR FERKISS. New York: Braziller, 1974, 369 pp. \$12.50.

A sweeping, normative analysis which combines philosophy, ethics, politics, and ecology with science and technology. The author rejects both liberalism and conservatism in favor of a new world view of "ecological humanism."

General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

LE DÉSORDRE ÉCONOMIQUE MONDIAL: ESSAI D'INTERPRÉTATION MONÉTAIRE. BY THIERRY DE MONTBRIAL. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1974, 185 pp. Fr. 27.

An emphasis on monetary laxity as the basic evil of the international economic system often leads to oversimplified explanations, but M. de Montbrial escapes that trap and writes most interestingly on a range of topics. He considers some points in economic theory and some matters of contemporary policy, challenges the sense of arrangements based on national control of natural resources, and has other provocative things to say. A professor, he is also head of the policy planning council of the Quai d'Orsay.

THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY: RESOURCE CONFLICTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. BY PHILIP CONNELLY AND ROBERT PERLMAN. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1975, 162 pp. \$10.95.

"The so-called resource crisis will have very little long-term effect on the balance of power between economies because it is only a temporary phenomenon." In supporting this largely economic conclusion, the British authors have a number of interesting things to say about the positions of different groups of countries and the markets for a number of materials. They say less about politics than their title suggests, but a good bit about policies.

GLOBAL REACH: THE POWER OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS. BY RICHARD J. BARNET AND RONALD E. MÜLLER. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974, 508 pp. \$11.95.

Straw men have become scarecrows. Extravagant claims about the global outlook and benevolent effects of multinational corporations are easily and readably refuted in this book. But by piling on indictments, the authors do little justice to some hard problems. Some of their own good points are smothered by lengthy statements of the negative conventional wisdom that sweepingly condemns business in America and investment in developing countries.

TWO CHEERS FOR THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY: A SPIRITED DEFENSE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH. BY WILFRED BECKERMAN. New York: St. Martin, 1975, 238 pp. \$7.95.

The strengths of this lively, valuable book lie in its vigorous application of economic analysis to the extremism of either/or reasoning and its common-sense emphasis on how much quality depends on quantity. Its weakness is the occasional indulgence in sweeping away issues with a "my scientists-your scientists" argument.

THE WORLD ECONOMIC CRISIS. EDITED BY WILLIAM P. BUNDY. New York: Norton (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1975, 252 pp. \$8.95.

Eleven articles from *Foreign Affairs* on oil, food, raw materials, money, and the economic and political problems to which they give rise. Among the authors are political leaders, economists, and officials, from producing and consuming countries.

ENERGY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: A REPORT TO THE ENERGY POLICY PROJECT OF THE FORD FOUNDATION. BY JOSEPH A. YAGER, ELEANOR B. STEINBERG AND OTHERS. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1974, 473 pp.

MULTINATIONAL OIL: A STUDY IN INDUSTRIAL DYNAMICS. BY NEIL H. JACOBY. New York: Macmillan, 1974, 323 pp. \$15.00 (Paper, \$3.95).

ERDÖL IN DER WELTWIRTSCHAFT UND WELTPOLITIK. BY ALFRED MICHAELIS. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1974, 239 pp. DM. 56.

AMERICA'S OIL FAMINE: HOW IT HAPPENED AND WHEN IT WILL END. BY RUTH SHELDON KNOWLES. New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1975, 254 pp. \$8.95.

The first study surveys the position of all major areas, neatly lays out U.S. choices and opts for a middle course: holding import dependence to about 20 to 25 percent. Jacoby's valuable analysis of the oil industry outside North America has become a historical study of a period he sees as marked by a high level of competition. Michaelis draws on a long academic and journalistic career for a global survey. Knowles, an oil journalist, has written a rather popular and quite optimistic account of the U.S. position.

DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME: EAST AND WEST. BY PETER WILES. Amsterdam: North-Holland/New York: American Elsevier, 1974, 136 pp. \$11.50.

INCOME DISTRIBUTION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE UNITED STATES, SWEDEN, WEST GERMANY, EAST GERMANY, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND JAPAN. BY MARTIN SCHNITZER. New York: Praeger, 1974, 234 pp. \$16.50.

Wiles' acrobatics involve detective work on Soviet figures, enlightening methodological explosions, and stimulating hypothetical investigations. Schnitzer uses fairly standard methods to produce useful results.

SOZIALE ASPEKTE DER AUSLÄNDERBESCHÄFTIGUNG. BY URSULA MEHR-LÄNDER. Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft (for the Research Institute of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung), 1974, 260 pp. DM. 30.

Not active discontent, but a sense of standing apart and almost dull dissatisfaction emerges from this interesting survey of the conditions and attitudes of foreign workers in Germany.

REDISTRIBUTION WITH GROWTH. BY HOLLIS CHENERY AND OTHERS. New York: Oxford University Press (for the World Bank and the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex), 1974, 304 pp. \$16.00 (Paper, \$4.50).

Essays that help one understand what the World Bank's new emphasis on linking the reduction of poverty with development may mean.

ACCUMULATION ON A WORLD SCALE: A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT. BY SAMIR AMIN. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974, 2 v. \$24.50 the set.

An Egyptian economist with French training and a good bit of African experience here sets forth a theory about "unequal exchange," underdevelopment and capitalism, relations between the center and the periphery and between markets and nationally con-

trolled economies. He says some interesting things, but gets heavily involved in disputes with other radical, Marxist, and quasi-Marxist writers.

CHINA, THE U.S.S.R. AND EASTERN EUROPE: A U.S. TRADE PERSPECTIVE. EDITED BY JOHN K. RYANS, JR., ANANT R. NEGANDHI, AND JAMES C. BAKER. Kent (Ohio): Kent State University Press, 1974, 196 pp. \$7.95.

Mainly descriptive, with two interesting pieces by businessmen: an Indian on trade with Russia, and an American on dealing with Romania.

ECONOMIC POLICIES COMPARED: WEST AND EAST. VOLUME 1: GENERAL THEORY. EDITED BY E. S. KIRSCHEN. Amsterdam: North-Holland/New York: American Elsevier, 1974, 355 pp. \$31.25 (Paper, \$18.75).

A massive effort by able men has produced a system that makes it possible to compare communist and capitalist economies but which does not guarantee that the results will be very enlightening.

AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER. BY EARL W. KINTER AND MARK R. JOELSON. New York: Macmillan, 1975, 391 pp. \$12.95.

No substitute for a lawyer, but a handy guide to principles, cases, and questions, mostly regarding the United States.

DIE BEDEUTUNG DER KOMPENSATORISCHEN FINANZIERUNG FÜR DIE ENTWICKLUNGSLÄNDER. BY M. RASUL SCHAMS. Hamburg: Verlag Weltarchiv, 1974, 265 pp. DM. 34.

A quite negative verdict on the contribution to development made by the International Monetary Fund's method of making up for a decline in export earnings.

LA NÉGOCIATION CEE-SUISSE DANS LE KENNEDY ROUND. EDITED BY NORBERT KOHLHASE AND HENRI SCHWAMM. Lausanne: Centre de Recherches Européennes, 1974, 220 pp. Sw. Fr. 56.

In describing and analyzing the complex negotiations between the European Community and Switzerland, the group of authors (with official support) have made a good contribution to the history of the Kennedy Round.

The United States

Gaddis Smith

BREACH OF FAITH: THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON. BY THEODORE H. WHITE. New York: Atheneum/Reader's Digest Press, 1975, 373 pp. \$10.95.

The author combines original material from interviews, close study of the written record, and a sense of history in his selection of the essential elements of the Watergate tragedy. White argues that "the true crime of Richard Nixon was simple: he destroyed the myth that binds America together . . . that somewhere in American life there is at least one man who stands for law, the President." The unrivaled chronicler of presidential victory since 1960 could hardly avoid writing this book.

U.S. v. RICHARD M. NIXON: THE FINAL CRISIS. BY FRANK MANKIEWICZ. New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Company, 1975, 276 pp. \$8.95.

Mr. Mankiewicz's thesis is that President Nixon was brought down not by low politics but by the proper functioning of the American legal process. A sequel to the author's *Perfectly Clear: Nixon from Whittier to Watergate* (1973).

BEFORE THE FALL: AN INSIDE VIEW OF THE PRE-WATERGATE WHITE HOUSE. BY WILLIAM SAFIRE. Garden City: Doubleday, 1975, 704 pp. \$12.50.

The author, who served Richard Nixon as political adviser and speechwriter, mingles

clinging admiration, self-conscious candor, and wisecracks. A good picture of domestic political tactics, less revealing for fundamental policies.

RESIGNATION IN PROTEST: POLITICAL AND ETHICAL CHOICES BETWEEN LOYALTY TO TEAM AND LOYALTY TO CONSCIENCE IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE. BY EDWARD WEISBAND AND THOMAS M. FRANCK. New York: Grossman, 1975, 236 pp. \$10.00.

A thorough study of how American government officials resign when they disagree with policy. The authors argue persuasively that the American habit of resignation in silence (in contrast to the British tradition of boldly speaking out) is a weakness.

CONVERSATIONS WITH KENNEDY. BY BENJAMIN C. BRADLEE. New York: Norton, 1975, 251 pp. \$7.95.

President Kennedy used private conversations with the author, then Washington bureau chief for *Newsweek* and a close friend, as a way of letting off steam. The President's comments on people and issues are salty and irreverent.

THE PAPERS OF ADLAI E. STEVENSON. VOLUME V: VISIT TO ASIA, THE MIDDLE EAST AND EUROPE, MARCH–AUGUST 1953. EDITED BY WALTER JOHNSON AND OTHERS. Boston: Little, Brown, 1975, 512 pp. \$17.50.

One is awed by Stevenson's energy and driving curiosity, but laments with him that the frantic pace of his trip left him little time to make more than superficial observations. Much of this volume consists of speeches, reprinted articles, transcripts of public interviews.

THE DIARIES OF EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR., 1943–1946. EDITED BY THOMAS M. CAMPBELL AND GEORGE C. HERRING. New York: New Viewpoints, 1975, 544 pp. \$12.50 (Paper, \$6.95).

Stettinius as Secretary of State was amiable and routinely competent. His diaries contain no surprises, but are a welcome addition to knowledge of the war years, and especially the Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta, Mexico City, and San Francisco conferences.

WHITE HOUSE WITNESS, 1942–1945. BY JONATHAN DANIELS. Garden City: Doubleday, 1975, 299 pp. \$8.95.

A sprightly, gossipy diary about wartime politics in Washington. The author served President Roosevelt in a variety of capacities, including Press Secretary.

ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL: THEIR SECRET WARTIME CORRESPONDENCE. EDITED BY FRANCIS L. LOEWENHEIM, HAROLD D. LANGLEY, AND MANFRED JONAS. New York: Saturday Review Press/Dutton, 1975, 805 pp. \$17.50.

An intelligently arranged, helpfully edited selection of 548 of the more than 1,700 messages exchanged between Churchill and Roosevelt. Many have not been published previously, or have appeared only in excerpted form. A book to be read as well as to be used for reference.

THE AMERICAN NON-POLICY TOWARDS EASTERN EUROPE, 1943–1947. BY GEIR LUNDESTAD. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget/Atlantic Highlands (N.J.): Humanities Press, 1975, 653 pp.

A highly competent, if ponderous, analysis by a young Norwegian historian of the confused behavior of the American government, together with a critique of historians who offer simplistic explanations. Norwegian scholars are publishing some excellent work on American history.

THE SPECTER: ORIGINAL ESSAYS ON THE COLD WAR AND THE ORIGINS OF McCARTHYISM. EDITED BY ROBERT GRIFFITH AND ATHAN THEOHARIS. New York: New Viewpoints, 1974, 368 pp. \$10.00 (Paper, \$4.95).

These stimulating essays by young historians examine the role of a variety of American groups and institutions in nourishing McCarthyism.

THE RISE AND FALL OF PAX AMERICANA: UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. BY C. J. BARTLETT. London: Elek Books, 1974, 204 pp. £6.95.

An admirably condensed general history based on a thorough knowledge of standard secondary sources. For the general reader, not the specialist.

KISSINGER ON THE COUCH. BY PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY AND CHESTER WARD. New Rochelle (N.Y.): Arlington House, 1975, 846 pp. \$12.95.

A silly, interminable tirade. The authors argue that Secretary of State Kissinger is the agent of a conspiracy, centering in the Council on Foreign Relations, to surrender the United States "to national oblivion."

MORE POWER THAN WE KNOW: THE PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT TOWARD DEMOCRACY. BY DAVE DELLINGER. Garden City: Doubleday, 1975, 326 pp. \$10.00.

Part autobiography, part lament over failure, part an appeal for spiritual courage and imagination by a veteran leader of the American Left.

OCEAN SPACE RIGHTS: DEVELOPING U.S. POLICY. BY LAWRENCE JUDA. New York: Praeger, 1975, 300 pp. \$20.00.

The starting point of this useful analytical narrative of expanding American claims of jurisdiction over the continental shelf is the Truman proclamation of 1945. Documentary appendices.

The Western Hemisphere

Robert D. Crassweller

CANADA'S WAR: THE POLITICS OF THE MACKENZIE KING GOVERNMENT, 1939-1945. BY J. L. GRANATSTEIN. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975, 436 pp. \$18.95.

In both World Wars Canada fought simultaneously for Allied victory and for new levels of national independence from Great Britain and the United States. This richly documented study examines the behavior of Mackenzie King and his colleagues.

THE POLITICS OF HOSTILITY: CASTRO'S REVOLUTION AND UNITED STATES POLICY. BY LYNN DARRELL BENDER. Hato Rey, Puerto Rico: Inter American University Press, 1975, 156 pp. \$7.95 (Paper, \$2.95).

Revision of U.S. policy toward Cuba, in the direction of reconciliation or accommodation, is argued in an emotionally and intellectually balanced manner by an observer whose conceptual model of U.S.-Cuban relationships is based on mutual hostility arising from an intense, self-perpetuating reactive process.

INSIDE CUBA. BY JOE NICHOLSON, JR. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1974, 235 pp. \$8.95.

A *New York Post* reporter provides an informal, man-in-the-street account of contemporary Cuba from a pro-revolutionary point of view. Emphasizing the achievement of economic equality, he concedes that basic civil liberties are lacking, but regards them as "secondary."

THE ALIENATED "LOYAL" OPPOSITION: MEXICO'S *PARTIDO ACCIÓN NACIONAL*. BY FRANZ A. VON SAUER. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1974, 197 pp. \$12.00.

A reasonable and judicious account of the origins, political history, beliefs, and prospects of the largest of the parties functioning in the minor zone of the political spec-

trum unoccupied by the official PRI. A surprising development: the urban-based, more conservatively oriented PAN, now in its 36th year, won more than 38 percent of the Federal District vote in the 1974 elections for deputies.

PSYCHOLOGY OF THE MEXICAN: CULTURE AND PERSONALITY. By R. DÍAZ-GUERRERO. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1975, 171 pp. \$10.95.

This is a work with many insights, devoted to the effects of culture upon personality. The author, a Mexican professor of psychology, addresses such topics as neurosis and family structure, interpersonal relations, respect and status, the passive-active dichotomy, and mental and social health.

BRAZILIAN SOCIETY. By T. LYNN SMITH. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1975, 273 pp. \$12.00.

A clear summary of sociological conditions and tendencies, encompassing population, religious structures, urbanization, and other aspects. Just the right balance of brevity and completeness for the general reader.

MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE POLITICS OF DEPENDENCE: COPPER IN CHILE. By THEODORE H. MORAN. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974, 286 pp. \$12.50.

Chilean copper policy from World War II to the fall of Allende is analyzed in terms of the interactions between the multinational copper companies and domestic interest groups, and the *dependencia* created by a massive foreign presence. The treatment is competent and judicious.

EXPROPRIATION OF U.S. INVESTMENTS IN CUBA, MEXICO, AND CHILE. By ERIC N. BAKLANOFF. New York: Praeger, 1975, 170 pp. \$15.00.

A brief but useful account of the philosophies and events relating to an important area of political and economic conflict. The author, a wise observer, advocates "an official investment policy of prudential disengagement."

CAMILO TORRES: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE PRIEST-GUERRILLERO. By WALTER J. BRODERICK. Garden City: Doubleday, 1975, 370 pp. \$10.00.

An ex-priest, sharing the radical, revolutionary social concern of the fallen Colombian *Guerrillero*, has written a sympathetic memorial to Torres.

Western Europe

Fritz Stern

KNAVES, FOOLS AND HEROES: IN EUROPE BETWEEN THE WARS. By SIR JOHN WHEELER-BENNETT. New York: St. Martin, 1975, 200 pp. \$10.00.

The well-known historian—who collected acquaintances among the world's great as others collect archives—reminisces in literate and fascinating fashion about his life in pre-Hitler Germany (amidst his own horses and distinguished friends), about his intimate relations with both Masaryks and other Czech leaders, about Trotsky, et al. Elegant and entertaining.

THE ROUND TABLE MOVEMENT AND IMPERIAL UNION. By JOHN E. KENDLE. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975, 332 pp. \$17.50.

Lord Milner's "kindergarten," as the group of bright, liberal imperialists were called, gradually evolved into the Round Table movement of imperial reform, dedicated to the idea of strengthening British supremacy. A carefully documented and broadly conceived study of an important movement in the thought and politics of late Victorian England.

THE DIARIES OF SIR ROBERT BRUCE LOCKHART. VOLUME ONE: 1915-1938. EDITED BY KENNETH YOUNG. New York: St. Martin, 1975, 436 pp. \$15.00.

Quite candid notes of a British diplomat who happened to be on the scene of the Bolshevik Revolution and was reappointed to government service during the Second World War. Between the wars, he drifted through upper-class British society, much concerned with gossip, politics, and Jews. His casual comment: "What an amazing thing privilege and position still are in England!" sums up much of the book, valuable precisely because of its superciliousness.

EDWARD VIII. BY FRANCES DONALDSON. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975, 477 pp. \$15.00.

Stripped of legend and remembered elegance, Edward emerges in this carefully constructed biography as an unpleasant and irresponsible man, a failure in most public endeavors; in his heedless pro-German sentiments in the 1930s and in other respects he was "obtusely, obdurately opinionated." A serious and readable portrait of a flawed character.

NORTHERN IRELAND IN CRISIS: REPORTING THE ULSTER TROUBLES. BY SIMON WINCHESTER. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1975, 256 pp. \$10.00.

A distinguished journalistic account of 30 months spent in Northern Ireland—at the beginning of the present trouble—by a reporter for *The Guardian*. A good account of the crisis, and of a journalist's ingenious way of ferreting out information.

MÉMOIRES D'AVENIR. BY MICHEL JOBERT. Paris: Grasset, 1974, 310 pp. Fr. 28.

Selective memoirs of Pompidou's longtime assistant and last Foreign Minister, who contributed his share of irony and pique to the substantive disagreements between France and the United States in 1973 and early 1974. There are vignettes from his career and the impression of continued great ambition, but few revelations about his past experience or thought.

LA FRANCE DÉSARMÉE. BY PAUL STEHLIN. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1974, 203 pp. Fr. 25.

General Stehlin, until 1963 chief of staff of the French air force and a deputy thereafter, opposed French pressure on their allies to buy French rather than American planes. Convinced of American technological superiority, he favored European-American collaboration, not rivalry, and his views, made public last November, caused a great storm—of which this is Stehlin's own impassioned and autobiographical account.

LES CENT PREMIERS JOURS DE GISCARD. BY ALFRED FABRE-LUCE. Paris: Laffont, 1974, 275 pp. Fr. 29.

A well-known writer and partisan of Giscard presents a rather light-hearted, anecdotal view of his hero's successful beginnings.

ADENAUER-STUDIEN III. UNTERSUCHUNGEN UND DOKUMENTE ZUR OSTPOLITIK UND BIOGRAPHIE. EDITED BY RUDOLF MORSEY AND KONRAD REPPENHAGEN. Mainz: Matthias-Grünwald, 1974, 271 pp. DM. 34.

A collection of important essays on Adenauer's foreign—especially Eastern—policy. Of greatest value are the diary notes from Adenauer's colleague, Heinrich Krone, which chronicle the Chancellor's policies and intentions from 1954 to 1969. A major source.

DIE EINSTELLUNG DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND ZUM STAATE ISRAEL: EINE ZUSAMMENFASSUNG DER ENTWICKLUNG SEIT 1949. BY JEKUTIEL DELIGDISCH. Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1974, 196 pp.

A timely and useful account of the relations of the Federal Republic to Israel, beginning with Adenauer's decision on moral and political grounds to grant restitution

to the Jewish state. Based on published material and interviews, it also examines the place of Bonn's policy toward Israel in the context of domestic politics and attitudes.

DIE WEIZSÄCKER-PAPIERE, 1933-1950. EDITED BY LEONIDAS E. HILL. Berlin: Propyläen Verlag, 1974, 683 pp. DM. 48.

A Canadian historian selects letters and diary notes from the life of a German diplomat who became Ribbentrop's State Secretary in the Foreign Office from 1938-43. Opposed to war, he served his masters in the hope that he could be a brake, not a motor. He was found guilty at Nuremberg. This book reveals a man full of prejudices, deceptions, dilemmas, and resentments—a study in the psychology of what might be called "the conscientious collaborator."

THE MYTHICAL WORLD OF NAZI WAR PROPAGANDA, 1939-1945. BY JAY W. BAIRD. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975, 329 pp. \$15.00.

Close examination of the organization, content, and style of Nazi propaganda for domestic purposes between victory and defeat. A valuable study, based on extensive archival research.

THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE MASSES: POLITICAL SYMBOLISM AND MASS MOVEMENTS IN GERMANY FROM THE NAPOLEONIC WARS THROUGH THE THIRD REICH. BY GEORGE L. MOSSE. New York: Howard Fertig, 1975, 252 pp. \$14.00.

A suggestive account of how monuments, festivals, and rituals transformed individual Germans into ardent nationalists and Nazis. A necessary reminder that the pageantry of politics is a complex and still topical subject.

LE DANEMARK A L'HEURE DU MARCHÉ COMMUN: BLOC-NOTES, 1971-1972. BY JENS OTTO KRAG. Paris: Plon, 1974, 233 pp. Fr. 26.75.

The diary of Denmark's former Social-Democratic Premier—who took his country into the EEC—affords a pleasant, cultivated glimpse into European and Danish politics. Frank, informal, and perceptive.

L'ESPAGNE DE FRANCO. BY GUY HERMET. Paris: Colin, 1974, 302 pp. Fr. 17.

A brief, informative introduction, written with constant thought to the problems of a post-Franco Spain.

DEATH OF A UTOPIA: THE DEVELOPMENT AND DECLINE OF STUDENT MOVEMENTS IN EUROPE. BY GIANNI STATERA. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975, 294 pp. \$10.95.

An Italian sociologist presents a short history and analysis of the European student movement and of the decline of its utopian impulse which sapped its mass appeal. An excellent introduction to the problems of that evanescent revolt and to the sociological and Marxist literature that is related to it.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

John C. Campbell

THE MENSHEVIKS: FROM THE REVOLUTION OF 1917 TO THE SECOND WORLD WAR. EDITED BY LEOPOLD H. HAIMSON. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975, 476 pp. \$22.50.

A work of unique historical significance, in which a number of former leaders of the Menshevik movement (Leo Lande, David Dallin, Simon Wolin, George Denicke, Boris Sapir) give their own accounts of and reflections on the revolution, the losing struggle for power, and the years of exile. This is but one volume in the major project on the history of the Menshevik movement directed by Leopold Haimson.

RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, 1898-1964. GENERAL EDITOR, ROBERT H. MCNEAL. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974, 4 v. \$75.00 the set.

A documentary collection worthy of special notice because it makes available in English such a wealth of material on Russian and Soviet history. The four volumes are: 1, *The Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, 1898-October 1917*, edited by Ralph Carter Elwood (306 pp.); 2, *The Early Soviet Period: 1917-1929*, edited by Richard Gregor (382 pp.); 3, *The Stalin Years: 1929-1953*, edited by Robert H. McNeal (280 pp.); and 4, *The Khrushchev Years, 1953-1964*, edited by Grey Hodnett (328 pp.). It should be noted that these are Party and not state documents, and that they deal with internal rather than international affairs.

SIBERIA TODAY AND TOMORROW: A STUDY OF ECONOMIC RESOURCES, PROBLEMS AND ACHIEVEMENTS. BY VIOLET CONOLLY. London: Collins, 1975, 248 pp. £4.95.

A book for the general reader which nevertheless bears on every page the imprint of the author's thorough knowledge both of the Soviet statistical source material and of the people and special conditions of Siberia. Essential background for consideration of the grandiose proposals for future development of Siberian resources with Western and Japanese capital and technology.

SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY (THIRD EDITION). BY V. D. SOKOLOVSKIY. EDITED BY HARRIET FAST SCOTT. New York: Crane, Russak (for the Stanford Research Institute), 1975, 494 pp. \$17.50.

English translation of the third and latest (1968) revision of the fundamental collective work on Soviet strategic thought first published in 1962. The editor's notes point out significant differences from earlier editions, which are fewer than one might expect.

SOVIET NAVAL POLICY: OBJECTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS. EDITED BY MICHAEL MCCGWIRE, KEN BOOTH, AND JOHN McDONNELL. New York: Praeger, 1975, 663 pp. \$32.50.

Michael McGwire, one of the best Western experts on the Soviet navy, contributes the most enlightening chapters to this volume, but there are others of considerable interest on special aspects of naval policy and its place in Soviet grand strategy. An earlier volume, *Soviet Naval Developments*, also edited by McGwire, was published by Praeger in 1973.

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1970. BY ROBERT O. FREEDMAN. New York: Praeger, 1975, 198 pp. \$16.50 (Paper, \$5.95).

A well-informed, step-by-step account of the ups and downs (mostly downs) of Soviet influence in the Middle East, with extensive excerpts from the Soviet press. The author nimbly threads his way through some very complex situations, showing an easy confidence in drawing conclusions that one has to admire even while waiting for more evidence.

SOVIET PENETRATION OF LATIN AMERICA. BY LEON GOURÉ AND MORRIS ROTHENBERG. Washington: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1975, 204 pp.

A catalogue of Soviet moves—diplomatic, economic, propaganda—plus a keen analysis of the strategy aimed at increasing Moscow's influence as Latin America becomes increasingly independent of the United States.

EASTERN EUROPE: A GEOGRAPHY OF THE COMECON COUNTRIES. BY ROY E. H. MELLOR. New York: Columbia University Press, 1975, 358 pp. \$17.50 (Paper, \$9.00).

Primarily a text for geographers, but notable for its historical perspective and especially useful in its sketches of the "national economic geographies" of individual states, not including the U.S.S.R.

WAR AND REVOLUTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, 1941-1945: THE CHETNIKS. By JOZO TOMASEVICH. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975, 508 pp. \$20.00.

THE CHETNIK MOVEMENT AND THE YUGOSLAV RESISTANCE. By MATTEO J. MILAZZO. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975, 208 pp. \$12.00.

By chance, after 30 years with no objective history of Mihailovich and the Chetniks, we now have two. Tomasevich's study, which he will follow with two additional volumes on the wartime collaborationist movements and on the Partisans, is the broader and more impressive work, but Milazzo deserves high marks, too, for indefatigable research and balanced interpretation. Both have consulted German and Italian as well as Yugoslav records, and one must conclude that there is little more left to say.

DIE SOZIALISTISCHE MARKTWIRTSCHAFT JUGOSLAWIENS. By MICHAEL HAGEMANN AND ALENKA KLEMENČIČ. Stuttgart: Fischer, 1974, 303 pp. DM. 78.

A many-sided and detailed picture of the Yugoslav economy. Klemenčič describes in general how the system grew and how it works. Hagemann deals with the problem of allocation of resources.

BEYOND MARX AND TITO: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN YUGOSLAV SOCIALISM. By SHARON ZUKIN. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975, 302 pp. \$15.50.

A novel attempt to depict ideology and practice in the evolution of the Yugoslav policy and society, using observation and interviews to test and measure, *inter alia*, the reality of socialist self-management.

POLITICS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. By OTTO ULČ. San Francisco: Freeman, 1974, 181 pp. \$9.00.

A curious book—part political-science text, part history, part cartoon collection, but nonetheless revealing of the real nature of Czechoslovak politics from 1948 to 1968.

BORN 1900: MEMOIRS. By JULIUS HAY. La Salle (Ill.): Library Press, 1975, 383 pp. \$11.95.

A noted Hungarian dramatist, who suffered imprisonment and then exile after being in the forefront of the events of 1956, tells us a great deal about twentieth-century Central Europe and communist politics in this informal autobiography. (First published in German in 1971.)

SEARCH FOR SECURITY: A STUDY IN BALTIC DIPLOMACY, 1920-1934. By HUGH I. RODGERS. Hamden (Conn.): Archon Books, 1975, 181 pp. \$12.00.

The foreign policy of Latvia (or, more accurately, the place of Latvia and the other small Baltic republics in European power politics) receives thorough treatment in this model monograph, compressing quantities of new material into a lean narrative.

The Middle East and North Africa

John C. Campbell

TURKEY, THE STRAITS AND U.S. POLICY. By HARRY N. HOWARD. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press (in cooperation with the Middle East Institute), 1975, 337 pp. \$14.50.

The leading American authority presents the first full diplomatic history of the ques-

tion of the Straits. He describes the period through the crisis of 1946, on which the documents are now available, with his customary careful scholarship. On the later years, he writes more generally but with first-hand knowledge and sure judgment.

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF IRAN: A DEVELOPING STATE IN A ZONE OF GREAT-POWER CONFLICT. BY SHAHRAM CHUBIN AND SEPEHR ZABIH. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975, 362 pp. \$17.50.

A first-rate, comprehensive treatment of Iran's international position since World War II, stressing relations with, first, the superpowers and, second, the states in its own region. The advantages and disadvantages of a one-man foreign policy are frankly assessed.

THE MODERNIZATION OF POVERTY: A STUDY IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH IN NINE ARAB COUNTRIES, 1945-1970. BY GALAL A. AMIN. Leiden: Brill, 1974, 124 pp. Gldrs. 52.

An Egyptian economist's critical study of widespread shortcomings in postwar Arab economic planning and performance: lack of a common market, huge defense expenditures, low rates of saving, income inequality, too rapid urban growth, neglect of agriculture.

DIE SCHEICHE KOMMEN: ARABIEN—ZENTRUM NEUER MACHT. BY JENS FRIEDEMANN. Bergisch Gladbach: Lübbe, 1974, 263 pp. DM. 28.

A popular account of the Arab rulers under the impact of their new wealth and power, by a journalist-economist well acquainted with the Arab world.

REVOLUTIONARY TRANSFORMATION IN THE ARAB WORLD: HABASH AND HIS COMRADES FROM NATIONALISM TO MARXISM. BY WALID W. KAZZIHA. London: Charles Knight, 1975, 118 pp. £2.00.

This brief history, by a former activist in the Arab Nationalists' Movement led by George Habash, describes the group's origins, activities, ideological conflicts, ultimate fragmentation, and lasting influence on Palestinian nationalism.

FOURTH SHORE: THE ITALIAN COLONIZATION OF LIBYA. BY CLAUDIO G. SEGRÈ. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975, 237 pp. \$15.00.

A scholarly treatment of 30 years of Italian rule in Libya. Despite its achievements in agricultural development, the vaunted policy of "colonization" hindered Italy in solving her own economic and social problems at home and brought more problems than benefits to the Libyans.

LIBYA: THE ELUSIVE REVOLUTION. BY RUTH FIRST. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1974, 294 pp. \$2.95 (Paper).

The revolution remains elusive after finishing this book, which nonetheless is a comprehensive and objective study of the strengths and weaknesses, as well as the contradictions, in the Qaddafi regime's domestic and foreign policies.

THE MODERN HISTORY OF ISRAEL. BY NOAH LUCAS. New York: Praeger, 1975, 500 pp. \$20.00.

An excellent overview of 100 years of Zionism and the state of Israel. Although aimed at the general reader, it is no bland recital of achievements, and the specialist will find many new insights together with a refreshing frankness. Events since the 1967 war are treated only briefly.

DECISIONS IN ISRAEL'S FOREIGN POLICY. BY MICHAEL BRECHER. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975, 639 pp. \$25.00.

A companion volume to the author's *The Foreign Policy System of Israel* (1972), this empirical analysis of decision-making on a number of critical issues (including the Sinai campaign, the Six-Day War, and the Rogers proposals of 1970) provides rich fare to those both avid for facts and with a taste for pattern and theory.

ISRAËL: LA MORT EN FACE. BY JACQUES DEROGY AND JEAN-NOËL GURGAND. Paris: Laffont, 1975, 383 pp.

Israel's experience in the Yom Kippur War and the year that followed, interpreted with verve and a rare sensitivity by two French journalists.

THE STRUGGLE FOR CYPRUS. BY CHARLES FOLEY AND W. I. SCOBIE. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1975, 193 pp. \$7.95.

Two journalists, who previously collaborated in editing the English translation of General Grivas's memoirs, give a lively and in part first-hand narrative of the campaign of guerrilla warfare which Grivas led in 1955-1960, plus a few notes on later events.

South and Southeast Asia

Lewis C. Austin

THE LAST DAYS OF UNITED PAKISTAN. BY G. W. CHOUDHURY. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975, 239 pp. \$10.00.

A vivid, informative, and authoritative account of the events leading up to the division of Pakistan and the birth of Bangladesh, told by one of the participants, a diplomat, statesman and political scientist. Choudhury blames the tragedy of the civil war on ineffective leadership from Yahya Khan and shortsighted self-interest on the part of Bhutto and Mujib. Diplomatically, he argues, it was a triumph for the Soviet Union and India and a dramatic setback to the U.S.-China policy.

CHINA AND PAKISTAN: DIPLOMACY OF AN ENTENTE CORDIALE. BY ANWAR HUSSAIN SYED. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1974, 259 pp. \$12.50 (Paper, \$5.00).

A lucid, persuasive analysis from a Pakistani-American scholar of the rationale behind the Sino-Pakistan entente, which is also an exemplary dramatization of the plight of the small state in a world of super- and would-be-superpowers.

CULTURES IN CONFLICT: THE FOUR FACES OF INDIAN BUREAUCRACY. BY STANLEY J. HEGINBOTHAM. New York: Columbia University Press, 1975, 236 pp. \$12.50.

The author finds that the conflicts among four models of organization—"dharmic," Gandhian, British colonial, and "community development"—as well as between traditional and modern concepts of duty, can be important determinants of success and failure in bureaucracy. The setting is the agricultural development program in Tamil Nadu in the 1960s.

KONFRONTASI: THE INDONESIA-MALAYSIA DISPUTE, 1963-1966. BY J. A. C. MACKIE. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Australian Institute of International Affairs), 1974, 368 pp. \$26.00.

Indonesia's attack on the concept of a larger Malaysia (the "confrontation" of the title) lasted from 1963 until Sukarno's fall. This sophisticated history of that diplomatic-military episode elucidates many puzzling questions. Was confrontation motivated by nationalist, ideological, or domestic political motives? Why did Malaysia and Indonesia have so little understanding of each other? Mackie's model case study offers both particular and universal insights about foreign policy.

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES FOR INDONESIA. BY JUERGEN B. DONGES, BERND STECHER, AND FRANK WOLTER. Tübingen: Mohr (for the Institut für Weltwirtschaft an der Universität Kiel), 1974, 178 pp. DM. 45.

The fruit of a study commissioned by the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation, this report outlines a plan for the rapid development of an export-oriented manufacturing industry. Taxes, tariffs, credit structures, licensing requirements—all the tools needed for a government to put together an economic policy are in this kit, with detailed but easily comprehensible instructions for use.

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE NEW STATES. BY MICHAEL LEIFER. New York: Longman, 1975, 114 pp. \$8.50 (Paper, \$3.50).

This particular analysis of the ten Southeast Asian states since independence finds them to be weak, fragmented, internally unstable and subject to external manipulation. Any hope for stability or cooperation, the author argues, will depend on the tolerance of the great powers and the subordination of national to regional interest by the larger local states. Prospects, he reckons, are slim.

THREE AND A HALF POWERS: THE NEW BALANCE IN ASIA. BY HAROLD C. HINTON. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975, 306 pp. \$15.00 (Paper, \$3.95).

Covering 30 years of time and 30 million square miles of territory in 300 pages is a feat which can be accomplished only at the cost of leaving much unsaid. In this work, detailed analysis has been sacrificed for breadth of coverage, and its usefulness is thereby diminished.

East Asia and the Pacific

Lewis C. Austin

THE PATTERN OF SINO-AMERICAN CRISES: POLITICAL-MILITARY INTERACTIONS IN THE 1950s. BY J. H. KALICKI. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975, 279 pp. \$17.95.

A subtle analyst traces the pattern of Sino-American relations from Korea to the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1958. He finds, first, that crisis does not dull perceptions but sharpens them: Chinese and American policymakers deal with each other better under pressure; second, that nations can learn from crisis: what was a dialogue of the deaf in 1950 becomes almost accurate communication by the end of that decade.

PRELUDE TO REVOLUTION: MAO, THE PARTY, AND THE PEASANT QUESTION, 1962–66. BY RICHARD BAUM. New York: Columbia University Press, 1975, 222 pp. \$10.00.

Mao's struggle with the ubiquitous tendency toward conservatism and corruption among officialdom was desperate but, in the long run, possibly unavailing, the author suggests, because the human tendency to self-interest is endemic. This study clarifies the tactics of that struggle, from the first conflict with Liu to the last-ditch appeal outside the Party which became the Cultural Revolution.

LIU SHAO-CH'I AND THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION: THE POLITICS OF MASS CRITICISM. BY LOWELL DITTMER. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974, 386 pp. \$12.95.

A complex and sympathetic portrait of a man cast by temperament, style, and role into the position of national guilt symbol during the Cultural Revolution. This immensely sophisticated study achieves wonders of persuasive analysis, given the minimum of data available to China scholars.

LA VOIE CHINOISE : LA LONGUE MARCHÉ DE L'ÉCONOMIE, 1949-1974. By GILBERT ÉTIENNE. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1974, 357 pp. Fr. 59.

The author, professor of development economics at the University of Geneva, distills from four visits to China and a massive accumulation of secondary bibliographic material an eminently lucid and comprehensive picture of the development of the Chinese economy over the last quarter century. Its successes relative to the rest of Asia he attributes in part to the high quality of administration—legacy both of Confucius and of Mao.

A POLITICAL HISTORY OF JAPANESE CAPITALISM. By JON HALLIDAY. New York: Pantheon, 1975, 466 pp. \$15.95.

An energetic and eloquent history of modern Japan from a left-radical standpoint which manages to synthesize that history into a coherent pattern with a consistent set of villains, but at the cost of oversimplifying or ignoring important issues—e.g., the advantages of the American connection, changes in the pattern of income distribution over time, and the reasons for the political inadequacy of the Left.

ORIGINS OF THE MODERN JAPANESE STATE: SELECTED WRITINGS OF E. H. NORMAN. EDITED BY JOHN W. DOWER. New York: Pantheon, 1975, 497 pp. \$15.95 (Paper, \$5.95).

Seminal writings about modern Japanese history are here collected by a young Wisconsin historian. Dower's brilliant introduction does full justice to the complex Canadian scholar-diplomat whose life was so tragically cut short in the anti-communist furor of the 1950s.

JAPANESE SOCIETY TODAY. By TADASHI FUKUTAKE. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1974, 162 pp. (Portland, Ore.: International Scholarly Book Services, distributor, \$9.50).

One of the grand old men of Japanese scholarship presents a brief analysis of the problems confronting Japanese society as a consequence of the great postwar GNP race, and offers some thoughts on other goals and models for development.

IEMOTO: THE HEART OF JAPAN. By FRANCIS L. K. HSU. Cambridge: Schenkman, 1975, 260 pp. (New York: Halsted Press, distributor, \$11.25; paper, \$5.95).

A distinguished cultural anthropologist speculates about the familial basis of Japanese society and finds the master-disciple type of grouping to be a ubiquitous and significant formation.

JAPANESE FOREIGN TRADE. By THOMAS R. KERSHNER. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1975, 204 pp. \$16.00.

It is almost a cliché that the Japanese economic role in Pacific Asia may be viewed as a continuation by peaceful means of the ideal of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperty Sphere. The author argues persuasively that the Japanese surplus of capital and the Asian surplus of materials all but require such a relationship: if Japan did not exist, Asia would have to invent her.

THE STRAINED ALLIANCE: PEKING, P'YŎNGYANG, MOSCOW AND THE POLITICS OF THE KOREAN CIVIL WAR. By ROBERT R. SIMMONS. New York: Free Press, 1975, 287 pp. \$10.95.

An elegant interpretation of the motives and events surrounding the fighting on the Korean peninsula in 1950-51. Simmons' historical detective work is too complex and cohesive to summarize in brief, but his brilliant re-evaluation of the nature of the conflict and the great-power strategies involved illuminates a previously murky subject.

EAST ASIA AND THE MAJOR POWERS: FROM CONFRONTATION TO AC-

COMMODATION. EDITED BY JAE KYU PARK AND SUNGJOO HAN. Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyung Nam University Press, 1975, 178 pp. \$5.00 (Paper).

This high-quality symposium includes incisive papers by, *inter alia*, Ishwer Ojha, Donald Zagoria, Ilpyong Kim, James Morley, and John Herz. Prognosis: none of the four great powers in the Far East wants Korean unification, for fear that a united Korea might be dominated by a rival, but all want relaxation of tensions between the divided states of the peninsula; any conflict will arise because of local, rather than international disagreements.

THE KURIL ISLANDS: RUSSO-JAPANESE FRONTIER IN THE PACIFIC. BY JOHN J. STEPHAN. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975, 279 pp. \$20.00.

The fascinating and little-known story of one of the world's most remote yet diplomatically sensitive spots. The Kuriles, still a bone of contention between Japan and the Soviet Union, have a history worth knowing, and only a talented historian like Stephan, with access to both Japanese and Soviet sources, could write it.

Africa

Jennifer Seymour Whitaker

THE WEST AND THE REST OF US. BY CHINWEIZU. New York: Random House, 1975, 520 pp. \$15.00 (Paper, \$4.95).

An initial historical account of Western imperialism in Africa forms the background for the projection of a far-reaching indictment of contemporary neo-imperialism—particularly of that omnivorous economic predator, the U.S. Lucid and passionate, the Nigerian author is at his best when analyzing the effects of cultural dependence; at times, however, his often convincing advocacy of economic and political autonomy for Africa degenerates into a cry of pure frustration and negation.

POLITICAL CORRUPTION: THE GHANA CASE. BY VICTOR T. LE VINE. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1975, 169 pp. \$7.50.

The “dash” emphatically did not oil the wheels of progress in Ghana, according to this succinct study of attitudes about political graft and civic responsibility among those who were on the take during the Nkrumah years.

RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND BUREAUCRACY IN TANZANIA: THE CASE OF MWANZA REGION. BY JAMES R. FINUCANE. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1974/New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1975, 192 pp. \$12.50 (Paper).

Although the goal of Tanzanian rural development encompasses productivity and participation in tandem, the focus here is on the latter—namely, the largely unremitting recent efforts of the government to draw the peasants into the efforts of the bureaucracy to restructure the economic and social conditions of rural life.

AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN NIGERIA, 1962–1968. BY JEROME C. WELLS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975, 490 pp. \$18.00.

Productivity is the author's main criterion here and, after exhaustive investigation of rationales for, and efforts of, various agricultural development programs, he concludes that the less direct government intervention into the modes of production the better.

MANAGING RURAL DEVELOPMENT: IDEAS AND EXPERIENCES FROM EAST AFRICA. BY ROBERT CHAMBERS. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1974/New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1975, 215 pp. \$12.50 (Paper).

Moving swiftly beyond the now commonplace analysis of administrative constraints shared by most LDC bureaucracies, this study draws on numerous examples in pro-

pounding a "how-to" approach to improving the implementation of rural development programs.

POLITICS IN ZAMBIA. EDITED BY WILLIAM TORDOFF. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975, 439 pp. \$14.00.

Conceived as a sequel to David C. Mulford's *Zambia: The Politics of Independence, 1957-64* (1967), this skillfully integrated and intelligent group of essays covers party and governmental politics and administration from 1964 to 1972.

GUINEA-BISSAU: A STUDY OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION. BY LARS RUDEBECK. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1974/New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1975, 277 pp. \$15.00 (Paper).

The ideology originally propounded by the late Amílcar Cabral, and its application in the liberated areas of the country prior to 1974 are enthusiastically recounted and convincingly related to a larger Marxist analysis of the development process in the Third World.

RHODESIA: WHITE RACISM AND IMPERIAL RESPONSE. BY MARTIN LONEY. Baltimore: Penguin, 1975, 234 pp. \$2.95 (Paper).

A highly readable history which covers several centuries of white exploitation of Rhodesia's Africans, and culminates in a quasi-Marxist analysis of the British failure to force majority rule.

THE SOUTHERN SUDAN: FROM CONFLICT TO PEACE. BY MOHAMED OMER BESHIR. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1975, 188 pp. \$18.50.

Replete with facts and stripped of rhetoric, this account by a participant in his country's reconciliation covers the period from 1965-72, focusing on the administration rather than the politics of the process.

THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AFTER TEN YEARS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES. EDITED BY YASSIN EL-AYOUTY. New York: Praeger, 1975, 262 pp. \$18.50.

An intelligently assembled group of essays explores the legal precedents and the admittedly somewhat tenuous political accomplishments of this organization, in which "unity" is maintained vis-à-vis the outside world by a decidedly muted emphasis on cohesiveness within.

THE CREOLES OF SIERRA LEONE: RESPONSES TO COLONIALISM, 1870-1945. BY LEO SPITZER. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974, 260 pp. \$12.50.

A fascinating description of the mixture of Victorian England and Africa in the Creole life-style, and of the attempts of this elite group to come to terms with their African roots in face of the increasing racial discrimination of their British masters.

HONORARY WHITE. BY E. R. BRAITHWAITE. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975, 190 pp. \$7.95.

The account of a black VIP's visit to South Africa, and of his reactions—principally anger, fear, and repulsion—to the way blacks live there. By the author of *To Sir, With Love*.

SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

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INDIA: the energy sector, by P. D. Henderson. Washington, World Bank, 1975. 185 pp.

HUMANITARIAN problems in South Vietnam and Cambodia: two years after the cease-fire. Study mission report, Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected With Refugees and Escapees, Committee on the Judiciary, Senate. Washington, 1975. 178 pp.

ATOMIC POWER

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TRANSNATIONAL corporations: a select bibliography. N.Y., 1975. 23 pp. (75.I.5.) \$2.50.

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THE IMPACT of multinational corporations on development and on international relations. Technical papers: taxation. N.Y., 1974. 111 pp. (74.II.A.6.) \$7.00.

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Memorandum submitted by Algeria on the occasion of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly. 221 pp. Annex I bis: Basic products of agricultural origin; statistical data concerning production, consumption, exports, imports. 157 pp.

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WESTERN EUROPE

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